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In this dissertation, I examine how elite rhetoric about past inter-group violence affects citi-
zens’ post-conflict social and political attitudes. To do so, I conducted a survey experiment
in the post-conflict country of Bosnia. In the first substantive chapter, I find that when
individuals are reminded of the violence that was committed against their co-ethnics, they
adopt negative views of out-group members. However, in the subsequent chapter, I find little
evidence that this rhetoric induces individuals to ostracize co-ethnics who socially engage
with out-groups. Combined, these findings indicate that (1) rhetoric about past violence
makes reconciliation less likely by engendering negative attitudes toward out-groups, but (2)
individuals who are open to inter-group engagement can still be effective conduits for positive
inter-group contact. The next chapter considers how this kind of rhetoric impacts citizens’
views of ethnic and multi-ethnic parties. I find that it reduces support for ethnic parties but
not multi-ethnic ones. This suggests that recalling past violence generates negative attitudes
toward the political actors who are the most clearly responsible for the original breakdown
in peace: ethnic parties. Finally, in the last substantive chapter, I show that rhetoric about
past violence does not significantly affect policy preferences. This provides reason for opti-
mism in post-conflict societies, where elites may have little incentive to keep war memories




In societies that have experienced severe inter-group violence, political elites often employ
rhetoric that references that violence and reminds citizens of past conflict. They can do
so for years, decades, or even centuries after the actual violence has ended (Bieber 2002;
Gershkoff and Kushner 2005; Medhurst and Brands 2000). Historians have debated to
what ends that kind of rhetoric is used, and many argue that it can have a number of
important political consequences. These include mobilizing public opinion behind the regime
and against its adversaries (Edele 2017; Wood 2011), fostering political nationalism (Coble
2007, 2011; Gries 2005), and justifying the regime’s consolidation of power (Anzulovic 1999;
Bieber 2002). However, is rhetoric that has citizens recall past violence actually effective
at achieving such goals? Regrettably, we continue to lack much systematic evidence about
the political consequences of rhetoric that invokes past violence and conflict. Moreover,
prior work in this area has almost exclusively been interested in explicitly political outcomes
while neglecting social ones. In other words, the focus has been on how having citizens
remember past violence affects their views of political elites and the policies they pursue.
Much less attention has been paid to how recalling that violence shapes the way ordinary
citizens perceive and behave toward each other. This is an unfortunate oversight considering
how many social outcomes are just as important as political ones to the trajectories of
post-conflict societies.
In this dissertation, I help close these gaps by examining how rhetoric that has individuals
recall past violence affects their social and political attitudes. To do so, I conducted a large
and nationally representative survey in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the site of a major ethnic
civil war in 1992-1995. The survey was both appropriate for the Bosnian context and covered
a number of topics relevant to post-conflict societies more generally. Embedded in the survey
was an experiment that allowed me to address how rhetoric about past inter-group violence
shapes post-conflict (1) inter- and intra-group social relations as well as (2) party and policy
preferences. More specifically, the experiment examined how being reminded of past inter-
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group violence shapes four outcomes: (1) attitudes toward out-groups, (2) attitudes toward
co-ethnics who form social relationships with out-groups, (3) affinity for political parties,
and (4) policy preferences. The first two outcomes can be considered social ones, meaning
they capture how individuals perceive and behave toward other ordinary citizens. The latter
two are political in the sense that they focus on the relationship between citizens and elites.
This is a paper based dissertation, and therefore, each outcome corresponds to a different
discrete paper and substantive chapter. However, the dissertation is roughly divided into two
halves. The first focuses on the social outcomes (i.e., attitudes toward out-groups and the
co-ethnics who engage with them) while the second addresses the political ones (i.e., affinity
for political parties and policy preferences). Below I describe each half of my dissertation
and their component chapters in more detail. In the concluding remarks, I discuss how
collectively the findings presented here provide insights into social and political life in post-
conflict societies.
1.1 Violence, Rhetoric, and Social Outcomes
As noted earlier, most prior work that explores the effects of war memories or their activation
has ignored social relations between ordinary citizens. In the first half of this dissertation,
I correct this oversight by examining how rhetoric that has citizens recall past inter-group
violence affects attitudes toward out-group members and the co-ethnics who associate with
them. In the first substantive chapter, “Elite Rhetoric, Violence, and Post-Conflict Social
Relations,” I focus on the former while the subsequent chapter, “Post-Conflict Tolerance of
Inter-Ethnic Contact,” addresses the latter. Both outcomes are important to understanding
social dynamics in post-conflict societies and have a number of important consequences.
For instance, we know that hostile attitudes toward out-groups can hinder hinder social
reintegration (Jenne 2010; Purdeková 2017), make conflict relapse more likely (Sambanis
and Shayo 2013), and prevent the emergence of a common civic identity (Besley and Reynal-
Querol 2014; Staerklé et al. 2010).
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Additionally, a better understanding of how individuals perceive co-ethnics who form
social relationships with out-group members is also important to post-conflict reconciliation
and reintegration prospects. We know that repeated and sustained engagement that occurs
across group lines can improve inter-group relations (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, 2008) and
can do so even in settings that experienced severe violence in the past (Alexander and Christia
2011; Mironova and Whitt 2014). However, if recalling past violence induces individuals to
reject and ostracize co-ethnics who socially engage with out-group members, then this poses
an additional obstacle to reconciliation. Not only will individuals who harbor hostile views of
out-groups resist engagement, but so may those who would otherwise be open to engagement
but abstain from it because they fear how that will be received by their co-ethnics. Therefore,
while these two chapters are discrete, they nevertheless speak to each other and combined
can help us achieve a better understanding of post-conflict social relations.
The main finding I present in the first chapter is that when individuals recall past inter-
group violence they express significantly more negative attitudes toward out-groups. More-
over, this effect appears to primarily or even exclusively be explained by how the salience
of group identity affects perceptions. In other words, when individuals reflect on past inter-
group violence they are also inherently being cued on group identity. In turn, such identity
cues reduce affinity for out-group members. Ultimately, these findings present a difficult
challenge to policymakers (both domestic and international) who are interested in improv-
ing the state of inter-group relations in post-conflict societies. When political elites engage
in rhetoric that references past violence, not only are they driving citizens in diverse soci-
eties apart, but this process appears to be driven by how such rhetoric increases the salience
of group identity. This suggests that policies or incentives designed to reduce the use of
this rhetoric are unlikely to be sufficient in fostering positive attitudes. Instead, the prob-
lem is significantly broader and will require that group identities themselves become less
exclusionary and adversarial.
What can be done to accomplish this task is a challenging question, but the findings I
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present in the subsequent chapter can help point us in the appropriate direction. Perhaps
surprisingly, I do not find that being reminded of past inter-group violence induces individuals
to reject or ostracize co-ethnics who form social relationships with out-group members. This
finding suggests that post-conflict intra-group bonds are sufficiently strong for individuals to
tolerate co-ethnics who cross group boundaries even when they are reminded of the violence
out-groups committed against them. This should provide reason for optimism in post-conflict
reconciliation prospects. As noted earlier, we know that repeated and sustained contact that
occurs across group lines can improve inter-group relations. The results from this chapter
indicate that rhetoric about past violence does not make individuals more likely to shun
engagement and not experience its prosocial effects in order to avoid a co-ethnic “backlash.”
In fact, one of the implications of this chapter is that even in post-conflict societies, open-
minded individuals can be a bridge between their co-ethnics and out-groups. Combined
and in total, the conclusions we can draw from this half of my dissertation are that (1)
rhetoric about past violence makes reconciliation less likely directly by engendering negative
attitudes toward out-groups, but (2) individuals who are open to engagement can still be
effective conduits for positive inter-group contact.
1.2 Violence, Rhetoric, and Political Outcomes
Whereas the first half of the dissertation focuses on social outcomes, the second half turns
to more explicitly ones. I discussed earlier how prior work has argued that political elites
often reference temporally distant violence and conflict in order to achieve certain political
objectives. These can include increasing their levels of public support and also shaping citi-
zens’ policy preferences. However, we still lack systematic evidence about whether rhetoric
of this kind is actually effective at accomplishing these goals. In this half of my dissertation,
I close that gap by examining the political effects of recalling past inter-group violence.
The first chapter from this half, “Public Views of Political Parties in Post-Conflict Soci-
eties,” explores how being reminded of violence affects views of political parties. Because I
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conducted the survey experiment in a setting where the violence was overwhelmingly inter-
ethnic in nature, I examine attitudes toward both (1) ethnic and (2) multi-ethnic parties.
The findings show that when ethnic parties or elites use rhetoric that invokes past violence,
they may be engaging in a counter-productive activity. More specifically, when individuals
are exposed to messaging that has them recall past inter-group violence, they express sys-
tematically less affinity for and confidence in ethnic parties. I do not find that multi-ethnic
parties pay a similar penalty with citizens. However, I do show that support for multi-ethnic
parties is still tremendously low. In total, the findings I present demonstrate that (1) re-
calling past violence generates negative attitudes toward the political actors who are the
most clearly and obviously responsible for the original breakdown in peace (ethnic parties)
and (2) and the alternative (multi-ethnic parties) enjoys very little support. Ultimately, the
overriding conclusion of this chapter is that citizens are particularly likely to turn away from
political parties and formal politics in post-conflict societies.
This has important implications for the literature on party-citizen linkages and demo-
cratic performance. Modern democracies require that active parties with firm links to broader
society perform countless essential functions, such as organizing citizen participation, man-
aging social conflict, and translating citizens’ preferences into public policies (Dalton and
Weldon 2005; Dalton et al. 2011). This is especially the case in new or transitioning democ-
racies (McAllister and White 2007; Tavits 2005), where strong parties are important to
democratic stability and consolidation (Innes 2002; Pridham 1999; Toka 1995), the qual-
ity of democratic representation (Kitschelt 1992; Mainwaring 1998), and the adoption of
needed reforms (Haggard and Kaufman 1995). In light of this literature, this chapter sug-
gests that post-conflict societies are especially vulnerable to further instability, a lack of elite
responsiveness, and poor governance.
Finally, in “Policy Preferences in a Post-War Environment,” I address whether recalling
past violence affects what public policy issues citizens prioritize and do not find evidence
that it does. This provides reason for optimism in post-conflict societies, where elites may
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have less of an incentive to keep war memories alive than was previously thought. Because
citizen’s policy preferences do not seem to respond in expected ways to such manipulation
when the violence is temporally distant (as it is in Bosnia), it may be the case that the
frequency with which elites employ rhetoric about past violence will decrease with time.
1.3 Concluding Remarks
To conclude, this dissertation examines how rhetoric that has citizens recall past violence
affects a number of important social and political outcomes. What this rhetoric does is
keep war memories alive, and I am specifically interested in how the act of recalling war
shapes attitudes. The findings I described above and present in subsequent chapters show
that depending on the attitudinal outcome I focus on, reminding individuals of past violence
and conflict can have the capacity to shift perceptions (attitudes toward out-groups, ethnic
party affinity) though not in every instance (attitudes toward co-ethnics who associate with
out-groups, multi-ethnic party affinity, policy preferences). In other words, rhetoric that
reminds citizens of violence has varied effects. The effects of this kind of rhetoric can be
quite pernicious, such as when it engenders negative attitudes toward out-group members or
reduces affinity for and confidence in the political parties who are responsible for managing
modern democracy.
However, the null findings I report in two of the chapters also provide reason for optimism.
Even though recalling past violence appears to increase hostility toward out-groups, it does
not seem to do the same for co-ethnics who still decide to cross group lines and engage
with out-group members. Additionally, the results from the analysis that examines policy
preferences suggest that for some political outcomes at least, the ability for this kind of
rhetoric to shape views may dissipate over time. Perhaps this is also the case for other, similar
kinds of attitudes that simply operate on a different timetable. These insights can ultimately
assist policymakers who operate in post-conflict societies and must confront the legacies of
a violent past. However, this dissertation also poses as many questions as it answers. In
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the final chapter, I discuss the questions that remain open and propose potentially fruitful
avenues for future research.
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Chapter 2: Elite Rhetoric, Violence, and Post-Conflict So-
cial Relations
How does the enduring salience of violence committed in wartime affect post-conflict social
relations between ordinary citizens? In societies emerging from violent inter-group conflict,
do individuals who are reminded of the violence their in-group suffered adopt hostile views of
the out-groups they were in conflict with previously? Rhetorical references to past violence
are common in post-conflict societies and are often used by political elites for strategic
purposes. Russian president Vladimir Putin has referenced his country’s experiences in
World War II in order to increase support for his personal rule and mobilize public opinion
against domestic critics and foreign rivals (Edele 2017; Wood 2011). The Chinese Communist
Party has similarly invoked memories of World War II-era Japanese atrocities to foster
nationalism and sustain one-party rule (Coble 2007, 2011; Gries 2005). Serbia’s former
president Slobodan Milošević often referenced nationalist conflicts that occurred centuries
earlier in order to portray himself as a defender of the Serb people and justify his consolidation
of power (Anzulovic 1999; Bieber 2002). Yet, despite the numerous examples of elite actors
and others employing rhetoric that pits one group against another for political purposes, we
know relatively little about how these references to past violence shape inter-group social
dynamics on the ground.
This is an unfortunate oversight when we consider how important the state of inter-group
relations are to the social and political trajectories of societies recovering from inter-group
conflict. If references to past inter-group violence induce individuals to adopt negative views
of the out-group members they share a country with, then post-conflict reconciliation and
reintegration will be harder to achieve. Additionally, as prior studies show, hostile views of
out-groups can also make conflict relapse more likely (Sambanis and Shayo 2013) and reduce
affinity for the common civic identity that is needed to maintain a diverse society (Besley
and Reynal-Querol 2014; Staerklé et al. 2010). Therefore, an examination of how references
to past violence affect views of out-groups would not only improve our understanding of
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post-conflict social relations, but could also have important implications for policymakers
operating in countries emerging from violent conflict.
In this paper, I help fill this gap by examining how references to past violence shape
ordinary individuals’ views of out-groups. To do so, I conducted a survey (N = 1,125) in the
country of Bosnia, the site of a major ethnic civil war in 1992–1995. Embedded in the survey
was an experiment that allowed me randomize whether respondents receive references to the
violence that occurred during the Bosnian War. Specifically, a random set of respondents was
asked to reflect on the violence that was committed against their ethnic in-group by an ethnic
out-group, whereas those assigned to the control condition did not receive this violence prime.
After condition assignment, respondents proceeded to an exercise designed to measure their
views of out-group members. I find that compared to respondents in the control condition,
those who are reminded of the violence their in-group suffered are significantly more likely
to (a) reject social contact with out-groups and (b) perceive themselves as fundamentally
different from out-group members. Moreover, I present evidence indicating that this effect
is primarily or even exclusively driven by how identity salience affects views of out-groups.
In other words, references to past violence inherently contain identity cues that appear to
increase the salience of group identity, which in turn reduces affinity for out-group members.
In fact, one of the key findings in this paper is that even fairly mild and subtle identity cues
can have strikingly similar effects to rhetoric that is very explicitly about past violence.
This paper makes an important contribution to our understanding of inter-group social
relations in post-conflict settings. Prior work that has explored rhetoric that invokes past
violence has primarily focused on how it affects explicitly political outcomes such as regime
support and popular mobilization (Anzulovic 1999; Bieber 2002; Coble 2007, 2011; Edele
2017; Gries 2005; Wood 2011), political engagement (Hadzic and Tavits 2019), and policy
preferences (Hadzic 2018). I instead address how references to a violent past shape social
relations between ordinary individuals by examining how these references influence views of
out-group members.
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This is not to say that prior studies have not examined social dynamics in post-conflict
settings. However, those that have tend to focus on how individual or community level
exposure to past violence affects views and preferences (Blattman 2009; Gilligan et al. 2014;
Voors et al. 2012). Much of this literature finds that inter-group violence can increase
prosocial behavior and attitudes toward in-group members (Bauer et al. 2014; Bellows and
Miguel 2009; De Luca and Verpoorten 2015a, 2015b) while reducing them toward out-groups
(Beber et al. 2014; Becchetti et al. 2014; Mironova and Whitt 2016; Rohner et al. 2013a,
2013b). I show that the sorts of references to past violence that are so common in post-
conflict societies can also shape social relations by reducing affinity for out-groups, thereby
making inter-group reconciliation and reintegration less likely. While achieving a better
understanding of how being subjected to or witnessing violence affects attitudes is surely
important, my findings suggest that we need to broaden the research agenda on post-conflict
social life. Even in contexts where the violence was severe and widespread, the share of the
population that personally experienced it tends to constitute a minority and one that shrinks
over time. However, rhetoric that makes references to a violent past can be employed for
decades or even centuries after the violence has ended and continue to shape inter-group
social relations long after the wartime generation has passed.
2.1 Violence and Social Attitudes
Whether we should expect references to past violence to affect views of out-groups is not
obvious and some literature suggests they are unlikely to do so. Prior studies show that an
important consequence of violent inter-group conflict is the emergence of negative attitudes
toward out-groups that persist long into the post-conflict period (Brubaker and Laitin 1998;
Collier et al. 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2000). Even individuals who are not directly exposed
to the violence can adopt hostile views of former rivals as they learn about their in-group’s
wartime experiences from family, friends, and other members of their community (Aguilar et
al. 2011; Balcells 2012; Lev-Wiesel 2007; Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Weiss and Weiss 2000).
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Therefore, if the violence was especially severe and widespread, universal awareness of what
occurred is already likely and hostile views of out-groups common. In that case, the kind
of elite rhetoric that references past violence I described earlier is unlikely to further affect
attitudes toward out-groups. Instead, it is the event itself (the violent conflict) that changes
social attitudes and references to it may simply reflect those attitudes without shaping them.
At the same time, other work focusing directly on rhetoric that employs references to past
violence indicates that such rhetoric can have a number of important political consequences,
including the mobilization of citizens along identity lines (Anzulovic 1999; Bieber 2002;
Maksić 2017). If references to past violence do affect political preferences and behavior in
this way, then we can reasonably suspect that social views (i.e., perceptions of out-groups)
are shaped as well by such references. Indeed, prior work shows that political preferences are
closely linked to social ones (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Hadzic et al. 2017; Hetherington
and Suhay 2011; Kam and Kinder 2007), so shifts in the former are likely to be associated
with changes in the latter. In this case, the expectation is that because references to violence
induce exclusionary political preferences, we should also observe individuals expressing more
negative views of out-group members as a consequence of being exposed to these references.
Additionally, numerous studies have concluded that even fairly mild cues that accentuate
differences between groups can have profound consequences for how individuals perceive
out-groups (Bigler and Liben 2006; Butler and Tavits 2017; Halpern et al. 2011). Cues
that do so can increase perceived social distance between oneself and out-groups, thereby
reducing empathy, compassion, and general prosocial attitudes toward members of those
groups (Feldman et al. 1998; Heinke and Louis 2009; Krebs 1975; Oveis et al. 2010).
Because references to past violence constitute such cues, the implications for how these
references should shape views of out-group members are clear. Those who receive references
to violence should express more negative attitudes toward out-groups than those who do
not receive such references. In sum, while some literature suggests that rhetoric invoking
past inter-group violence may not affect views of out-groups, the research that speaks most
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directly to my study predicts that they should. Therefore, my expectation is that when
individuals are reminded of the violence their in-group experienced at the hands of an out-
group, they will express less affinity for members of that out-group.
2.2 The Case of Bosnia
In order to examine whether and how references to past violence affect attitudes toward out-
groups, I conducted a survey experiment in Bosnia, the site of a major ethnic civil war in
1992–1995. The origins of the Bosnian War are best understood in the context of Yugoslavia’s
disintegration in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Following a decade of economic stagnation,
Yugoslavia’s constituent republics held their first competitive, multi-party elections at var-
ious points throughout 1990. Bosnia and Herzegovina, the country’s most diverse republic,
held its elections in November and December of that year. In the months that followed the
elections, the Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) and Croat members of the elected government be-
came increasingly alarmed by the continued centralization of power under Serbia’s Slobodan
Milošević. These concerns culminated in an independence referendum in February of 1992
that was approved by voters but boycotted by the country’s ethnic Serb population. Shortly
thereafter, the war broke out in April of 1992.
At the war’s onset, the country’s Bosniak and Croat leaderships were allied against Serb
forces. However, this alliance was short-lived and was followed by the 16-month Croat-
Bosniak War (October 1992 – February 1994) fought primarily in central and southern
Bosnia. Eventually, after a U.S. brokered ceasefire, the alliance between Bosniaks and Croats
was reformed. The war continued along these lines and finally ended in late 1995 following
an international intervention.
Bosnia is an appropriate test case for this study for a number of reasons. First, the
violence was overwhelmingly inter-group in nature, where ethnicity was the relevant cleavage
along which the violence was committed. All three of the country’s major ethnic groups
(Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) were involved in the war, and while the alliance structure
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changed several times, at different points significant violence was committed across all three
ethnic dyads. The inter-ethnic nature of the violence is a feature the Bosnian War shares
with roughly 70% of civil wars fought in the post-World War II period (Sambanis 2001).
In this respect, the war in Bosnia is an archetypal case of modern civil war. Also, in the
years after the Cold War, an increasing share of civil conflicts are ethnic ones (Sarkees and
Wayman 2010). This means the Bosnian War represents a conflict type that is becoming
more common, enhancing the generalizability of any potential findings.
Bosnia also provides a realistic context in which to conduct a study of this kind. As prior
research on the country shows, the war retains significant social and political relevance in
the post-conflict period (Hadzic et al. 2017; Kartsonaki 2016; Kerr 2005). This is reflected
in how many of Bosnia’s most competitive political parties routinely reference the war in
their literature and how party leaders often discuss past violence in their speeches.1 This
continues to be the case to the present day, almost 25 years after the war ended, as has been
repeatedly noted by international election observers (OSCE ODIHR 2019). Recent survey
work also indicates that concerns about future violence in the country and broader region are
common throughout Bosnian society (Office of the UN Resident Coordinator 2013, 2015).
Ultimately, this all suggests that Bosnia is an appropriate setting to examine how references
to past violence shape inter-group relations. Exposing individuals to messaging that invokes
the violence is not an abstract exercise that has no bearing on contemporary attitudes.
Instead, Bosnian citizens are exposed to real-world rhetoric about the war on a regular
basis, a phenomenon I attempt to mimic in an experimental setting. This is important to
the external validity of the study.
2.3 Research Design
The survey experiment was conducted in November and December of 2016. The fieldwork
was carried out by the Bosnian survey firm Prism Research, whose enumerators administered
1For examples of Bosnian elites engaging in this kind of rhetoric, please see Section 2.7.1 of the Supple-
mentary Appendix (SA).
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tablet-assisted, in-person interviews with 1,125 adult Bosnian citizens.2 The survey was
roughly 15-minutes long and covered a number of topics relevant to a post-conflict setting.
In this section, I describe the design and report results from the part of the survey that
focused on views of out-groups. A description of the recruitment procedures and information
about sampling locations is presented in Section 2.7.2. Summary statistics for the sample of
respondents are reported in 2.7.3.3
2.3.1 Assignment to Experimental Condition
Pre-treatment, respondents were asked a basic set of demographic questions, including one
where they identified their ethnicity. They were then randomly assigned to a control condi-
tion or to one of two treatment conditions. Those assigned to control received no additional
questions before proceeding to an exercise designed to measure their views of out-groups.
Respondents assigned to the first treatment condition received an additional question
asking them to describe their thoughts and feelings about the violence that was committed
against their ethnic group by members of an ethnic out-group during the Bosnian War.
Because significant violence occurred across all three ethnic dyads, asking respondents about
either of the two major out-groups sufficed for this study. I opted to ask Bosniaks about
the violence committed against them by Serbs, Croats were asked about Bosniak violence,
and Serbs were asked about Croat violence. I refer to this experimental condition as the
Violence Prime.4 This treatment is based on prior research in psychology and economics
2The research design was approved by the institutional review board at Washington University in St.
Louis (IRB no. 201607026). All respondents also provided informed consent prior to starting the survey.
3Prior to fielding the final survey, I conducted a small pilot study with roughly 100 respondents. The
pilot was used to pre-test various aspects of the questionnaire and software, including proper randomization
of condition assignment, skip patterns, branching, etc. Prism also collected feedback on question wording
from respondents and enumerators, who indicated the questions were easy to follow and understand.
4I did not alternate which out-group the respondents were asked about due to concerns about imbalance.
For example, the survey sample is representative of the country’s ethnic composition and therefore includes
only 125 Croat respondents. Even with proper randomization, there would be a non-negligible probability
that significantly more respondents are asked about one out-group than are asked about the other. Instead,
I asked Bosniaks about the form of violence that is most salient to members of their ethnic group (i.e., Serb
violence). Arguably, I did the same for Croats, for whom the most salient period of the broader conflict is
likely the Croat-Bosniak War. Finally, Serbs were asked about Croat violence so that the Violence Prime
would cover every form of violence (Bosniak, Croat, and Serb) rather than focus primarily on the violence
that was committed by a specific ethnic group.
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that employs controlled recollection of trauma (Lerner and Keltner 2001) and has also been
used in the study of war and terrorism effects (Callen et al. 2014; Lerner et al. 2003).5
Since past violence can be framed in a number of different ways, a discussion of what
motivated the design of the Violence Prime is warranted. My main objective was to make
the wording of the prime reflect as closely as possible how political elites often reference
past violence in societies emerging from an inter-group conflict. Therefore, because political
violence is inherently relational (there is a perpetrator and a victim) and was committed
across clearly delineated group lines in Bosnia, I opted to ask respondents about the vio-
lence their ethnic group experienced at the hands of an ethnic out-group. By referencing a
particular out-group, I make the prime more realistic and reflective of how past violence is
invoked in Bosnia and elsewhere, where elites often rhetorically target specific groups when
discussing their in-group’s experiences (Coble 2007, 2011; Gries 2005). I also decided to have
the prime emphasize the themes of victimhood and suffering, which are frequently present
in elite rhetoric about past violence and inter-group conflict (Bieber 2002; Coble 2007, 2011;
Gries 2005; Maksić 2017). These design choices are important to the external validity of the
study. The more closely the Violence Prime approximates the references to past violence
individuals receive from elites and other sources, the more confident we can be that any
potential findings apply to a non-experimental setting.6
5Note that while prior studies that have adopted a similar approach primarily focus on how inducing
certain kinds of emotions (e.g., fear, anger, anxiety, sadness) shapes attitudes and preferences, I remain
largely agnostic about the potential emotions that references to past violence might generate. Indeed, a
review of the respondents’ answers to the Violence Prime question indicates that a variety of emotions were
induced. Whether different emotions have heterogeneous effects on views of out-groups remains a task for
future work. Another difference between this study and prior ones is that the Violence Prime is worded
more generally than are treatments used in other work. For example, Lerner et al. (2003) cue respondents
on a specific violent event – the September 11th terrorist attacks – whereas I inquire about the violence that
the respondent’s ethnic group experienced more broadly (at the hands of a particular out-group). I do this
because in the Bosnian context it is debatable whether any specific event is sufficiently prominent for all
respondents to be aware of it. The Srebrenica massacre likely meets this standard for Bosniaks, but there is
no comparably salient wartime event for Croats and Serbs.
6At the same time, because the Violence Prime asks about a specific out-group, what this study can
say about how references to past violence more generally (independent of the out-group) affect attitudes
is admittedly limited. Therefore, while this design choice makes the Violence Prime more realistic, it also
represents a limitation of the study. Also, when violence is referenced, the tone of the messaging, the personal
qualities of the messengers, and the themes that are emphasized are likely important factors to consider.
While this is beyond the scope of the study, future work may want to delve into these additional factors.
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Finally, I also included a second treatment condition that references group identity but
not violence. I do so because I recognize that the Violence Prime invokes both past violence
and group identities. Therefore, a likely effect of the Violence Prime is that it increases
the salience of group identity among respondents, which in turn could induce more negative
views of out-group members. If respondents who receive the Violence Prime express less
affinity for out-groups than those in control, then by comparing the views of Violence Prime
respondents with ones who are cued on group identity but not violence, I am better able to
determine how much of the original effect is due to (a) the increased salience of identity and
(b) non-identity based factors.
One challenge to designing such a prime is that some work suggests post-conflict group
identities in Bosnia have been heavily shaped by collective narratives about each group’s
wartime experiences (Basta 2016; Šehagić 2016). Therefore, by asking respondents an ab-
stract question about their level of ethnic pride or their interpretation of Bosniak, Croat, or
Serb identity, I may risk implicitly priming them on their ethnic group’s experiences during
the war. In order to avoid this, I intentionally made this prime subtle by asking respondents
how they celebrated a recent ethno-religious holiday associated with their ethnic group. In
Bosnia, ethnicity and religion are overlapping cleavages, where Bosniaks identify with Islam,
Croats with Roman Catholicism, and Serbs with Eastern Orthodoxy. Therefore, Bosniak
respondents were asked about Bajram, Croats about the Catholic Christmas, and Serbs
about the Orthodox Christmas. Each of these holidays is widely observed by individuals of
greatly varying levels of religiosity and ethnic nationalism. I call this condition the Identity
Prime. After receiving either prime, respondents proceeded to the exercise that measures
their views of out-groups. The exact wording of each prime is presented in Figure 2.1.7
7Asking respondents to identify their ethnicity at the beginning of the survey was necessary so that
the appropriate ethno-religious holiday and wartime violence questions could be selected. The exercise that
followed also requires that the respondent’s ethnicity is known. By including this question, however, re-
spondents may already be primed to think about their identity prior to being assigned to an experimental
condition. If anything, this should only make uncovering significant treatment effects less likely. All respon-
dents were asked to identify their ethnicity, potentially reducing differences across experimental conditions
in how salient their identity is while taking the survey.
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Figure 2.1: Violence and Identity Primes
Violence Prime
How do you feel when you think about the violence that was committed against
[co-ethnics] by members of the [out-group] people and their leaders during the last
war? Please describe your thoughts.
Bosniak respondents: Bosniaks, Serb
Croat respondents: Croats, Bosniak
Serb respondents: Serbs, Croat
Identity Prime
Please describe how you celebrated the last [ethno-religious holiday].
Bosniak respondents: Bajram
Croat respondents: Catholic Christmas
Serb respondents: Orthodox Christmas
Important to note is that this study is not designed to determine whether the experience of
violent inter-group conflict affects individuals’ attitudes toward out-group members. Should
I find that references to past violence do not shape views of out-groups independent of their
effect on the salience of group identity, it would be inappropriate to conclude that violence
itself does not affect such views. That may be the case, but alternatively, various studies also
indicate that violent conflict can harden group identities and make them adversarial in both
the short- and long-term (Balcells 2012; Dyrstad 2012). Therefore, without knowing how
individuals responded to identity cues pre-conflict, we cannot draw any definitive conclusions
about how violence affects attitudes. Rather, this study is instead designed to examine (a)
what effect post-conflict references to past violence have on views of out-groups and (b)
what role identity based versus non-identity based factors play in this process.
2.3.2 Measuring Views of Out-Groups
After condition assignment, respondents were presented with a vignette that describes a
fictional out-group member. In order to indicate the ethnicity of that out-group mem-
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ber, I exploit the easy recognizability of certain Bosnian names as markers of ethnic group
membership. In that vein, the only feature of the vignette that varied was the out-group
member’s name. Respondent ethnicity determined the name (and by extension, ethnicity)
of the out-group member. The out-group member’s ethnicity was always matched to that
of the perpetrating group from the Violence Prime. Therefore, for Bosniak respondents the
out-group member was a Serb, for Croats a Bosniak, and for Serbs a Croat. Figure 2.2
presents the wording for the vignette.8
Figure 2.2: Vignette about Out-Group Member
[Out-group name] is 36 years old and has been a school teacher for the last 12 years.
He has been married for 8 years, and he and his wife have 2 children. He enjoys the
outdoors and is a film enthusiast.
Bosniak respondents: Serb name (Ðorđe Jeftić)
Croat respondents: Bosniak name (Mehmed Hodžić)
Serb respondents: Croat name (Hrvoje Jurišić)
After being presented with the vignette, respondents were asked three questions designed
to measure their views of the fictional out-group member. All three questions use the same
4-point scale ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (4). The first two
questions capture the respondents’ willingness to engage in social contact with the out-
group member. The first asks respondents how much they agree with the statement that
they would like to have the out-group member as a neighbor. The second asks how much
they agree that they would liked to have him as a friend. I refer to the former question as
Out-Group Neighbor and the latter as Out-Group Friend.
The last question asks respondents how much they agree with the statement that the
out-group member likely shares their values. I refer to this question as Out-Group Values
and include it to assess whether references to past inter-group violence prompt respondents
8This approach is based on prior studies that similarly use names to indicate social group membership
(see McCauley 2014; McClendon 2016; Scacco and Warren 2018). The 8 enumerators who participated in
the pilot study and the fieldwork supervisor provided feedback on the selected names. All agreed that the
names make the ethnicity of the fictional out-group member easily identifiable.
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to perceive themselves as fundamentally different from out-group members. While all three
questions ultimately capture the respondents’ views of out-groups, they also delve into two
related but distinct aspects of inter-group relations: social contact in the cases of Out-
Group Neighbor and Out-Group Friend and perceptions about shared values in the case of
Out-Group Values. The answers to these questions serve as the dependent variables in the
analyses that follow.9 Because of how the questions are scaled, answering lower (higher) on
the scale indicates less (more) affinity for out-group members.
Balance tests reported in Section 2.7.6 of the SA indicate that the experimental conditions
are well-balanced across most respondent covariates, including ethnicity, gender, education,
marital status, and employment status. Respondent age is the partial exception and varies
somewhat across conditions. However, in substantive terms, the differences in mean age are
fairly modest: 43.5 years for control, 45.7 for the Violence Prime, and 41.8 for the Identity
Prime. Moreover, respondent age is an inconsistent and typically insignificant predictor of
views of out-groups. Given these modest differences, in the analyses that follow, I report
treatment effects without controlling for respondent covariates. However, as I note later in
the paper, the results are robust to the inclusion of covariate controls as well as alternative
methods used to correct for potential imbalances across experimental conditions.
2.4 Results and Discussion
I begin by first examining whether respondents who receive the Violence Prime have system-
atically different attitudes than do respondents assigned to the control condition. This is the
most direct test of whether and how references to past violence affect views of out-groups.
To do so, in Figure 2.3 I present OLS estimates (with 95% confidence intervals) where the
dependent variable is either Out-Group Neighbor, Out-Group Friend, or Out-Group Values,
and the independent variable is a dichotomous indicator of condition assignment (1 = Vio-
9The exact wording of the survey questions is presented in Section 2.7.4 of the SA. The distribution of
responses across questions and experimental conditions is shown in Section 2.7.5. The response rates were
97.9%, 94.8%, and 86.5% for Out-Group Neighbor, Out-Group Friend, and Out-Group Values, respectively.
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lence Prime, 0 = control). To reiterate, because of how the dependent variables are scaled,
negative estimates indicate that respondents who receive the Violence Prime express less
affinity for out-group members than do respondents in control.
Figure 2.3: The Effects of Violence Salience on Views of Out-Groups
−0.50 −0.25 0.00 0.25
Violence Prime
Out−Group Neighbor
−0.50 −0.25 0.00 0.25
Out−Group Friend
−0.50 −0.25 0.00 0.25
Out−Group Values
Note: the left panel corresponds to Out-Group Neighbor, the middle to Out-Group Friend, and the right
to Out-Group Values. The independent variable is a dichotomous indicator of treatment assignment (1
= Violence Prime, 0 = control). For each panel, I present the OLS estimate along with 95% confidence
interval. Because of how the dependent variables are scaled, a negative estimate indicates that the
Violence Prime induces respondents to resist contact with the fictional out-group member (Out-Group
Neighbor and Out-Group Friend) or to perceive themselves as fundamentally different from him (Out-
Group Values).
As the results show, I find that the Violence Prime consistently reduces affinity for
out-group members. With respect to Out-Group Neighbor, respondents who receive the
Violence Prime answer roughly 0.160 points lower on the 4-point scale than do respondents
assigned to control. Similarly, compared to respondents in the control condition, those
who receive the Violence Prime answer about 0.282 points lower on the scale when Out-
Group Friend is the dependent variable. Both treatment effects are significant at the 95%
level and indicate that references to past violence make individuals less likely to engage in
social contact with out-group members.10 Finally, receiving references to past violence also
10The fact that the effect size is notably larger when Out-Group Friend rather than Out-Group Neighbor
is the dependent variable is interesting in its own right. One possible interpretation of this is that the effect
is particularly pronounced when the implied social contact is “deep.” Whereas the amount of social contact
individuals experience with neighbors is likely to vary significantly, friendship unambiguously implies a high
degree of contact. While this difference is interesting and suggestive, this study was not designed to address
whether and how references to past violence vary in their effect depending on the level of social contact.
This remains a task for future work.
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makes respondents perceive themselves as fundamentally different from out-group members.
Relative to respondents in control, those assigned to the Violence Prime condition answer
roughly 0.190 points lower on the scale when Out-Group Values is the dependent variable.
This treatment effect is also significant at the 95% level.
In order to provide an additional, intuitive interpretation of the results, I also estimated a
series of ordered probit regressions and plot the predicted probabilities along with 95% con-
fidence intervals in Figure 2.4.11 The point estimates that appear in the figure correspond to
the predicted probability of respondents in the control or Violence Prime condition replying
“strongly agree” (the highest affinity category) to the relevant survey question (Out-Group
Neighbor, Out-Group Friend, or Out-Group Values).















































Note: the dots represent the predicted probabilities of answering “strongly agree” to Out-Group Neighbor
(left panel), Out-Group Friend (middle panel), and Out-Group Values (right panel) for the control and
Violence Prime conditions. The bars refer to the corresponding 95% confidence intervals.
As seen in the figure, respondents who receive the Violence Prime are consistently less
likely to reply “strongly agree” than are respondents in the control condition, regardless of the
dependent variable. For instance, among respondents in control, the predicted probability of
replying “strongly agree” to the Out-Group Neighbor question is 64%. This declines to 55%
11The full regression output for Figures 2.3 and 2.4 is presented in Tables 2.10 and 2.11 of the SA,
respectively.
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for respondent who receive the Violence Prime, a statistically significant 9 point decrease
(first difference [FD] = −0.087, 95% confidence interval [CI]: −0.148, −0.022). Similar to the
original OLS results, the treatment effect for the Violence Prime is even more pronounced
when Out-Group Friend is the dependent variable. Whereas the probability of responding
“strongly agree” is 54% for respondents assigned to control, it declines to 40% for those who
receive the Violence Prime. This constitutes a substantively large and statistically significant
14 percentage point decrease (FD = −0.139, 95% CI: −0.205, −0.072). Finally, I again find
that references to past violence increase how different from out-group members respondents
perceive themselves to be. Whereas the probability of answering “strongly agree” to Out-
Group Values is 28% for respondents assigned to control, it is only 21% for those who receive
the Violence Prime. This represents a statistically significant 7 point decline (FD = −0.075,
95% CI: −0.141, −0.019).
In sum, I consistently find that references to past violence reduce affinity for out-group
members. Compared to those assigned to the control condition, receiving the Violence Prime
induces respondents to (a) express less desire or willingness to engage in social contact with
out-groups and (b) perceive themselves as fundamentally different from out-group members.
Ultimately, this suggests that the kinds of references to past inter-group violence that are
so common in post-conflict societies are an impediment to inter-group reconciliation and
the emergence of prosocial attitudes toward out-group members. However, what explains
this finding? As noted earlier, because the Violence Prime invokes both past violence and
group identities, a likely effect of the treatment is that it increased the salience of group
identity among respondents. This motivated the inclusion of the Identity Prime, which
cues respondents on identity without referencing violence. I now turn to examining whether
and how much of the prior findings are explained by the effects of group identity versus
non-identity based factors on views of out-groups.
Figure 2.5 presents the treatment effects for both the Violence Prime and the Identity
Prime on views of out-group members. What distinguishes this figure from Figure 2.3 is the
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addition of the Identity Prime to the estimation. Therefore, the figure displays OLS estimates
(with 95% confidence intervals) where the dependent variable is either Out-Group Neighbor,
Out-Group Friend, or Out-Group Values, and the independent variables are dummies for
each prime (making the control condition the comparison group).
Figure 2.5: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of
Out-Groups
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Note: the left panel corresponds to Out-Group Neighbor, the middle to Out-Group Friend, and the
right to Out-Group Values. The independent variables are dummies for each prime, making control the
comparison condition. For each panel, I present the OLS estimates along with 95% confidence intervals.
Because of how the dependent variables are scaled, negative estimates indicate that the relevant prime
induces respondents to resist contact with the fictional out-group member (Out-Group Neighbor and
Out-Group Friend) or to perceive themselves as fundamentally different from him (Out-Group Values).
As the results show, receiving the Identity Prime consistently reduces affinity for out-
group members. Relative to respondents assigned to control, those who receive the Identity
Prime answer roughly 0.152, 0.224, and 0.189 points lower on the scale when the dependent
variable is Out-Group Neighbor, Out-Group Friend, and Out-Group Values, respectively. In
every case, the treatment effect is statistically significant at the 95% level. In comparison,
the treatment effects for the Violence Prime equal −0.160, −0.282, and −0.190 and are
statistically indistinguishable from those of the Identity Prime. In other words, respondents
who receive either treatment are both more likely to (a) reject social contact with out-
groups and (b) perceive themselves as different from out-group members than are those in
the control condition, but views of out-groups are very similar when comparing respondents
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assigned to the Violence Prime to respondents assigned to the Identity Prime. Ultimately,
this indicates that it is primarily by increasing the salience of group identities that references
to past inter-group violence engender negative views of out-group members.
In order to provide a more intuitive interpretation of the results, I repeat the exercise
from the prior analysis and plot the predicted probabilities (with 95% confidence intervals) of
replying “strongly agree” across survey questions and experimental conditions in Figure 2.6.12
The figure shows that among respondents in the control condition, the probability of replying
“strongly agree” to Out-Group Neighbor is 64%. This decreases to 56% for respondents
assigned to the Violence Prime, a statistically significant 8 point decline (FD = −0.085,
95% CI: −0.146, −0.020). For respondents who receive the Identity Prime, the probability
is 57%. This represents a statistically significant 7 point decrease (FD = −0.072, 95% CI:
−0.134, −0.007). The difference in predicted probabilities between respondents assigned to
the Violence Prime and the Identity Prime is statistically insignificant and substantively
small (FD = 0.013, 95% CI: −0.053, 0.078).


















































Note: the dots represent the predicted probabilities of answering “strongly agree” to Out-Group Neighbor
(left panel), Out-Group Friend (middle panel), and Out-Group Values (right panel) for the control,
Violence Prime, and Identity Prime conditions. The bars refer to the corresponding 95% confidence
intervals.
12The full regression output for Figures 2.5 and 2.6 is presented in Tables 2.12 and 2.13 of the SA,
respectively.
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The conclusions are the same when examining the results for Out-Group Friend. Whereas
the probability of replying “strongly agree” to the Out-Group Friend question is 54% for
respondents assigned to the control condition, it is 41% for those who receive the Violence
Prime. This constitutes a large and statistically significant 13 percentage point decrease (FD
= −0.137, 95% CI: −0.202, −0.070). For Identity Prime respondents, the probability is 44%,
a significant 10 point decrease (FD = −0.106, 95% CI: −0.171, −0.039) when compared to
the control condition. The difference in the predicted probabilities between Violence Prime
and Identity Prime respondents is again statistically and substantively insignificant (FD =
0.031, 95% CI: −0.032, 0.094).
Finally, the results also indicate that references to past violence and identity cues both
increase how different from out-group members respondents perceive themselves to be.
Whereas the probability of replying “strongly agree” to Out-Group Values is 30% for re-
spondents assigned to control, it is only 22% for those who receive the Violence Prime.
This represents a statistically significant 8 point decrease (FD = −0.075, 95% CI: −0.140,
−0.017). I find that the Identity Prime has an almost identical effect. The probability of
replying “strongly agree” among these respondents is 23%, a significant 7 point decline when
compared to the control condition (FD = −0.067, 95% CI: −0.132, −0.011). Once again,
the difference in the predicted probabilities between respondents who receive the Violence
Prime and those who receive the Identity Prime is small and insignificant (FD = 0.007, 95%
CI: −0.043, 0.058).13
To summarize, I show in the first part of the analysis that when individuals receive
references to inter-group violence that occurred in the past, they adopt more negative views
of out-group members. The second part of the analysis indicates that these effects are
primarily explained by how identity salience shapes views of out-groups. What is especially
13I have also partitioned the data by respondent ethnicity and conducted an exploratory analysis of
differences across ethnic groups. Because this study was not designed to explore inter-ethnic differences in
the treatment effects, I present these results in Section 2.7.8 of the SA rather than the main text. While
some notable differences between ethnic groups do emerge, the conclusions are qualitatively similar to those
reached in the main analysis.
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striking about these findings is how similar the treatment effects for the Violence Prime and
the Identity Prime are given the differences in their designs. For instance, respondents who
receive the Violence Prime are first asked about an out-group that is cast in a negative light
(referring to the violence committed by that out-group against the respondent’s co-ethnics)
and are then required to express their views about a member of that out-group. In contrast,
the Identity Prime simply cues respondents on a holiday that is associated with their ethnic
group and also widely observed by individuals of greatly varying levels of religiosity and
ethnic nationalism. Therefore, the Violence Prime is rather strong while the Identity Prime
is arguably quite subtle. Yet, despite these differences, the Identity Prime has a signifiant
and substantively similar effect to that of the Violence Prime. This indicates that it is indeed
the identity cues embedded in references to past violence that explain why such references
induce negative attitudes toward out-group members.
2.5 Robustness Checks
In order to further scrutinize the findings, I now turn to a number of robustness checks I
conducted. First, as mentioned previously, the experimental conditions are well-balanced
across most respondent covariates. Respondent age is the only exception and varies slightly
across conditions. While age is an inconsistent and typically insignificant predictor of views
of out-group members, in order to correct for potential imbalances, I replicated the main
analysis while controlling for respondent covariates. The results are presented in Tables
2.14 through 2.17 of the SA and show that none of the earlier conclusions change. As an
additional precaution, I estimated a series of propensity score weighted regressions (Olmos
and Govindasamy 2015), employing multiple methods in the derivation of propensity scores.
These results are reported in Tables 2.18 through 2.23 and again show that the earlier findings
continue to hold and none of the conclusions change.
I also considered alternative operationalizations of respondents’ views of out-groups.
First, the original dependent variables (Out-Group Neighbor, Out-Group Friend, and Out-
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Group Values) all employ the same 4-point scale ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to
“strongly agree” (4). I dichotomized these variables, collapsing “strongly disagree” with “dis-
agree” (0) and “strongly agree” with “agree” (1), and estimated a number of probit regressions.
The results are shown in Tables 2.24 through 2.26 and are very similar to the main ones.
Finally, I used the three dependent variables and a factor analysis to create a continuous
scale that measures views of out-group members. Results from models that employ the scale
as the dependent variable are presented in Table 2.27 and are effectively the same as the
main results.
2.6 Conclusion
I started this paper by asking whether and how references to past violence shape views
of out-groups in societies recovering from inter-group conflict. Whereas other work has
primarily addressed how exposure to violence affects inter-group relations, I instead examine
how references to a violent past do so. Such references are common in post-conflict societies
and are often employed by political elites for strategic purposes. To the extent that prior
research has explored the effects of rhetoric that invokes past violence, the focus has been on
explicitly political outcomes. In this study, I show that references of this kind also have an
important social consequence by reducing affinity for out-groups. Compared to individuals
who are not reminded of the violence that was committed against their in-group, those who
are express significantly less willingness to engage in social contact with out-groups and are
also more likely to perceive themselves as fundamentally different from out-group members.
Moreover, I find that these effects appear to be primarily driven by the identity cues that
are embedded in these references and how such cues affect views of out-groups.
Several interesting questions, for both scholars and policymakers, remain open. Prior
work shows that in the absence of positive, sustained inter-group contact, the emergence of
prosocial attitudes toward out-groups is unlikely to occur. Such contact has the potential
to reduce prejudice toward out-group members by engendering greater empathy and trust
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toward them (Hewstone et al. 2005; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, 2008) and can do so even in
societies that experienced severe violence in the past (Alexander and Christia 2011; Mironova
and Whitt 2014). However, before engagement can improve inter-group relations, resistance
to such engagement needs to be reduced. Unfortunately, the findings I present in this
study do not provide much reason for optimism on that front. Not only does rhetoric
referencing past violence drive the citizens of diverse societies apart, but it appears to do
so by increasing the salience of group identity. This suggests policy measures or incentives
that dissuade elites from employing this rhetoric are likely insufficient to foster positive
inter-group attitudes. Rather, the problem is much broader and will require that group
identities themselves become less adversarial and exclusionary. What policies can accomplish
this remains an open question that is especially pressing for international organizations
and great powers that have in recent times become increasingly involved in post-conflict
peace maintenance, development, and reconciliation (Juncos 2005; Kang and Meernik 2004;
Kevlihan et al. 2014; Uvin 2001).
Going forward, scholars should also examine the different ways in which past violence
can be rhetorically framed and whether alternative framings shape social views differently.
As noted earlier, my main objective when designing the Violence Prime was to make the
content reflect as closely as possible how political elites often reference past violence in post-
conflict societies. However, this approach is admittedly just one among many I could have
taken and what these references emphasize is likely to vary depending on the orientation of
the elites. For instance, following an internal ethnic conflict, political competition is often
dominated by parties that display favoritism toward a particular group (ethnic parties) and
those that do not (non/multi-ethnic parties) (Hadzic et al. 2017; Rozenas et al. 2017).
When the violence was especially severe and recent, it may be unavoidable to discuss the
past regardless of what the elite actor’s orientation is, ethnic or non-/multi-ethnic. However,
ethnic elites may emphasize different themes about the violence and its consequences than
non- or multi-ethnic elites (i.e., victimization vs. reconciliation, retribution vs. forgiveness).
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Exploring whether the effects of references to past violence are heterogeneous depending on
how they are framed and what themes they stress remains a task for future work.
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2.7 Supplementary Appendix
This supplementary appendix contains the following:
2.7.1: examples of Bosnian elites engaging in rhetoric that is about past violence.
2.7.2: information concerning recruitment procedures and sampling locations.
2.7.3: summary statistics for the sample of respondents.
2.7.4: the exact wording of the survey questions that measure views of out-group members.
2.7.5: descriptive statistics for the distribution of responses across experimental conditions
and survey questions.
2.7.6: balance tests.
2.7.7: supplementary model results.
2.7.8: an exploratory analysis of the treatment effects across ethnic groups.
2.7.1 Elite Rhetoric and Violence in Bosnia
In this section, I briefly review instances of when Bosnia’s most competitive political parties
referenced the Bosnian War in their literature. While not an exhaustive review, this exercise
is supposed to illustrate how Bosnian political elites do engage in the kind of rhetoric de-
scribed in the paper and how they do so to the present day. The parties I review include the
Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herze-
govina (HDZ BiH), and the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD). I selected
these parties because they are currently the most competitive parties associated with each
ethnic group. They have also enjoyed that status for most of the post-conflict period. The
SDA is an ethnic Bosniak party, the HDZ BiH an ethnic Croat one, and the SNSD an ethnic
Serb one.
Beginning with the SDA, the party’s most recent “program declaration” was released in
2015. This document is considered a statement of the SDA’s foundational principles and
highest priorities. Among these priorities is the rejuvenation of Bosniak culture following
the war:
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We will strive to renew and develop the Bosniak cultural heritage
after the mass destruction and genocide against Bosniaks that occurred
during the war of aggression (SDA 2015, p. 9).
Additionally, in its program, the party commits itself to pursuing further legal action
against Serbia for that country’s involvement during the Bosnian War:
The SDA will collect the new facts and evidence needed to renew
the lawsuit against Serbia...for violating the UN Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide during the 1992-
1995 aggression against Bosnian and Herzegovina (SDA 2015, p. 11).
As these two excerpts show, the suffering Bosniaks endured is a prominent theme in
the SDA’s rhetoric about the war. This is illustrated by the party’s repeated references to
genocide and their promises of seeking legal action against perpetrators.
The HDZ BiH also references the war in its literature. In the party’s 2018 election pro-
gram, the HDZ BiH commits itself to opposing any interpretation of the war that endangers
the reputation of Croat service members. The party proclaims that such interpretations
amount to a “distortion of the historical facts and truths” about the war:
We will strongly and resolutely oppose any distortion of the historical
facts and truths about the Homeland War that endangers the reputa-
tion and dignity of Croat defenders (HDZ BiH 2018, p. 12).
The full protection of the reputation and dignity of Croat defenders
and the Homeland War is and will remain a permanent commitment
of ours (HDZ BiH 2018, p. 13).
Finally, the SNSD also emphasizes Serb suffering in its party documents. In literature
released during the lead-up to the 2018 Bosnian general elections, the SNSD repeatedly
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condemns Operation Storm. This was a 1995 joint military operation between the Croatian
Army, the Bosniak dominated Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croat
paramilitaries in Bosnia. In doing so, the party stresses how much suffering Serb civilians
endured as a consequence of Operation Storm:
Ethnic cleansing, supposedly opposed by the entire world, was made
possible with the assistance of Western powers and NATO. They trained
the Croat Army, gave it the green light, and enabled a terrible ethnic
cleansing to occur (SNSD 2018, p. 142).
130,000 Serbs were expelled and ethnically cleansed, many were killed,
and all simply because they were Orthodox (SNSD 2018, p. 142).
In sum, all three of Bosnia’s most prominent ethnic parties continue to engage in rhetoric
that references the Bosnian War. Ultimately, this suggests that Bosnia provides a realistic
context in which to examine how this kind of rhetoric shapes perceptions of out-groups.
Rather than being an abstract exercise with no bearing on actual attitudes, the experiment
I conducted for this study attempts to mimic a real-world phenomenon.
2.7.2 Recruitment Procedures and Sampling Locations
Prism employed a multistage random stratified sampling design for this study. The sample
was first stratified by region. Within each region, the sample was further stratified by
urbanization levels. Due to the cross-classification of regions and urbanization levels, 240
Primary Sampling Units (PSU) were selected across strata. For urban locations, streets
served as PSUs while villages and settlements served as PSUs in rural districts. Regional
supervisors provided enumerators with a starting point for each PSU, and therefore, the
enumerators had no control over the selection of starting points.
From each starting point the enumerator selected the third household from the right
(excluding the starting point). If the enumerator was unable to obtain an interview at the
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initial household, they selected the household to the immediate right of the initial one as
the first substitute. If the enumerator was again unable to obtain an interview at the first
substitute household, they selected the household to the immediate left of the initial one
as the second substitute. Finally, if the enumerator could not obtain an interview at the
second substitute household, the enumerator selected a new initial household as the starting
point by continuing with a random route procedure that was designed for them prior to the
fieldwork. This process was then repeated until an interview was obtained.
After the enumerator selected a household, they asked the person present whether there
are any permanent household members living at the residence who are 18 or older. If
there was only one eligible household member, that member was asked to participate in
an interview. If there were multiple eligible household members, the enumerator randomly
selected a respondent using a Kish grid they received from their regional supervisor.
All enumerators were local to the region they were assigned to and received training prior
to the fieldwork. The training was conducted at Prism’s regional centers and consisted of role-
playing exercises and mock interviews that needed to be completed successfully before the
enumerator was approved for actual fieldwork. Prior to starting the final study, Prism also
conducted a small pilot study with roughly 100 respondents in order to test various aspects
of the questionnaire, including proper randomization, branching, skip patterns, question
wording, etc. Prism also collected feedback from the personnel involved with the pilot study
(8 enumerators and the fieldwork supervisor) concerning the selected names used in the
vignette. All those involved agreed that the ethnicity of the fictional individual described in
the vignette is easily identifiable by virtue of his name. All information was then compiled
into a pilot study report which I closely consulted before finalizing the questionnaire.
The final sample for the survey consisted of 1,125 adult (18 or older) Bosnian citizens.
Figure 2.7 presents a map that displays the number of respondents and share of the sample
that corresponds to each of Bosnia’s current 143 municipalities. Respondents were sampled
from 49 of these municipalities.
33
Figure 2.7: Distribution of Respondents Across Bosnian Municipalities
2.7.3 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for the sample are presented in Table 2.1. Respondent age is measured
in years while education is measured on a 7-point scale ranging from “no education” (1) to
“masters / doctorate” (7). Employment status is a three-category variable that includes “em-
ployed”, “unemployed”, and “not in labor force” (homemakers, students, pensioners, disabled
persons, etc.). I collected information on respondent characteristics for ethnicity, gender, age,
and education prior to condition assignment. Therefore, these covariates are pre-treatment.
The survey firm further collected information on employment and marital status at the end
of the survey, thereby making these covariates post-treatment. Nevertheless, for descriptive
reasons, I provide information for both pre- and post-treatment covariates. There was no
non-response for pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, and education) and mini-
mal non-response for post-treatment covariates (around 1% for both employment and marital
status).
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for the Sample of Respondents
Respondent Sample
# of respondents 1125
# (%) assigned to Control 360 (32%)
# (%) assigned to Violence Prime 387 (34%)
# (%) assigned to Identity Prime 378 (34%)
# (%) Bosniaks 608 (54%)
# (%) Croats 125 (11%)
# (%) Serbs 392 (35%)
# (%) Women 642 (57%)
# (%) Men 483 (43%)
# (%) Married 644 (57%)
# (%) Unmarried 469 (42%)
# (%) NA 12 (1%)
# (%) Employed 367 (33%)
# (%) Unemployed 324 (29%)
# (%) Not in Labor Force 428 (38%)






2.7.4 Wording of Survey Questions
After condition assignment and being read the vignette, respondents were asked three ques-
tions designed to measure their views of the out-group member described in the vignette.
The exact wording of these survey questions is presented in Figure 2.8.
Figure 2.8: Survey Questions about Out-Group Member















Bosniak respondents: Ðorđe Jeftić
Croat respondents: Mehmed Hodžić
Serb respondents: Hrvoje Jurišić
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2.7.5 Distribution of Responses
Table 2.2 shows the distribution of responses across the full sample and each experimental
condition for Out-Group Neighbor. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 do the same for Out-Group Friend and
Out-Group Values, respectively. Across all tables, I provide both the number and percentage
of respondents who correspond to each response category.
Table 2.2: Distribution of Responses Across 4-Point Scale, Out-Group Neighbor
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
All Respondents
# (%) 77 (7%) 48 (4%) 326 (30%) 650 (59%)
Control Condition
# (%) 16 (5%) 12 (3%) 100 (28%) 225 (64%)
Violence Prime
# (%) 28 (7%) 20 (5%) 120 (32%) 209 (55%)
Identity Prime
# (%) 33 (9%) 16 (4%) 106 (29%) 216 (58%)
Table 2.3: Distribution of Responses Across 4-Point Scale, Out-Group Friend
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
All Respondents
# (%) 91 (9%) 92 (9%) 391 (37%) 493 (46%)
Control Condition
# (%) 19 (6%) 15 (4%) 126 (37%) 182 (53%)
Violence Prime
# (%) 34 (9%) 46 (13%) 137 (37%) 149 (41%)
Identity Prime
# (%) 38 (11%) 31 (9%) 128 (36%) 162 (45%)
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Table 2.4: Distribution of Responses Across 4-Point Scale, Out-Group Values
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
All Respondents
# (%) 112 (12%) 184 (19%) 432 (44%) 245 (25%)
Control Condition
# (%) 25 (8%) 56 (17%) 147 (46%) 93 (29%)
Violence Prime
# (%) 37 (12%) 64 (20%) 156 (49%) 64 (20%)
Identity Prime
# (%) 50 (15%) 64 (19%) 129 (39%) 88 (27%)
2.7.6 Balance Tests
Tables 2.5 through 2.9 present the results from balance tests. Table 2.5 shows the results
before dropping cases due to non-response in Out-Group Neighbor, Out-Group Friend, or
Out-Group Values. Table 2.6 shows the results after dropping cases due to non-response in
any of the dependent variables. Tables 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 show the results after dropping cases
due to non-response in Out-Group Neighbor, Out-Group Friend, and Out-Group Values,
respectively. Non-response was mild for the Out-Group Neighbor (2.1%) and Out-Group
Friend (5.2%) questions. For Out-Group Values, non-response was higher but not severe
(13.5%). 84.9% of the respondents answered all three of the survey questions that serve as
dependent variables.
The models are probit regressions that correspond to pairwise comparisons between ex-
perimental conditions. For each model, the dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator
of condition assignment. Across all tables, Models 1 and 2 compare the control condition
and the Violence Prime (1 = Violence Prime, 0 = control). Models 3 and 4 compare the
control condition and the Identity Prime (1 = Identity Prime, 0 = control). Models 5 and
6 compare the Identity Prime and the Violence Prime (1 = Violence Prime, 0 = Identity
Prime). Models 1, 3, and 5 examine whether the experimental conditions are well-balanced
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across only pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models 2, 4,
and 6 examine whether the experimental conditions are well-balanced across both pre- and
post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status).
As the results show, the experimental conditions are well-balanced across most covari-
ates, including ethnicity, gender, education, marital status, and employment status. Only
respondent age is correlated with treatment assignment. However, in substantive terms,
differences in respondent age are modest: average age is 43.5, 45.7, and 41.8 years for the
control, Violence Prime, and Identity Prime conditions, respectively. Additionally, as shown
in 2.7.7 and 2.7.8, respondent age is an inconsistent and typically insignificant predictor of
attitudes toward out-groups and none of the substantive conclusions depend on the inclusion
/ exclusion of covariate controls.
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Table 2.5: Balance Test on Respondent Characteristics, Before Non-Response
for Out-Group Neighbor, Out-Group Friend, or Out-Group Values
Variables DV: DV: DV: DV: DV: DV:
Violence Violence Identity Identity Violence Violence
Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime
Croat −0.140 −0.146 −0.204 −0.186 0.060 0.026
(0.149) (0.152) (0.151) (0.153) (0.156) (0.159)
Serb 0.072 0.074 0.008 0.017 0.070 0.069
(0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.098) (0.099)
Male 0.019 0.030 −0.053 −0.030 0.064 0.048
(0.094) (0.097) (0.094) (0.098) (0.093) (0.096)
Age 0.006 0.006 −0.003 −0.004 0.009∗ 0.010∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Education 0.031 0.039 0.032 0.028 −0.002 0.009
(0.045) (0.048) (0.045) (0.048) (0.043) (0.045)
Married −0.062 0.029 −0.111
(0.101) (0.103) (0.101)
Employed −0.025 0.013 −0.021
(0.134) (0.133) (0.130)
Unemployed −0.054 −0.063 0.007
(0.129) (0.129) (0.127)
Constant −0.372 −0.370 0.067 0.095 −0.437 −0.461
(0.290) (0.305) (0.288) (0.303) (0.277) (0.294)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Identity Identity
Condition Prime Prime
N 747 734 738 725 765 757
AIC 1041 1027 1030 1018 1060 1054
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents
assigned to control or the Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Identity Prime. Models 5 and 6 cover respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime.
Models 1, 3, and 5 only include pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models 2,
4, and 6 include both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). The reference
level for ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.6: Balance Test on Respondent Characteristics, After Non-Response
for Out-Group Neighbor, Out-Group Friend, or Out-Group Values
Variables DV: DV: DV: DV: DV: DV:
Violence Violence Identity Identity Violence Violence
Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime
Croat −0.227 −0.232 −0.148 −0.128 −0.071 −0.110
(0.164) (0.168) (0.159) (0.162) (0.171) (0.175)
Serb 0.020 0.023 0.001 0.010 0.034 0.031
(0.110) (0.111) (0.110) (0.111) (0.109) (0.110)
Male 0.054 0.040 −0.101 −0.076 0.145 0.101
(0.102) (0.106) (0.101) (0.105) (0.101) (0.105)
Age 0.005 0.007 −0.003 −0.003 0.007∗ 0.010∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Education 0.058 0.057 0.054 0.051 −0.003 0.001
(0.051) (0.055) (0.050) (0.052) (0.048) (0.050)
Married −0.089 −0.006 −0.111
(0.111) (0.111) (0.113)
Employed 0.091 0.019 0.096
(0.146) (0.141) (0.142)
Unemployed 0.039 −0.024 0.060
(0.141) (0.137) (0.140)
Constant −0.475 −0.539 −0.052 −0.051 −0.381 −0.464
(0.322) (0.339) (0.310) (0.326) (0.307) (0.328)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Identity Identity
Condition Prime Prime
N 632 620 641 628 637 630
AIC 883 871 896 885 887 882
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents
assigned to control or the Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Identity Prime. Models 5 and 6 cover respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime.
Models 1, 3, and 5 only include pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models 2,
4, and 6 include both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). The reference
level for ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.7: Balance Test on Respondent Characteristics, After Non-Response
for Out-Group Neighbor
Variables DV: DV: DV: DV: DV: DV:
Violence Violence Identity Identity Violence Violence
Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime
Croat −0.137 −0.144 −0.176 −0.157 0.038 0.003
(0.152) (0.155) (0.152) (0.155) (0.158) (0.161)
Serb 0.085 0.088 0.007 0.016 0.085 0.083
(0.101) (0.102) (0.102) (0.104) (0.099) (0.100)
Male 0.022 0.032 −0.056 −0.030 0.069 0.051
(0.095) (0.099) (0.095) (0.099) (0.094) (0.097)
Age 0.005 0.006 −0.003 −0.003 0.009∗ 0.010∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Education 0.028 0.035 0.032 0.029 −0.005 0.004
(0.046) (0.049) (0.046) (0.049) (0.043) (0.045)
Married −0.065 0.015 −0.100
(0.103) (0.104) (0.102)
Employed −0.020 0.004 −0.005
(0.135) (0.135) (0.131)
Unemployed −0.058 −0.055 −0.003
(0.130) (0.130) (0.128)
Constant −0.350 −0.345 0.067 0.089 −0.410 −0.427
(0.292) (0.308) (0.291) (0.306) (0.280) (0.297)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Identity Identity
Condition Prime Prime
N 730 717 724 711 748 740
AIC 1018 1004 1011 999 1038 1032
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents
assigned to control or the Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Identity Prime. Models 5 and 6 cover respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime.
Models 1, 3, and 5 only include pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models 2,
4, and 6 include both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). The reference
level for ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.8: Balance Test on Respondent Characteristics, After Non-Response
for Out-Group Friend
Variables DV: DV: DV: DV: DV: DV:
Violence Violence Identity Identity Violence Violence
Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime
Croat −0.166 −0.168 −0.163 −0.143 −0.004 −0.039
(0.154) (0.158) (0.153) (0.156) (0.160) (0.163)
Serb 0.078 0.082 −0.006 0.004 0.091 0.088
(0.103) (0.104) (0.104) (0.106) (0.101) (0.102)
Male 0.011 0.019 −0.066 −0.036 0.070 0.045
(0.097) (0.100) (0.097) (0.101) (0.095) (0.099)
Age 0.006 0.007 −0.003 −0.003 0.009∗ 0.010∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Education 0.037 0.045 0.047 0.047 −0.012 −0.006
(0.047) (0.050) (0.047) (0.050) (0.044) (0.046)
Married −0.077 0.009 −0.111
(0.104) (0.106) (0.104)
Employed −0.006 −0.014 0.027
(0.138) (0.136) (0.133)
Unemployed −0.010 −0.050 0.035
(0.133) (0.132) (0.130)
Constant −0.391 −0.420 −0.003 0.008 −0.375 −0.417
(0.297) (0.314) (0.295) (0.310) (0.283) (0.301)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Identity Identity
Condition Prime Prime
N 708 695 701 688 725 717
AIC 987 973 979 967 1006 999
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents
assigned to control or the Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Identity Prime. Models 5 and 6 cover respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime.
Models 1, 3, and 5 only include pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models 2,
4, and 6 include both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). The reference
level for ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.9: Balance Test on Respondent Characteristics, After Non-Response
for Out-Group Values
Variables DV: DV: DV: DV: DV: DV:
Violence Violence Identity Identity Violence Violence
Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime
Croat −0.172 −0.179 −0.160 −0.139 −0.009 −0.051
(0.160) (0.164) (0.158) (0.161) (0.168) (0.171)
Serb 0.042 0.043 0.047 0.055 0.008 0.004
(0.109) (0.110) (0.108) (0.110) (0.107) (0.108)
Male 0.041 0.026 −0.102 −0.082 0.134 0.095
(0.101) (0.105) (0.100) (0.104) (0.100) (0.104)
Age 0.005 0.007 −0.003 −0.002 0.007∗ 0.009∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Education 0.049 0.046 0.040 0.034 0.004 0.010
(0.051) (0.054) (0.049) (0.052) (0.047) (0.050)
Married −0.095 −0.000 −0.116
(0.110) (0.110) (0.111)
Employed 0.101 0.047 0.075
(0.144) (0.140) (0.140)
Unemployed 0.026 −0.014 0.037
(0.140) (0.137) (0.139)
Constant −0.444 −0.496 −0.004 −0.006 −0.405 −0.471
(0.318) (0.335) (0.307) (0.324) (0.304) (0.325)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Identity Identity
Condition Prime Prime
N 642 630 652 639 652 645
AIC 898 885 911 900 908 904
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents
assigned to control or the Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Identity Prime. Models 5 and 6 cover respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime.
Models 1, 3, and 5 only include pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models 2,
4, and 6 include both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). The reference
level for ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05
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2.7.7 Supplementary Model Results
This section reports the results of the additional model specifications referred to throughout
the main text. Below I present the following:
* Tables 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, and 2.13 present the full regression output for the models that
were used to create Figures 2.3 (OLS), 2.4 (ordered probit), 2.5 (OLS), and 2.6 (ordered
probit) of the main text, respectively.
* Tables 2.14, 2.15, 2.16, and 2.17 present the results after controlling for pre- or pre-
and post-treatment covariates. Tables 2.14 and 2.15 replicate the analyses from Tables
2.10 and 2.11, respectively, while controlling for respondent covariates. Tables 2.16 and
2.17 replicate the analyses from Tables 2.12 and 2.13, respectively, while controlling for
respondent covariates. Across all tables, Models 1, 3, and 5 control for only pre-treatment
covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models 2, 4, and 6 show the results when
controlling for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status).
Additionally, across all tables, the dependent variable is Out-Group Neighbor for Models 1
and 2, Out-Group Friend for Models 3 and 4, and Out-Group Values for Models 5 and 6.
* Tables 2.18, 2.19, and 2.20 show the results from propensity score weighted regressions.
Probit regression was used to estimate propensity scores across all models presented in these
tables. The dependent variable is Out-Group Neighbor, Out-Group Friend, and Out-Group
Values for Tables 2.18, 2.19, and 2.20, respectively. I subset the data in order to compare
experimental conditions. Across all tables, Models 1 and 2 cover respondents assigned to
control or the Violence Prime while Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control
or the Identity Prime. In Models 1 and 3, only pre-treatment covariates were used in the
estimation of propensity scores. Both pre- and post-treatment covariates were used in the
estimation of propensity scores for Models 2 and 4.
* Tables 2.21, 2.22, and 2.23 show the results from propensity score weighted regressions.
Generalized boosted regression was used to estimate propensity scores across all models
presented in these tables. What distinguishes propensity score estimation conducted with
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generalized boosted regression is that interactions between covariates are permitted in de-
riving propensity scores for observations. The dependent variable is Out-Group Neighbor,
Out-Group Friend, andOut-Group Values for Tables 2.21, 2.22, and 2.23, respectively. Across
all tables, Models 1 and 2 cover respondents assigned to control or the Violence Prime while
Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the Identity Prime. In Models 1 and
3, only pre-treatment covariates were used in the estimation of propensity scores. Both pre-
and post-treatment covariates were used in the estimation of propensity scores for Models 2
and 4.
* Tables 2.24, 2.25, and 2.26 show the results from a series of probit regressions that
employ dichotomous versions of the original dependent variables. For each of the variables, I
collapsed “strongly disagree” with “disagree” (0) with “strongly agree” and “agree” (1). Table
2.24 corresponds to Out-Group Neighbor, Table 2.25 corresponds to Out-Group Friend, and
Table 2.26 corresponds to Out-Group Values. For every model presented in every table,
the independent variables are dummies for each prime, making the control condition the
comparison group. For every table, Model 1 presents the results without controls, Model 2
includes controls for only pre-treatment covariates, and Model 3 includes controls for both
pre- and post-treatment covariates. Because dichotomizing the original dependent variables
significantly reduces variation in these variables, I also note when treatment effects achieve
statistical significance at the 90% level. As the results in these tables show, the treatment
effects for both the Violence Prime and the Identity Prime are always significant at either
the 90% level or higher.
* Table 2.27 shows the results when a factor scale, Attitudes Scale, is used as the de-
pendent variable. Out-Group Neighbor, Out-Group Friend, Out-Group Values, and a factor
analysis were used to create the scale. For every model, the independent variables are dum-
mies for each prime, making the control condition the comparison group. Model 1 presents
the results without controls, Model 2 includes controls for only pre-treatment covariates, and
Model 3 includes controls for both pre- and post-treatment covariates.
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Table 2.10: The Effects of Violence Salience on Views of Out-Groups, OLS
Models
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Neighbor Friend Values
Violence Prime −0.160∗ −0.282∗ −0.190∗
(0.062) (0.067) (0.070)
Constant 3.513∗ 3.377∗ 2.960∗
(0.044) (0.048) (0.050)
Comparison Control Control Control
Condition
N 730 708 642
R2 0.009 0.025 0.011
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable
is Out-Group Neighbor (on 1-4 scale), Out-Group Friend (on 1-4 scale), and Out-Group Values (on 1-4 scale)
for Models 1, 2, and 3, respectively. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.11: The Effects of Violence Salience on Views of Out-Groups, Ordered
Probit Models
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Neighbor Friend Values
Violence Prime −0.228∗ −0.355∗ −0.238∗
(0.088) (0.085) (0.086)
Comparison Control Control Control
Condition
N 730 708 642
AIC 1428 1589 1590
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable
is Out-Group Neighbor (on 1-4 scale), Out-Group Friend (on 1-4 scale), and Out-Group Values (on 1-4 scale)
for Models 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Threshold coefficients are not presented. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.12: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of
Out-Groups, OLS Models
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Neighbor Friend Values
Violence Prime −0.160∗ −0.282∗ −0.190∗
(0.064) (0.069) (0.074)
Identity Prime −0.152∗ −0.224∗ −0.189∗
(0.064) (0.069) (0.073)
Constant 3.513∗ 3.377∗ 2.960∗
(0.046) (0.049) (0.052)
Comparison Control Control Control
Condition
N 1101 1067 973
R2 0.007 0.017 0.009
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable
is Out-Group Neighbor (on 1-4 scale), Out-Group Friend (on 1-4 scale), and Out-Group Values (on 1-4 scale)
for Models 1, 2, and 3, respectively. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.13: The Effects of Violence Salience and Identity on Views of
Out-Groups, Ordered Probit Models
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Neighbor Friend Values
Violence Prime −0.224∗ −0.348∗ −0.228∗
(0.088) (0.085) (0.085)
Identity Prime −0.191∗ −0.268∗ −0.204∗
(0.089) (0.086) (0.085)
Comparison Control Control Control
Condition
N 1101 1067 973
AIC 2192 2437 2476
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable
is Out-Group Neighbor (on 1-4 scale), Out-Group Friend (on 1-4 scale), and Out-Group Values (on 1-4 scale)
for Models 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Threshold coefficients are not presented. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.14: The Effects of Violence Salience on Views of Out-Groups, OLS Models, With
Controls
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Neighbor Neighbor Friend Friend Values Values
Violence Prime −0.157∗ −0.140∗ −0.277∗ −0.263∗ −0.204∗ −0.190∗
(0.061) (0.062) (0.066) (0.067) (0.069) (0.069)
Croat −0.100 −0.106 −0.026 −0.020 −0.348∗ −0.347∗
(0.100) (0.101) (0.107) (0.109) (0.111) (0.113)
Serb −0.198∗ −0.212∗ −0.301∗ −0.309∗ −0.276∗ −0.288∗
(0.066) (0.067) (0.071) (0.072) (0.076) (0.076)
Male −0.001 0.025 −0.049 −0.038 0.036 −0.007
(0.062) (0.064) (0.067) (0.070) (0.070) (0.072)
Age 0.002 −0.000 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Education 0.082∗ 0.075∗ 0.085∗ 0.078∗ 0.144∗ 0.112∗
(0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.035) (0.037)
Married 0.016 −0.046 −0.019
(0.067) (0.072) (0.076)
Employed −0.035 0.042 0.230∗
(0.088) (0.096) (0.100)
Unemployed −0.144 0.016 0.025
(0.085) (0.092) (0.096)
Constant 3.161∗ 3.294∗ 3.005∗ 3.016∗ 2.321∗ 2.379∗
(0.193) (0.202) (0.207) (0.219) (0.222) (0.232)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Control Control
Condition
N 730 717 708 695 642 630
R2 0.031 0.035 0.058 0.057 0.063 0.071
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable
is Out-Group Neighbor (on 1-4 scale) for Models 1 and 2, Out-Group Friend (on 1-4 scale) for Models 3 and
4, and Out-Group Values (on 1-4 scale) for Models 5 and 6. Models 1, 3, and 5 include controls for only
pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education). Models 2, 4, and 6 include controls for both
pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). The reference level for respondent
ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.15: The Effects of Violence Salience on Views of Out-Groups, Ordered Probit
Models, With Controls
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Neighbor Neighbor Friend Friend Values Values
Violence Prime −0.227∗ −0.207∗ −0.356∗ −0.342∗ −0.260∗ −0.245∗
(0.088) (0.089) (0.086) (0.087) (0.086) (0.087)
Croat −0.176 −0.197 −0.082 −0.082 −0.442∗ −0.444∗
(0.144) (0.147) (0.141) (0.144) (0.138) (0.141)
Serb −0.343∗ −0.364∗ −0.456∗ −0.464∗ −0.392∗ −0.408∗
(0.095) (0.096) (0.092) (0.093) (0.094) (0.096)
Male 0.006 0.045 −0.074 −0.060 0.043 −0.013
(0.090) (0.094) (0.087) (0.091) (0.087) (0.091)
Age 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Education 0.108∗ 0.104∗ 0.102∗ 0.095∗ 0.171∗ 0.133∗
(0.044) (0.047) (0.043) (0.045) (0.044) (0.047)
Married −0.004 −0.079 −0.019
(0.097) (0.095) (0.095)
Employed −0.063 0.059 0.290∗
(0.129) (0.124) (0.125)
Unemployed −0.191 0.054 0.036
(0.122) (0.119) (0.120)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Control Control
Condition
N 730 717 708 695 642 630
AIC 1419 1396 1568 1546 1564 1536
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable
is Out-Group Neighbor (on 1-4 scale) for Models 1 and 2, Out-Group Friend (on 1-4 scale) for Models 3 and
4, and Out-Group Values (on 1-4 scale) for Models 5 and 6. Models 1, 3, and 5 include controls for only
pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education). Models 2, 4, and 6 include controls for both
pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). The reference level for respondent
ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. Threshold coefficients
are not presented. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.16: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of Out-Groups, OLS
Models, With Controls
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Neighbor Neighbor Friend Friend Values Values
Violence Prime −0.155∗ −0.138∗ −0.274∗ −0.261∗ −0.200∗ −0.184∗
(0.063) (0.063) (0.068) (0.068) (0.072) (0.073)
Identity Prime −0.162∗ −0.146∗ −0.230∗ −0.214∗ −0.202∗ −0.176∗
(0.064) (0.064) (0.068) (0.069) (0.072) (0.072)
Croat −0.095 −0.106 −0.005 −0.007 −0.255∗ −0.251∗
(0.085) (0.086) (0.091) (0.092) (0.096) (0.098)
Serb −0.188∗ −0.196∗ −0.290∗ −0.294∗ −0.231∗ −0.234∗
(0.056) (0.056) (0.060) (0.061) (0.064) (0.065)
Male −0.044 −0.042 −0.049 −0.053 −0.005 −0.036
(0.052) (0.054) (0.056) (0.058) (0.060) (0.062)
Age 0.001 −0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Education 0.104∗ 0.093∗ 0.094∗ 0.086∗ 0.145∗ 0.129∗
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030)
Married 0.007 −0.025 0.013
(0.056) (0.061) (0.065)
Employed 0.027 0.051 0.121
(0.073) (0.079) (0.084)
Unemployed −0.122 −0.013 0.003
(0.071) (0.077) (0.082)
Constant 3.118∗ 3.236∗ 2.999∗ 3.028∗ 2.355∗ 2.380∗
(0.163) (0.170) (0.174) (0.183) (0.188) (0.197)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Control Control
Condition
N 1101 1084 1067 1050 973 957
R2 0.034 0.038 0.050 0.049 0.050 0.052
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable
is Out-Group Neighbor (on 1-4 scale) for Models 1 and 2, Out-Group Friend (on 1-4 scale) for Models 3 and
4, and Out-Group Values (on 1-4 scale) for Models 5 and 6. Models 1, 3, and 5 include controls for only
pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education). Models 2, 4, and 6 include controls for both
pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). The reference level for respondent
ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.17: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of Out-Groups, Ordered
Probit Models, With Controls
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Neighbor Neighbor Friend Friend Values Values
Violence Prime −0.221∗ −0.202∗ −0.345∗ −0.331∗ −0.244∗ −0.225∗
(0.088) (0.089) (0.086) (0.087) (0.086) (0.087)
Identity Prime −0.204∗ −0.187∗ −0.280∗ −0.263∗ −0.221∗ −0.192∗
(0.089) (0.090) (0.087) (0.088) (0.085) (0.086)
Croat −0.162 −0.182 −0.032 −0.040 −0.308∗ −0.305∗
(0.118) (0.121) (0.116) (0.118) (0.113) (0.116)
Serb −0.332∗ −0.346∗ −0.434∗ −0.441∗ −0.319∗ −0.324∗
(0.077) (0.078) (0.075) (0.076) (0.076) (0.077)
Male −0.058 −0.055 −0.065 −0.072 0.003 −0.035
(0.073) (0.076) (0.071) (0.074) (0.071) (0.073)
Age 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Education 0.137∗ 0.123∗ 0.110∗ 0.100∗ 0.162∗ 0.145∗
(0.035) (0.037) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
Married −0.017 −0.055 0.017
(0.080) (0.077) (0.077)
Employed 0.047 0.080 0.146
(0.104) (0.100) (0.099)
Unemployed −0.138 0.023 0.010
(0.099) (0.096) (0.097)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Control Control
Condition
N 1101 1084 1067 1050 973 957
AIC 2167 2131 2403 2367 2443 2404
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable
is Out-Group Neighbor (on 1-4 scale) for Models 1 and 2, Out-Group Friend (on 1-4 scale) for Models 3 and
4, and Out-Group Values (on 1-4 scale) for Models 5 and 6. Models 1, 3, and 5 include controls for only
pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education). Models 2, 4, and 6 include controls for both
pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). The reference level for respondent
ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. Threshold coefficients
are not presented. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.18: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of
Out-Groups (Out-Group Neighbor), Propensity Score Weighted Regression,
Probit Regression Method
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Neighbor Neighbor Neighbor Neighbor
Violence Prime −0.157∗ −0.139∗
(0.061) (0.061)
Identity Prime −0.165∗ −0.150∗
(0.062) (0.062)
Croat −0.113 −0.121 −0.077 −0.102
(0.103) (0.103) (0.106) (0.108)
Serb −0.210∗ −0.226∗ −0.238∗ −0.237∗
(0.066) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069)
Male 0.003 0.025 −0.083 −0.105
(0.061) (0.062) (0.064) (0.066)
Age 0.001 −0.000 −0.001 −0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Education 0.082∗ 0.077∗ 0.116∗ 0.105∗







Constant 3.164∗ 3.288∗ 3.179∗ 3.295∗
(0.196) (0.204) (0.190) (0.193)
Comparison Control Control Control Control
Condition
N 730 717 724 711
AIC 1801 1762 1808 1769
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. I subset the data
in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the Identity Prime. The dependent
variable is Out-Group Neighbor (on 1-4 scale). Probit regression was used to estimate propensity scores. Only
pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education) were used in the estimation of propensity scores
for Models 1 and 3. Both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status) were used
in the estimation of propensity scores for Models 2 and 4. The reference level for respondent ethnicity is
Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. ∗p < 0.05
55
Table 2.19: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of
Out-Groups (Out-Group Friend), Propensity Score Weighted Regression,
Probit Regression Method
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Friend Friend Friend Friend
Violence Prime −0.277∗ −0.263∗
(0.065) (0.066)
Identity Prime −0.231∗ −0.216∗
(0.067) (0.067)
Croat −0.051 −0.043 0.073 0.050
(0.101) (0.099) (0.105) (0.107)
Serb −0.312∗ −0.322∗ −0.303∗ −0.300∗
(0.071) (0.072) (0.073) (0.073)
Male −0.037 −0.025 −0.067 −0.067
(0.065) (0.066) (0.068) (0.071)
Age 0.003 0.003 0.001 −0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Education 0.083∗ 0.076∗ 0.098∗ 0.099∗







Constant 3.014∗ 3.027∗ 3.020∗ 3.090∗
(0.221) (0.236) (0.215) (0.220)
Comparison Control Control Control Control
Condition
N 708 695 701 688
AIC 1826 1794 1823 1791
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. I subset the data
in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the Identity Prime. The dependent
variable is Out-Group Friend (on 1-4 scale). Probit regression was used to estimate propensity scores. Only
pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education) were used in the estimation of propensity scores
for Models 1 and 3. Both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status) were used
in the estimation of propensity scores for Models 2 and 4. The reference level for respondent ethnicity is
Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.20: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of
Out-Groups (Out-Group Values), Propensity Score Weighted Regression,
Probit Regression Method
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Values Values Values Values
Violence Prime −0.204∗ −0.190∗
(0.068) (0.069)
Identity Prime −0.201∗ −0.175∗
(0.073) (0.073)
Croat −0.366∗ −0.365∗ −0.123 −0.121
(0.124) (0.122) (0.129) (0.132)
Serb −0.285∗ −0.302∗ −0.217∗ −0.212∗
(0.070) (0.071) (0.074) (0.074)
Male 0.035 −0.005 −0.036 −0.058
(0.068) (0.070) (0.076) (0.078)
Age 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Education 0.144∗ 0.112∗ 0.158∗ 0.149∗







Constant 2.341∗ 2.400∗ 2.298∗ 2.319∗
(0.236) (0.248) (0.257) (0.266)
Comparison Control Control Control Control
Condition
N 642 630 652 639
AIC 1651 1619 1771 1735
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. I subset the data
in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the Identity Prime. The dependent
variable is Out-Group Values (on 1-4 scale). Probit regression was used to estimate propensity scores. Only
pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education) were used in the estimation of propensity scores
for Models 1 and 3. Both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status) were used
in the estimation of propensity scores for Models 2 and 4. The reference level for respondent ethnicity is
Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.21: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of
Out-Groups (Out-Group Neighbor), Propensity Score Weighted Regression,
Generalized Boosted Regression Method
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Neighbor Neighbor Neighbor Neighbor
Violence Prime −0.157∗ −0.139∗
(0.061) (0.061)
Identity Prime −0.165∗ −0.150∗
(0.062) (0.062)
Croat −0.100 −0.107 −0.078 −0.101
(0.098) (0.099) (0.101) (0.104)
Serb −0.204∗ −0.218∗ −0.240∗ −0.237∗
(0.066) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069)
Male −0.002 0.022 −0.082 −0.100
(0.061) (0.061) (0.063) (0.065)
Age 0.001 −0.000 −0.001 −0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Education 0.082∗ 0.076∗ 0.115∗ 0.105∗







Constant 3.170∗ 3.302∗ 3.188∗ 3.303∗
(0.194) (0.203) (0.190) (0.193)
Comparison Control Control Control Control
Condition
N 730 717 724 711
AIC 1793 1757 1799 1762
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. I subset the data
in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the Identity Prime. The dependent
variable is Out-Group Neighbor (on 1-4 scale). Generalized boosted regression was used to estimate propen-
sity scores. Only pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education) were used in the estimation
of propensity scores for Models 1 and 3. Both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employ-
ment status) were used in the estimation of propensity scores for Models 2 and 4. The reference level for
respondent ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.22: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of
Out-Groups (Out-Group Friend), Propensity Score Weighted Regression,
Generalized Boosted Regression Method
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Friend Friend Friend Friend
Violence Prime −0.276∗ −0.263∗
(0.065) (0.066)
Identity Prime −0.231∗ −0.216∗
(0.067) (0.067)
Croat −0.020 −0.015 0.066 0.046
(0.094) (0.093) (0.098) (0.101)
Serb −0.303∗ −0.311∗ −0.304∗ −0.298∗
(0.071) (0.072) (0.073) (0.073)
Male −0.051 −0.039 −0.069 −0.065
(0.064) (0.065) (0.067) (0.070)
Age 0.003 0.003 0.001 −0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Education 0.085∗ 0.079∗ 0.097∗ 0.100∗







Constant 3.009∗ 3.024∗ 3.032∗ 3.100∗
(0.220) (0.233) (0.214) (0.219)
Comparison Control Control Control Control
Condition
N 708 695 701 688
AIC 1818 1789 1815 1784
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. I subset the data
in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the Identity Prime. The dependent
variable is Out-Group Friend (on 1-4 scale). Generalized boosted regression was used to estimate propensity
scores. Only pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education) were used in the estimation of
propensity scores for Models 1 and 3. Both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment
status) were used in the estimation of propensity scores for Models 2 and 4. The reference level for respondent
ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.23: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of
Out-Groups (Out-Group Values), Propensity Score Weighted Regression,
Generalized Boosted Regression Method
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Values Values Values Values
Violence Prime −0.204∗ −0.190∗
(0.068) (0.068)
Identity Prime −0.200∗ −0.175∗
(0.073) (0.073)
Croat −0.341∗ −0.340∗ −0.120 −0.120
(0.122) (0.121) (0.125) (0.128)
Serb −0.276∗ −0.288∗ −0.216∗ −0.212∗
(0.070) (0.071) (0.074) (0.074)
Male 0.035 −0.008 −0.031 −0.056
(0.069) (0.070) (0.075) (0.077)
Age 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Education 0.145∗ 0.113∗ 0.158∗ 0.148∗







Constant 2.314∗ 2.373∗ 2.292∗ 2.313∗
(0.238) (0.252) (0.256) (0.266)
Comparison Control Control Control Control
Condition
N 642 630 652 639
AIC 1652 1620 1764 1730
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. I subset the data
in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the Identity Prime. The dependent
variable is Out-Group Values (on 1-4 scale). Generalized boosted regression was used to estimate propensity
scores. Only pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education) were used in the estimation of
propensity scores for Models 1 and 3. Both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment
status) were used in the estimation of propensity scores for Models 2 and 4. The reference level for respondent
ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.24: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of
Out-Groups, Dichotomous Out-Group Neighbor Outcome, Probit Regression




Violence Prime −0.271∗∗ −0.275∗∗ −0.248∗
(0.128) (0.130) (0.132)


















Constant 1.410∗∗ 0.716∗∗ 0.930∗∗
(0.097) (0.320) (0.341)
Comparison Control Control Control
Condition
N 1101 1101 1084
AIC 779 768 746
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable
is a dichotomous version of Out-Group Neighbor (0 = “strongly disagree” or “disagree”, 1 = “strongly agree”
or “agree”). Model 2 includes controls for only pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education).
Model 3 includes controls for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status).
The reference level for respondent ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in
labor force. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.25: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of
Out-Groups, Dichotomous Out-Group Friend Outcome, Probit Regression




Violence Prime −0.508∗∗ −0.512∗∗ −0.487∗∗
(0.118) (0.119) (0.120)


















Constant 1.285∗∗ 0.807∗∗ 0.903∗∗
(0.093) (0.293) (0.308)
Comparison Control Control Control
Condition
N 1067 1067 1050
AIC 963 960 948
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable
is a dichotomous version of Out-Group Friend (0 = “strongly disagree” or “disagree”, 1 = “strongly agree”
or “agree”). Model 2 includes controls for only pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education).
Model 3 includes controls for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status).
The reference level for respondent ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in
labor force. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.26: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of
Out-Groups, Dichotomous Out-Group Values Outcome, Probit Regression




Violence Prime −0.184∗ −0.204∗ −0.184∗
(0.105) (0.107) (0.108)


















Constant 0.667∗∗ −0.205 −0.095
(0.076) (0.274) (0.288)
Comparison Control Control Control
Condition
N 973 973 957
AIC 1195 1169 1154
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable
is a dichotomous version of Out-Group Values (0 = “strongly disagree” or “disagree”, 1 = “strongly agree”
or “agree”). Model 2 includes controls for only pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education).
Model 3 includes controls for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status).
The reference level for respondent ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in
labor force. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.27: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of
Out-Groups, Attitudes Scale Outcome
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
Attitudes Scale Attitudes Scale Attitudes Scale
Violence Prime −0.254∗∗ −0.264∗∗ −0.242∗∗
(0.079) (0.078) (0.078)


















Constant 0.155∗∗ −0.488∗∗ −0.421∗∗
(0.056) (0.202) (0.212)
Comparison Control Control Control
Condition
N 955 955 939
R2 0.012 0.050 0.050
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent vari-
able is Attitudes Scale. Model 2 includes controls for only pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age,
education). Model 3 includes controls for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employ-
ment status). The reference level for respondent ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment
status is Not in labor force. ∗p < 0.05
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2.7.8 Sub-Group Analysis
In this section, I conduct an exploratory analysis of differences in the treatment effects across
ethnic groups. However, before doing so, I note a caveat. This study was not designed to
explore differences between ethnic groups. For instance, the sample is representative of the
country’s ethnic composition, and therefore, significant variation exists in the number of
respondents associated with each ethnic group that are present in the sample (Bosniaks
represent around 54% of the sample, Croats 11%, and Serbs 35%). This presents statistical
power issues, especially for Croats (125 Croats are present in the sample before non-response).
Therefore, this analysis is highly exploratory and only suggestive in nature. Due to this issue,
in the analysis below I also note when a treatment effect is weakly significant (p < 0.10).
Tables 2.28 through 2.36 present the results for Bosniak (2.28 / 2.29 / 2.30), Croat (2.31
/ 2.32 / 2.33), and Serb (2.34 / 2.35 / 2.36) respondents. The dependent variable is Out-
Group Neighbor for models presented in Tables 2.28 / 2.31 / 2.34, Out-Group Friend for
models presented in Tables 2.29 / 2.32 / 2.35, and Out-Group Values for models presented
in Tables 2.30 / 2.33 / 2.36. For every model, the independent variables are dummies for
each prime, making the control condition the comparison group. For every table, I report
both OLS (Models 1 / 2 / 3) and ordered probit (Models 4 / 5 / 6) regression results for (a)
models without covariate controls, (b) models that include controls for only pre-treatment
covariates, and (c) models that include controls for both pre- and post-treatment covariates.
A number of patterns emerge across all three ethnic groups. First, the treatment effects
for the Violence Prime and the Identity Prime are always negative, indicating that cuing
respondents on either past violence or identity reduces affinity for out-groups. Second, the
treatment effects for the two primes are always statistically indistinguishable from each other.
However, interesting differences also emerge across ethnic groups. For instance, the
results for Bosniak respondents most closely resemble the findings from the main analysis.
The treatment effects for both primes are negative and almost always significant at the 95%
level when Out-Group Neighbor or Out-Group Friend is the dependent variable. Also, when
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Out-Group Values is the dependent variable, the treatment effect for the Identity Prime is
always significant. The treatment effect for the Violence Prime, while typically insignificant,
is always negative.
The results for Croat respondents are more mixed. While the point estimates for the
treatment effects are generally quite similar to those found for Bosniaks (and sometimes
even larger in magnitude), only the estimates for the Violence Prime on Out-Group Friend
and Out-Group Values are consistently significant. Worth noting again is that Croats only
constitute around 11% of the sample. Therefore, given the small sample size, it is quite
reassuring that the estimates for the primes are always negative if not typically significant
at conventional levels.
Finally, the results for Serb respondents are perhaps the most interesting. The Violence
Prime is significant at either the 90% or 95% level only when Out-Group Friend is employed
as the dependent variable. However, what is more striking is that the point estimates for
Serb respondents are usually smaller, and sometimes quite notably so, than they are for
Bosniaks and Croats.
These differences between Serbs and non-Serbs appear to partly be driven by more nega-
tive baseline views of out-groups among Serb respondents. For example, among respondents
assigned to control, the mean value of Out-Group Neighbor is 3.623 for Bosniaks and 3.543
for Croats. For Serbs assigned to control, the mean value is 3.319. This means that for re-
spondents in the control condition, Serbs tend to answer on average around 0.304 and 0.224
points lower on the scale than do Bosniaks and Croats, respectively. In contrast, for respon-
dents assigned to the Violence Prime and Identity Prime conditions, inter-ethnic differences
in mean response are not as large. With respect to Violence Prime respondents, the mean
value of Out-Group Neighbor is 3.400 for Bosniaks, 3.289 for Croats, and 3.302 for Serbs
(0.098 point difference between Bosniaks and Serbs, −0.013 point difference between Croats
and Serbs). For Identity Prime respondents, the mean value is 3.430 for Bosniaks, 3.324
for Croats, and 3.260 for Serbs (0.170 point difference between Bosniaks and Serbs, 0.064
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point difference between Croats and Serbs). In other words, inter-ethic differences in how
respondents in control answer these questions appear to be more powerful in explaining the
smaller effect sizes for Serbs than are inter-ethnic differences among respondents assigned to
either prime.
Table 2.28: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of Out-Groups,
Out-Group Neighbor Outcome, Bosniak Respondents
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Neighbor Neighbor Neighbor Neighbor Neighbor Neighbor
Violence Prime −0.223∗∗ −0.210∗∗ −0.181∗∗ −0.299∗∗ −0.292∗∗ −0.258∗∗
(0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.125) (0.126) (0.127)
Identity Prime −0.193∗∗ −0.220∗∗ −0.211∗∗ −0.234∗ −0.271∗∗ −0.268∗∗
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.125) (0.126) (0.127)
Male −0.089 −0.070 −0.111 −0.089
(0.071) (0.073) (0.103) (0.106)
Age −0.004 −0.007∗∗ −0.005 −0.008∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Education 0.097∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.117∗∗







Constant 3.623∗∗ 3.391∗∗ 3.542∗∗
(0.062) (0.206) (0.220)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Control Control
Condition
N 598 598 589 598 598 589
AIC 1524 1512 1482 1094 1086 1069
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes
only Bosniak respondents. The dependent variable is Out-Group Neighbor (on 1-4 scale) for all models.
The modeling strategy is OLS for Models 1 through 3 and ordered probit regression for Models 4 though 6
(threshold coefficients are not presented). Models 2 and 5 include controls for only pre-treatment covariates
(gender, age, education). Models 3 and 6 include controls for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital
status, employment status). The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. ∗p < 0.10,
∗∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.29: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of Out-Groups,
Out-Group Friend Outcome, Bosniak Respondents
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Friend Friend Friend Friend Friend Friend
Violence Prime −0.265∗∗ −0.264∗∗ −0.248∗∗ −0.307∗∗ −0.315∗∗ −0.303∗∗
(0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.120) (0.121) (0.122)
Identity Prime −0.235∗∗ −0.260∗∗ −0.252∗∗ −0.273∗∗ −0.302∗∗ −0.297∗∗
(0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.119) (0.120) (0.121)
Male −0.019 −0.020 −0.017 −0.025
(0.080) (0.082) (0.099) (0.102)
Age −0.001 −0.002 −0.000 −0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Education 0.109∗∗ 0.096∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.110∗∗







Constant 3.473∗∗ 3.043∗∗ 3.111∗∗
(0.069) (0.229) (0.245)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Control Control
Condition
N 585 585 576 585 585 576
AIC 1601 1595 1570 1259 1255 1239
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes
only Bosniak respondents. The dependent variable is Out-Group Friend (on 1-4 scale) for all models. The
modeling strategy is OLS for Models 1 through 3 and ordered probit regression for Models 4 though 6
(threshold coefficients are not presented). Models 2 and 5 include controls for only pre-treatment covariates
(gender, age, education). Models 3 and 6 include controls for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital
status, employment status). The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. ∗p < 0.10,
∗∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.30: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of Out-Groups,
Out-Group Values Outcome, Bosniak Respondents
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Values Values Values Values Values Values
Violence Prime −0.142 −0.163 −0.146 −0.177 −0.206∗ −0.187
(0.105) (0.105) (0.106) (0.116) (0.117) (0.119)
Identity Prime −0.229∗∗ −0.261∗∗ −0.238∗∗ −0.239∗∗ −0.279∗∗ −0.256∗∗
(0.105) (0.104) (0.105) (0.116) (0.117) (0.118)
Male 0.003 −0.026 0.018 −0.017
(0.086) (0.088) (0.097) (0.099)
Age 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Education 0.154∗∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.166∗∗ 0.145∗∗







Constant 3.063∗∗ 2.297∗∗ 2.396∗∗
(0.075) (0.254) (0.272)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Control Control
Condition
N 533 533 524 533 533 524
AIC 1504 1494 1471 1358 1350 1331
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes
only Bosniak respondents. The dependent variable is Out-Group Values (on 1-4 scale) for all models. The
modeling strategy is OLS for Models 1 through 3 and ordered probit regression for Models 4 though 6
(threshold coefficients are not presented). Models 2 and 5 include controls for only pre-treatment covariates
(gender, age, education). Models 3 and 6 include controls for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital
status, employment status). The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. ∗p < 0.10,
∗∗p < 0.05
69
Table 2.31: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of Out-Groups,
Out-Group Neighbor Outcome, Croat Respondents
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Neighbor Neighbor Neighbor Neighbor Neighbor Neighbor
Violence Prime −0.254 −0.252 −0.192 −0.385 −0.370 −0.308
(0.193) (0.194) (0.185) (0.259) (0.260) (0.269)
Identity Prime −0.219 −0.193 −0.262 −0.280 −0.240 −0.302
(0.194) (0.197) (0.189) (0.264) (0.268) (0.278)
Male 0.199 0.085 0.271 0.065
(0.161) (0.165) (0.217) (0.243)
Age 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.011
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Education 0.074 0.028 0.080 0.007







Constant 3.544∗∗ 2.967∗∗ 3.095∗∗
(0.130) (0.556) (0.528)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Control Control
Condition
N 121 121 118 121 121 118
AIC 317 321 301 255 259 246
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes
only Croat respondents. The dependent variable is Out-Group Neighbor (on 1-4 scale) for all models. The
modeling strategy is OLS for Models 1 through 3 and ordered probit regression for Models 4 though 6
(threshold coefficients are not presented). Models 2 and 5 include controls for only pre-treatment covariates
(gender, age, education). Models 3 and 6 include controls for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital
status, employment status). The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. ∗p < 0.10,
∗∗p < 0.05
70
Table 2.32: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of Out-Groups,
Out-Group Friend Outcome, Croat Respondents
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Friend Friend Friend Friend Friend Friend
Violence Prime −0.500∗∗ −0.483∗∗ −0.422∗∗ −0.656∗∗ −0.639∗∗ −0.589∗∗
(0.189) (0.188) (0.186) (0.257) (0.258) (0.264)
Identity Prime −0.285 −0.317∗ −0.337∗ −0.320 −0.361 −0.376
(0.188) (0.188) (0.187) (0.262) (0.266) (0.273)
Male −0.001 −0.112 −0.033 −0.221
(0.155) (0.164) (0.213) (0.238)
Age 0.011∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.014∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Education 0.037 −0.018 0.048 −0.035







Constant 3.556∗∗ 2.896∗∗ 2.941∗∗
(0.126) (0.531) (0.522)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Control Control
Condition
N 118 118 115 118 118 115
AIC 300 301 290 262 264 258
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes
only Bosniak respondents. The dependent variable is Out-Group Friend (on 1-4 scale) for all models. The
modeling strategy is OLS for Models 1 through 3 and ordered probit regression for Models 4 though 6
(threshold coefficients are not presented). Models 2 and 5 include controls for only pre-treatment covariates
(gender, age, education). Models 3 and 6 include controls for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital
status, employment status). The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. ∗p < 0.10,
∗∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.33: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of Out-Groups,
Out-Group Values Outcome, Croat Respondents
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Values Values Values Values Values Values
Violence Prime −0.567∗∗ −0.581∗∗ −0.521∗∗ −0.606∗∗ −0.629∗∗ −0.598∗∗
(0.229) (0.231) (0.229) (0.250) (0.251) (0.259)
Identity Prime −0.195 −0.147 −0.189 −0.183 −0.137 −0.208
(0.227) (0.234) (0.233) (0.248) (0.254) (0.263)
Male 0.218 0.050 0.242 0.045
(0.194) (0.206) (0.209) (0.231)
Age −0.004 0.003 −0.005 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Education −0.021 −0.079 −0.035 −0.111







Constant 2.930∗∗ 3.056∗∗ 3.014∗∗
(0.151) (0.648) (0.637)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Control Control
Condition
N 110 110 107 110 110 107
AIC 315 319 307 299 304 292
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes
only Croat respondents. The dependent variable is Out-Group Values (on 1-4 scale) for all models. The
modeling strategy is OLS for Models 1 through 3 and ordered probit regression for Models 4 though 6
(threshold coefficients are not presented). Models 2 and 5 include controls for only pre-treatment covariates
(gender, age, education). Models 3 and 6 include controls for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital
status, employment status). The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. ∗p < 0.10,
∗∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.34: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of Out-Groups,
Out-Group Neighbor Outcome, Serb Respondents
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Neighbor Neighbor Neighbor Neighbor Neighbor Neighbor
Violence Prime −0.017 −0.014 −0.020 −0.044 −0.036 −0.041
(0.107) (0.106) (0.107) (0.143) (0.144) (0.146)
Identity Prime −0.059 −0.052 −0.027 −0.091 −0.075 −0.041
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.146) (0.147) (0.149)
Male −0.078 −0.078 −0.126 −0.118
(0.089) (0.092) (0.120) (0.125)
Age 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Education 0.144∗∗ 0.153∗∗ 0.198∗∗ 0.218∗∗







Constant 3.319∗∗ 2.423∗∗ 2.481∗∗
(0.079) (0.294) (0.306)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Control Control
Condition
N 382 382 377 382 382 377
AIC 966 961 947 824 819 811
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes
only Serb respondents. The dependent variable is Out-Group Neighbor (on 1-4 scale) for all models. The
modeling strategy is OLS for Models 1 through 3 and ordered probit regression for Models 4 though 6
(threshold coefficients are not presented). Models 2 and 5 include controls for only pre-treatment covariates
(gender, age, education). Models 3 and 6 include controls for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital
status, employment status). The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. ∗p < 0.10,
∗∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.35: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of Out-Groups,
Out-Group Friend Outcome, Serb Respondents
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Friend Friend Friend Friend Friend Friend
Violence Prime −0.204∗ −0.206∗ −0.200∗ −0.291∗∗ −0.293∗∗ −0.281∗
(0.110) (0.110) (0.111) (0.142) (0.142) (0.144)
Identity Prime −0.169 −0.179 −0.151 −0.234 −0.249∗ −0.215
(0.113) (0.113) (0.114) (0.146) (0.146) (0.148)
Male −0.131 −0.116 −0.190 −0.164
(0.092) (0.096) (0.118) (0.124)
Age 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Education 0.089∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.104∗ 0.143∗∗







Constant 3.144∗∗ 2.686∗∗ 2.605∗∗
(0.081) (0.307) (0.321)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Control Control
Condition
N 364 364 359 364 364 359
AIC 924 925 914 857 858 848
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes
only Serb respondents. The dependent variable is Out-Group Friend (on 1-4 scale) for all models. The
modeling strategy is OLS for Models 1 through 3 and ordered probit regression for Models 4 though 6
(threshold coefficients are not presented). Models 2 and 5 include controls for only pre-treatment covariates
(gender, age, education). Models 3 and 6 include controls for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital
status, employment status). The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. ∗p < 0.10,
∗∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.36: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of Out-Groups,
Out-Group Values Outcome, Serb Respondents
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6:
Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Values Values Values Values Values Values
Violence Prime −0.147 −0.145 −0.131 −0.215 −0.220 −0.198
(0.108) (0.105) (0.106) (0.150) (0.150) (0.152)
Identity Prime −0.115 −0.121 −0.094 −0.149 −0.164 −0.125
(0.107) (0.104) (0.105) (0.148) (0.149) (0.151)
Male −0.084 −0.079 −0.118 −0.109
(0.087) (0.091) (0.125) (0.131)
Age 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Education 0.201∗∗ 0.210∗∗ 0.279∗∗ 0.295∗∗







Constant 2.796∗∗ 1.833∗∗ 1.811∗∗
(0.078) (0.291) (0.304)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Control Control
Condition
N 330 330 326 330 330 326
AIC 785 770 762 764 751 744
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes
only Serb respondents. The dependent variable is Out-Group Values (on 1-4 scale) for all models. The
modeling strategy is OLS for Models 1 through 3 and ordered probit regression for Models 4 though 6
(threshold coefficients are not presented). Models 2 and 5 include controls for only pre-treatment covariates
(gender, age, education). Models 3 and 6 include controls for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital
status, employment status). The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. ∗p < 0.10,
∗∗p < 0.05
75
Chapter 3: Post-Conflict Tolerance of Inter-Ethnic Con-
tact
How does a history of violent conflict affect social relations between ordinary citizens? We
know from prior studies that violence committed during a conflict can remain tremendously
salient to citizens for years or even decades after the conflict ends (Balcells 2012; Lupu and
Peisakhin 2017). In part, this is explained by how political elites in post-conflict societies
often employ rhetoric that references past violence, thereby keeping memories of that violence
alive (Coble 2007; Edele 2017; Gries 2005; Wood 2011). In societies recovering from inter-
ethnic conflict, one of the primary reasons ethnic elites engage in this kind of rhetoric is to
engender popular hostility toward co-ethnic rivals or competitiors who advocate for inter-
ethnic engagement (Anzulovic 1999; Bieber 2002; Maksić 2017). In turn, ethnic elites can
benefit electorally from that increased hostility (Hadzic et al. 2017; Rozenas et al. 2017).
However, does a similar dynamic apply to the social sphere and among ordinary individuals?
Specifically, when citizens are exposed to rhetoric about past inter-ethnic violence, do they
reject and ostracize co-ethnic citizens who form social relationships with out-group members?
Alternatively, is it the case that post-conflict intra-ethnic bonds are sufficiently strong for
individuals to tolerate co-ethnics who cross group lines?
Whatever the answers are to these questions, a better understanding of how rhetoric
about past violence shapes intra-ethnic dynamics among ordinary citizens has important
implications for post-conflict reconciliation and reintegration prospects. For instance, we
know that repeated and sustained contact across ethnic lines can improve inter-ethnic re-
lations (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, 2008) and can do so even in societies that experienced
severe violence in the past (Alexander and Christia 2011; Mironova and Whitt 2014). How-
ever, if individuals are ostracized by their co-ethnics for crossing group boundaries, then
this poses an additional obstacle to such contact. Not only will people who harbor hostile
views of out-group members resist contact, but so may those who would otherwise be open
to inter-ethnic contact but fear how that will be received by their co-ethnics.
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Alternatively, if rhetoric that references past violence does not induce a co-ethnic backlash
against those who associate with out-groups, then we can be more optimistic about prospects
for post-conflict reconciliation. Those who are open to inter-ethnic contact can engage in it
without fear of co-ethnic ostracism. Moreover, even individuals who would ordinarily resist
contact and thereby forgo its potentially prosocial effects might nevertheless experience it
by virtue of associating with at least some co-ethnics who are actively engaged with out-
groups. In turn, post-conflict policies designed to integrate various social spheres may have
a “magnifying” effect in that these policies could (a) improve inter-ethnic relations among
target individuals and (b) have positive downstream effects by making these individuals
effective conduits for contact between their co-ethnics and various out-groups.
In order to examine whether rhetoric about past inter-ethnic violence shapes attitudes
toward co-ethnics who associate with out-groups, I conducted a survey experiment in the
post-conflict country of Bosnia. I find that respondents who are exposed to this rhetoric
do not reject co-ethnics who form social relationships with out-group members. Addition-
ally, this applies across all of Bosnia’s major ethnic groups as well as a host of moderating
variables. Ultimately, this provides reason to be optimistic about post-conflict inter-ethnic
relations. While rhetoric about past violence may engender hostility toward co-ethnic elites
who cross ethnic lines, this dynamic does not seem to spill over into the social sphere. I
further elaborate on the potential policy implications of this finding in the conclusion.
3.1 Case Selection and Research Design
The survey experiment was conducted in November and December of 2016 on a large
(N=1,125) and nationally representative sample of adult Bosnian citizens. The site of a
major ethnic civil war in 1992-1995, Bosnia is an appropriate test case for two main reasons.
First, the violence was overwhelmingly inter-ethnic, a feature the Bosnian War shares with
most modern civil wars (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). This enhances the generalizability of
any potential findings. Second, the violence was severe, widespread, and involved all three of
Bosnia’s major ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs). Therefore, the war should be
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easy to recall even years later. If past violence can be invoked and shape views of co-ethnics
who associate with out-groups, this should be especially detectable in the Bosnian context.
I describe the case in greater detail in Section 3.4.1 of the Supplementary Appendix (SA).
The fieldwork was carried out by the Bosnian survey firm Prism Research, whose enu-
merators conducted tablet-assisted, in-person interviews. Respondents from every region of
the country were interviewed and the full survey covered a number of topics relevant to a
post-war setting. For this paper, I focus on the part that examines attitudes toward co-
ethnics who are socially engaged with out-groups. A description of recruitment procedures
and summary statistics are presented in Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3, respectively.
3.1.1 Assignment to Experimental Condition
Respondents started the survey by answering a set of demographic questions. They were
then assigned to one of three experimental conditions. The first condition is a pure control
and respondents assigned to it immediately proceeded to the rest of the survey.
A second set of respondents was assigned to a condition where they were asked to reflect
on the violence that was committed against their co-ethnics by an ethnic out-group. Because
significant violence occurred across all three ethnic dyads, asking about either of the two
major out-groups sufficed for this study. I opted to ask Bosniaks about the violence that
was committed against them by Serbs, Croats were asked about Bosniak violence, and Serbs
were asked about Croat violence. I refer to this condition as the Violence Prime and base it
on prior work in psychology and economics that uses the controlled recollection of violence
to experimentally study war and terrorism effects (Callen et al. 2014; Lerner et al. 2003).14
14Due to concerns about imbalance, I decided not to alternative which out-group respondents were asked
about in the Violence Prime (e.g., asking some Croat respondents about Bosniak violence while asking
others about Serb violence). For example, the sample is representative of the country’s ethnic composition,
and therefore, includes only 125 Croat respondents. Even with proper randomization, there would be a
non-negligible chance that a significantly higher number of Croats are asked about the violence committed
against them by one out-group than are asked about the other out-group. Instead, I opted to ask Bosniaks
about the violence that is most salient to members of their ethnic group (i.e., Serb violence). I believe I did
the same for Croats, for whom the most salient period of the broader conflict is arguably the Croat-Bosniak
War (see a more detailed discussion of the case in 3.4.1). Finally, I asked Serbs about Croat violence in order
to cover every form of violence (Bosniak, Croat, and Serb) rather than have the study primarily focus on
the violence that was committed by a single ethnic group.
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A final set of respondents was assigned to a condition that invoked group identity but
not violence. Specifically, they were asked how they celebrated a recent ethno-religious
holiday associated with their ethnic group. In Bosnia, ethnicity and religion are overlapping
cleavages, where Bosniaks identify with Islam, Croats with Roman Catholicism, and Serbs
with Eastern Orthodoxy. Therefore, I asked Bosniaks how they celebrated Bajram, Croats
were asked about the Catholic Christmas, and Serbs about the Orthodox Christmas. I refer
to this condition as the Identity Prime and include it because the Violence Prime may also
increase the salience of identity among respondents and thereby affect how they perceive
co-ethnics who associate with out-groups. By including an additional condition that cues
respondents on identity but not violence, I am better able to determine whether any initial
effects (for the Violence Prime) are explained by how identify salience (rather than the
invocation of past violence) shapes perceptions. The wording for each prime is presented in
Figure 3.1.15
Figure 3.1: Violence and Identity Primes
Violence Prime
How do you feel when you think about the violence that was committed against
[co-ethnics] by members of the [out-group] people and their leaders during the last
war? Please describe your thoughts.
Bosniak respondents: Bosniaks, Serb
Croat respondents: Croats, Bosniak
Serb respondents: Serbs, Croat
Identity Prime
Please describe how you celebrated the last [ethno-religious holiday].
Bosniak respondents: Bajram
Croat respondents: Catholic Christmas
Serb respondents: Orthodox Christmas
15Balance tests reported in 3.4.4 indicate that the experimental conditions are generally well-balanced
across respondent characteristics.
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3.1.2 Measuring Views of Co-Ethnics who Engage with Out-Groups
After condition assignment, respondents were read a vignette that describes a fictional co-
ethnic who is married to an out-group member. The vignette includes information on the
co-ethnic, his spouse, and the spouse’s parents. In order to indicate the ethnicity of the
individuals in the vignette, I exploit the easy recognizability of certain Bosnian names as
markers of ethnic group membership. In that vein, the only feature of the vignette that
varied was the names that were used. The ethnicity of the respondent determined what
names were employed for the co-ethnic and the out-group members (spouse and spouse’s
parents). Obviously, for the fictional co-ethnic, a Bosniak, Croat, and Serb name was used
for Bosniak, Croat, and Serb respondents, respectively. For the out-group members in the
vignette, I matched their ethnicity to that of the perpetrating group from the Violence Prime.
Therefore, Serb names were used for Bosniak respondents, Bosniak names for Croats, and
Croat names for Serbs. The wording of the vignette is presented in Figure 3.2. The figure
presents both the general format to the text as well as the exact wording of the vignette that
was presented to Bosniak, Croat, and Serb respondents.16
The vignette was followed by three questions designed to capture the respondents’ atti-
tudes toward the fictional co-ethnic. All questions used the same 4-point scale ranging from
“strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (4). The first asked respondents how much they
agree with the statement that they would like to have the co-ethnic as a neighbor. The
second asked how much they agree that they would like to have him as a friend. I refer to
the former question as Co-Ethnic Neighbor and the latter as Co-Ethnic Friend. These two
questions are supposed to capture whether rhetoric about past violence induces individuals
to reject social contact with co-ethnics who associate with out-groups. The final question
asked respondents how much they agree with the statement that the co-ethnic likely shares
16This approach is based on prior studies that similarly use names to indicate social group membership
(see McCauley 2014; McClendon 2016; Scacco and Warren 2018). Also, prior to conducting the final survey,
Prism fielded a pilot study with roughly 100 respondents. In addition to testing various aspects of the
survey, the 8 enumerators and fieldwork supervisor who participated in the pilot provided feedback on the
selected names. All agreed that the names make the ethnicity of all individuals described in the vignette
easily identifiable.
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their values. I refer to this question as Co-Ethnic Values and include it to assess whether
references of past violence make respondents perceive themselves as fundamentally different
from co-ethnics who are engaged with out-groups. The answers to these questions serve as
the three dependent variables in the analysis that follows.17
Figure 3.2: Vignette about Co-Ethnic who Engages with Out-Groups
General Text
[co-ethnic name] is a 34 year-old chemical engineer. He and his wife [out-group
name – spouse] have been married for 7 years and have 2 children. [out-group
name – spouse]’s parents, [out-group name – father-in-law] and [out-group
name – mother-in-law], live nearby and often take care of the children when
[co-ethnic name, first name only] and [out-group name – spouse] are at work.
[co-ethnic name, first name only] is an avid soccer fan and his hobbies include
hiking and travel.
Text for Bosniak Respondents
Mehmed Hodžić is a 34 year-old chemical engineer. He and his wife Jovanka have
been married for 7 years and have 2 children. Jovanka’s parents, Radomir and
Dragoslava, live nearby and often take care of the children when Mehmed and
Jovanka are at work. Mehmed is an avid soccer fan and his hobbies include hiking
and travel.
Text for Croat Respondents
Hrvoje Jurišić is a 34 year-old chemical engineer. He and his wife Fadila have been
married for 7 years and have 2 children. Fadila’s parents, Ahmed and Fikreta, live
nearby and often take care of the children when Hrvoje and Fadila are at work.
Hrvoje is an avid soccer fan and his hobbies include hiking and travel.
Text for Serb Respondents
Ðorđe Jeftić is a 34 year-old chemical engineer. He and his wife Lucija have been
married for 7 years and have 2 children. Lucija’s parents, Franjo and Josipa, live
nearby and often take care of the children when Ðorđe and Lucija are at work.
Ðorđe is an avid soccer fan and his hobbies include hiking and travel.
17The exact wording of the survey questions is presented in 3.4.5. The distribution of responses across
questions and experimental conditions is shown in 3.4.6. The response rates were 98.4%, 96.4%, and 88.3%
for Co-Ethnic Neighbor, Co-Ethnic Friend, and Co-Ethnic Values, respectively.
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Worth noting is how this design reflects a dynamic I described earlier. If individuals reject
co-ethnics for engaging in the kind of inter-ethnic relationships described in the vignette, then
even those who are open to engagement may hesitate because doing so could entail severing
ties with their co-ethnics. However, if references to past violence do not induce this kind
of rejection, then (a) individuals are free to pursue inter-ethnic engagement and (b) this
may foster contact with out-groups even for those who would otherwise abstain from it. For
instance, Co-Ethnic Neighbor and Co-Ethnic Friend ask respondents whether they would
like to have the fictional co-ethnic as a neighbor or friend, respectively. Because that co-
ethnic is married to an out-group member, this kind of intra-ethnic contact also implies a
significant amount of contact between the respondent and the out-group member. In other
words, an absence of co-ethnic rejection suggests possible positive, downstream effects that
further improve inter-ethnic attitudes and relations.
3.2 Results
The results are presented in Figure 3.3.18 Each panel corresponds to a different survey
question (Co-Ethnic Neighbor, Co-Ethnic Friend, or Co-Ethnic Values), and the independent
variables are dummies for each prime, making control the comparison condition. I plot
the coefficient estimates for a number of model types, including OLS, ordered probit, and
probit regression, and the dependent variable is always some version of the relevant survey
question. For the OLS and ordered probit models, the dependent variable is the 4-point
scale described earlier, while the probit model employs a binary dependent variable that
collapses the scale into two values (0 = “strongly disagree” or “disagree”, 1 = “strongly agree”
or “agree”). Because of how the dependent variables are scaled, negative estimates indicate
that the relevant prime induces respondents to reject contact with the fictional co-ethnic
(Co-Ethnic Neighbor and Co-Ethnic Friend) or to perceive themselves as very different from
him (Co-Ethnic Values).
18The full regression output for Figure 3.3 is presented in Tables 3.9 through 3.11. I also replicated the
analysis while controlling for respondent characteristics and present the results in Tables 3.12 through 3.14.
As these results show, none of the conclusions change after controlling for respondent characteristics.
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Figure 3.3: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of
Co-Ethnics Engaged with Out-Groups




−0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2
Ordered Probit
Co−Ethnic Neighbor
−0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2
Probit




−0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2
Ordered Probit
Co−Ethnic Friend
−0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2
Probit




−0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2
Ordered Probit
Co−Ethnic Values
−0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2
Probit
Note: the top panel corresponds to Co-Ethnic Neighbor, the middle panel to Co-Ethnic Friend, and the
bottom panel to Co-Ethnic Values. For each panel, I present the coefficient estimates along which 95%
confidence intervals across various model types (OLS, ordered probit, and probit). The independent
variables are dummies for each prime, making control the comparison condition. Because of how the
dependent variables are scaled, negative estimates indicate that the relevant prime induces respondents
to resist contact with the fictional co-ethnic (Co-Ethnic Neighbor and Co-Ethnic Friend) or to perceive
themselves as fundamentally different from him (Co-Ethnic Values).
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As the results show, the treatment effect for the Violence Prime is almost always in-
significant when control is the comparison condition. This is the case regardless of what
dependent variable or model type is employed. The only exception to this is the estimate
from the probit model that uses Co-Ethnic Friend as the dependent variable. In fact, the
treatment effects for both the Violence Prime and the Identity Prime are typically insignif-
icant. Therefore, there is little evidence that references to past violence or the salience of
group identity induce individuals to resist contact with or perceive themselves as very dif-
ferent from co-ethnics who are socially engaged with out-groups. This provides reason for
optimism in societies recovering from ethnic conflict. As described earlier, ethnic elites in
these setting often engage in rhetoric that references past inter-ethnic violence, and one of
their objectives is to reduce support for rival elites who are associated with the group but
also open to engagement with former rivals. The results from this analysis indicate that this
dynamic does not apply “on the ground” among ordinary citizens.
However, does a similar pattern emerge across ethnic groups? After all, the survey was
designed to be nationally representative, and therefore, significant variation exists in the
number of respondents from each ethnic group that are present in the sample (54% Bosniak,
11% Croat, 35% Serb). In order to determine whether these results are driven by a particular
group, I subsetted the data by respondent ethnicity and replicated the analysis for each ethnic
group. The results are presented in Figures 3.6 through 3.8 of the SA and are very similar
to the main results for all three ethnic groups.
I also examined whether this relationship is moderated by various forms of proximity
to actual violence. To do so, I estimated a series of interaction models where I present
the treatment effects across varying levels of the wartime casualty rate of the respondent’s
municipality of residence. The results are presented in Figures 3.9 through 3.11. I did the
same with respondent age and report the results in Figures 3.12 through 3.17. Overall,
the results from these additional analyses do not change any of the substantive conclusions
reached earlier.
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Finally, it might be the case that the treatment effects are moderated by an individual’s
local demographic environment. For instance, the kind of inter-ethnic relationship described
in the vignette is obviously much less likely to exist in highly homogenous locales than in
more diverse settings. Therefore, respondents who reside in ethnically homogenous commu-
nities may perceive inter-ethnic relationships as less realistic or be rarely exposed to such
relationships. For this reason, I also examined whether the treatment effects vary signifi-
cantly across various measures of local ethnic diversity and present the results in Figures 3.18
through 3.26. Once again, there is little evidence that the Violence Prime shapes attitudes
toward co-ethnics who are engaged with out-group members.
In sum, I do not find that references to past inter-ethnic violence induce individuals
to reject co-ethnics who associate with out-groups. This is the case generally, for each of
Bosnia’s major ethnic groups, and across a host of moderating variables. Like with any study
of this kind, one concern may be social desirability bias, where respondents are reluctant
to express intolerant views of inter-ethnic contact. An alternative issue could be that the
Bosnian War is already so salient throughout Bosnian society, there is little room for the
experimental treatments to further shape attitude. However, as noted earlier, this paper
describes just one part of a larger survey. For a similarly designed exercise that examines just
attitudes toward out-groups, I do find statistically significant and substantively meaningful
treatment effects for both primes. Therefore, given that the treatments do appear to shape
attitudes toward out-groups, there is little reason to think that social desirability bias or
weak treatments explain why we fail to observe similar effects for co-ethnics who are socially
engaged with out-groups.19 Instead, it appears that post-conflict intra-ethnic bonds are
sufficiently strong for individuals to tolerate co-ethnics who cross group boundaries and
engage in social relationships with out-group members.
19After condition assignment, the survey consisted of a number of exercises, including the one described
in this paper and another that examines attitudes toward out-groups. The order in which these exercises
were presented to respondents was randomized. Therefore, the typically null effects we observe in this paper
are not due to late placement or survey fatigue. If that were the case, then we should similarly observe
primarily null effects when assessing how the treatments shape just views of out-groups.
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3.3 Conclusion
I started this paper by asking whether rhetoric that references inter-ethnic violence affects
how individuals view co-ethnic citizens who associate with out-groups. Rhetoric of this
kind is common in societies that have experienced significant ethnic violence, and it is often
employed by ethnic elites to achieve certain political goals. Among the more important
of these goals is engendering popular hostility toward rival elites who support cooperation
and engagement with out-groups. By conducting an original survey experiment in the post-
conflict country of Bosnia, I show that a similar dynamic does not apply to the social sphere
and among ordinary individuals. When exposed to rhetoric that reminds them of past inter-
ethnic violence, individuals do not become more likely to reject or ostracize co-ethnic citizens
who cross group boundaries.
This finding provides reason to be optimistic about prospects for post-conflict inter-ethnic
reconciliation. One implication of the finding is that policy efforts designed to encourage
post-conflict reintegration may have positive downstream effects on inter-ethnic attitudes
and relations. Investing time and resources into reintegrating post-conflict social spheres
and institutions (neighborhoods, schools, workplaces, etc.) may not only be an effective
way of inducing contact and prosociality between those who are directly targeted by these
policies. Instead, because individuals appear not to face rejection from their co-ethnics for
engaging with out-groups, such policy interventions may also increase positive inter-ethnic
contact even for those who are initially hesitant to engage in it. Ultimately, this study
can help inform both domestic policymakers who are interested in fostering reconciliation
and reintegration and also international ones who in recent years have become increasingly
involved in post-conflict societies.
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3.4 Supplementary Appendix
This supplementary appendix contains the following:
3.4.1: a description of the Bosnian case.
3.4.2: information concerning recruitment procedures and sampling locations.
3.4.3: summary statistics for the sample of respondents.
3.4.4: balance tests.
3.4.5: the exact wording of the survey questions that measure views of co-ethnics who are
socially engaged with out-group members.
3.4.6: the distribution of responses across experimental conditions and survey questions.
3.4.7: results by ethnic group and from interaction models where treatment effects across
various moderating variables are presented.
3.4.8: the full regression output for models referred to throughout the main text.
3.4.1 The Case of Bosnia
The origins of the Bosnian War are best understood in the context of Yugoslavia’s disin-
tegration in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Following a decade of economic stagnation,
Yugoslavia’s various constituent republics held their first competitive, multi-party elections
at various points throughout 1990. Bosnia and Herzegovina, the country’s most diverse re-
public, held its elections in November and December of that year. In the months that followed
the elections, the Bosniak and Croat members of the elected government became increasingly
alarmed by the continued centralization of power under Serbia’s Slobodan Milošević. These
concerns culminated in an independence referendum in February of 1992 that was approved
by voters but boycotted by Bosnia’s ethnic Serb population. Shortly thereafter, the Bosnian
War broke out in April of 1992.
While the alliance structure between the country’s three major ethnic groups changed
several times throughout the course of the war, at various points, significant violence was
committed across all three ethnic dyads. At first, the country’s Bosniak and Croat leaderships
87
were allied against Serb forces. However, this alliance eventually collapsed and was followed
by the 16-month Croat-Bosniak War fought primarily in central and southern Bosnia. In
March of 1994, the Washington Agreement led to a ceasefire between Bosniaks and Croats
and the original alliance against Serb forces was reformed. The war continued along these
lines and finally concluded in late-1995 following an international intervention.
3.4.2 Recruitment Procedures and Sampling Locations
Prism employed a multistage random stratified sampling design for this survey. The sample
was first stratified by region. Within reach region, the sample was further stratified by
standard urbanization levels. Due to the cross-classification of regions and urbanization
levels, 49 strata were created, and the distribution of the sample is proportional to the 18
and older population across strata. 240 Primary Sampling Units (PSU) were then selected
across strata. For urban locations, streets served as the PSUs while villages and settlements
served as the PSUs in rural districts. Regional supervisors determined the starting point for
each PSU and enumerators exercised no control over the selection of starting points.
For each starting point the enumerator first selected the third household from the right
(excluding the starting point). If the enumerator failed to obtain an interview at the selected
household, they selected the household to the immediate right of the initial one as the first
substitute. If the enumerator again failed to obtain an interview at the first substitute
household, they selected the household to the immediate left of the initial one as the second
substitute. Finally, if the enumerator failed to obtain an interview at the second substitute
household, they selected a different initial household as the starting point by continuing with
a random route procedure that was designed for them. This process was repeated until an
interview was obtained.
After the enumerator selected a household, they asked the person present at that house-
hold if any of its permanent members are 18 or older. If there was only one eligible household
member, that member was asked to participate in the interview. If there were multiple eli-
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gible household members, the enumerator randomly selected a respondent using a Kish grid
they received from their regional supervisor.
All enumerators were local to their assigned region and received training prior to the
fieldwork. The training was conducted at Prism’s regional centers and consisted of role-
playing exercises and mock interviewers that needed to be completed successfully before the
enumerator was approved for fieldwork. Additionally, prior to starting the final study, Prism
conducted a small pilot study with roughly 100 respondents in order to test various aspects
of the questionnaire. Technical aspects that were tested included proper randomization,
branching, skip patterns, question wording, etc. Prism also collected feedback from the
enumerators concerning how respondents reacted to both primes and how identifiable (by
virtue of their names) the ethnicity of the fictional individuals’ described in the vignette
are. This information was then compiled into a pilot study report which I closely consulted
before finalizing the questionnaire.
Figure 3.4: Distribution of Respondents Across Bosnian Municipalities
The sample for the survey consisted of 1,125 Bosnian citizens of adult age (18 or older).
Figure 3.4 presents a map that displays the number of respondents and the share of the
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sample that corresponds to each of Bosnia’s current municipalities. Of the country’s 143
municipalities, respondents were sampled from 49.
3.4.3 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the sample. Respondent age is measured in years
while education is measured on a 7-point scale ranging from “no education” (1) to “mas-
ters/doctorate” (7). Employment status is a three-category variable that includes “em-
ployed,” “unemployed,” and “not in labor force” (homemakers, students, pensioners, disabled
persons, etc.). I collected information on respondent characteristics prior to condition as-
signment (pre-treatment) for ethnicity, gender, age, and education. The survey firm further
collected information on employment and marital status at the end of the survey and af-
ter condition assignment (post-treatment). For descriptive purposes, I present information
for both pre- and post-treatment covariates. There was no non-response for pre-treatment
covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education) and low non-response for post-treatment co-
variates (around 1% for both employment and marital status).
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for the Sample of Respondents
Respondent Sample
# of respondents 1125
# (%) assigned to Control 360 (32%)
# (%) assigned to Violence Prime 387 (34%)
# (%) assigned to Identity Prime 378 (34%)
# (%) Bosniaks 608 (54%)
# (%) Croats 125 (11%)
# (%) Serbs 392 (35%)
# (%) Women 642 (57%)
# (%) Men 483 (43%)
# (%) Married 644 (57%)
# (%) Unmarried 469 (42%)
# (%) NA 12 (1%)
# (%) Employed 367 (33%)
# (%) Unemployed 324 (29%)
# (%) Not in Labor Force 428 (38%)







Tables 3.2 through 3.5 present the results from balance tests. Table 3.2 shows the results
before dropping cases due to non-response in any of the dependent variables employed in
the main analysis (Co-Ethnic Neighbor, Co-Ethnic Friend, or Co-Ethnic Values). Tables
3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 show the results post-non-response for the Co-Ethnic Neighbor, Co-Ethnic
Friend, and Co-Ethnic Values questions, respectively. Non-response was mild for the Co-
Ethnic Neighbor (1.6%) and Co-Ethnic Friend (3.6%) questions. For Co-Ethnic Values,
non-response was higher but not severe (11.7%).
The models are probit regressions that correspond to pairwise comparisons between ex-
perimental conditions. For each model, the dependent variable is a binary indicator of
condition assignment. Across all tables, Models 1 and 2 compare the control condition and
the Violence Prime (1 = Violence Prime, 0 = control). Models 3 and 4 compare the con-
trol condition and the Identity Prime (1 = Identity Prime, 0 = control). Models 5 and
6 compare the Identity Prime and the Violence Prime (1 = Violence Prime, 0 = Identity
Prime). Models 1, 3, and 5 examine whether the experimental conditions are well-balanced
across only pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models 2, 4,
and 6 examine whether the experimental conditions are well-balanced across both pre- and
post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status).
As the results show, the experimental conditions are well-balanced across most covari-
ates, including ethnicity, gender, education, marital status, and employment status. Only
respondent age is correlated with treatment assignment. However, in substantive terms, dif-
ferences in age are modest: average age is 43.5, 45.7, and 41.8 years for the control, Violence
Prime, and Identity Prime conditions, respectively. Additionally, none of the dependent
variables are significantly correlated with respondent age, and the results do not change
after controlling for respondent characteristics (see Tables 3.12 through 3.14).
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Table 3.2: Balance Test on Respondent Characteristics, Before Non-Response
for Co-Ethnic Neighbor, Co-Ethnic Friend, or Co-Ethnic Values
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6:
Violence Violence Identity Identity Violence Violence
Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime
Croat −0.140 −0.146 −0.204 −0.186 0.060 0.026
(0.149) (0.152) (0.151) (0.153) (0.156) (0.159)
Serb 0.072 0.074 0.008 0.017 0.070 0.069
(0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.098) (0.099)
Male 0.019 0.030 −0.053 −0.030 0.064 0.048
(0.094) (0.097) (0.094) (0.098) (0.093) (0.096)
Age 0.006 0.006 −0.003 −0.004 0.009∗ 0.010∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Education 0.031 0.039 0.032 0.028 −0.002 0.009
(0.045) (0.048) (0.045) (0.048) (0.043) (0.045)
Married −0.062 0.029 −0.111
(0.101) (0.103) (0.101)
Employed −0.025 0.013 −0.021
(0.134) (0.133) (0.130)
Unemployed −0.054 −0.063 0.007
(0.129) (0.129) (0.127)
Constant −0.372 −0.370 0.067 0.095 −0.437 −0.461
(0.290) (0.305) (0.288) (0.303) (0.277) (0.294)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Identity Identity
Condition Prime Prime
N 747 734 738 725 765 757
AIC 1041 1027 1030 1018 1060 1054
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents
assigned to control or the Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Identity Prime. Models 5 and 6 cover respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime.
Models 1, 3, and 5 only include pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models 2,
4, and 6 include both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). The reference
level for ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 3.3: Balance Test on Respondent Characteristics, After Non-Response
for Co-Ethnic Neighbor
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6:
Violence Violence Identity Identity Violence Violence
Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime
Croat −0.145 −0.150 −0.171 −0.152 0.024 −0.011
(0.152) (0.155) (0.152) (0.155) (0.158) (0.161)
Serb 0.084 0.086 0.019 0.028 0.069 0.067
(0.101) (0.102) (0.102) (0.103) (0.099) (0.100)
Male 0.014 0.019 −0.057 −0.035 0.062 0.042
(0.095) (0.098) (0.095) (0.099) (0.094) (0.097)
Age 0.006∗ 0.007∗ −0.003 −0.003 0.009∗ 0.011∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Education 0.031 0.035 0.035 0.030 −0.006 0.002
(0.046) (0.049) (0.046) (0.049) (0.043) (0.045)
Married −0.067 0.022 −0.108
(0.102) (0.104) (0.102)
Employed 0.005 0.019 0.004
(0.135) (0.134) (0.131)
Unemployed −0.032 −0.049 0.015
(0.130) (0.130) (0.128)
Constant −0.381 −0.389 0.041 0.061 −0.412 −0.440
(0.292) (0.307) (0.291) (0.306) (0.279) (0.296)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Identity Identity
Condition Prime Prime
N 735 722 725 712 754 746
AIC 1023 1010 1012 1000 1045 1039
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents
assigned to control or the Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Identity Prime. Models 5 and 6 cover respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime.
Models 1, 3, and 5 only include pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models 2,
4, and 6 include both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). The reference
level for ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 3.4: Balance Test on Respondent Characteristics, After Non-Response
for Co-Ethnic Friend
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6:
Violence Violence Identity Identity Violence Violence
Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime
Croat −0.135 −0.139 −0.140 −0.124 0.003 −0.034
(0.154) (0.158) (0.154) (0.157) (0.159) (0.162)
Serb 0.097 0.097 0.006 0.015 0.095 0.091
(0.102) (0.103) (0.104) (0.105) (0.100) (0.101)
Male 0.026 0.026 −0.057 −0.030 0.073 0.041
(0.096) (0.099) (0.096) (0.101) (0.095) (0.098)
Age 0.006∗ 0.008∗ −0.003 −0.003 0.009∗ 0.011∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.096) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Education 0.033 0.036 0.044 0.043 −0.012 −0.009
(0.046) (0.049) (0.047) (0.050) (0.044) (0.046)
Married −0.102 −0.006 −0.119
(0.103) (0.105) (0.103)
Employed 0.042 −0.004 0.069
(0.136) (0.136) (0.132)
Unemployed 0.002 −0.054 0.053
(0.132) (0.131) (0.129)
Constant −0.397 −0.422 0.002 0.021 −0.394 −0.445
(0.294) (0.310) (0.296) (0.310) (0.282) (0.299)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Identity Identity
Condition Prime Prime
N 722 709 707 694 739 731
AIC 1005 991 987 976 1023 1017
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents
assigned to control or the Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Identity Prime. Models 5 and 6 cover respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime.
Models 1, 3, and 5 only include pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models 2,
4, and 6 include both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). The reference
level for ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 3.5: Balance Test on Respondent Characteristics, After Non-Response
for Co-Ethnic Values
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6:
Violence Violence Identity Identity Violence Violence
Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime
Croat −0.172 −0.182 −0.142 −0.129 −0.042 −0.082
(0.159) (0.163) (0.156) (0.159) (0.166) (0.170)
Serb 0.070 0.068 0.038 0.046 0.035 0.026
(0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.109) (0.106) (0.107)
Male 0.025 0.022 −0.080 −0.055 0.101 0.071
(0.100) (0.104) (0.099) (0.104) (0.099) (0.103)
Age 0.007∗ 0.009∗ −0.001 −0.000 0.008∗ 0.009∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Education 0.036 0.034 0.052 0.049 −0.020 −0.019
(0.049) (0.053) (0.048) (0.051) (0.046) (0.049)
Married −0.103 −0.035 −0.083
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109)
Employed 0.057 0.016 0.055
(0.142) (0.140) (0.139)
Unemployed −0.012 −0.028 0.002
(0.138) (0.136) (0.137)
Constant −0.480 −0.484 −0.153 −0.146 −0.301 −0.308
(0.308) (0.326) (0.303) (0.319) (0.296) (0.315)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Identity Identity
Condition Prime Prime
N 662 649 660 647 664 656
AIC 922 908 923 912 923 918
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents
assigned to control or the Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Identity Prime. Models 5 and 6 cover respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime.
Models 1, 3, and 5 only include pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models 2,
4, and 6 include both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). The reference
level for ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05
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3.4.5 Wording of Survey Questions
After condition assignment and being read the vignette, respondents were asked three ques-
tions designed to measure their views of the co-ethnic described in the vignette. The exact
wording of these survey questions is presented in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Survey Questions about Co-Ethnic who Engages with Out-Groups















Bosniak respondents: Mehmed Hodžić
Croat respondents: Hrvoje Jurišić
Serb respondents: Ðorđe Jeftić
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3.4.6 Distribution of Responses
Tables 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 show the distribution of responses for all respondents and each
experimental condition for the Co-Ethnic Neighbor, Co-Ethnic Friend, and Co-Ethnic Values
questions, respectively.
Table 3.6: Distribution of Responses Across 4-Point Scale,
Co-Ethnic Neighbor
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
All Respondents
# (%) 32 (3%) 40 (4%) 258 (23%) 777 (70%)
Control Group
# (%) 10 (3%) 8 (2%) 81 (23%) 254 (72%)
Identity Prime
# (%) 13 (3%) 14 (4%) 92 (25%) 253 (68%)
Violence Prime
# (%) 9 (2%) 18 (5%) 85 (22%) 270 (71%)
Table 3.7: Distribution of Responses Across 4-Point Scale,
Co-Ethnic Friend
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
All Respondents
# (%) 42 (4%) 78 (7%) 352 (32%) 612 (56%)
Control Group
# (%) 10 (3%) 17 (5%) 109 (32%) 209 (61%)
Identity Prime
# (%) 19 (5%) 24 (7%) 132 (36%) 187 (52%)
Violence Prime
# (%) 13 (3%) 37 (10%) 111 (29%) 216 (57%)
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Table 3.8: Distribution of Responses Across 4-Point Scale,
Co-Ethnic Values
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
All Respondents
# (%) 64 (6%) 183 (18%) 449 (45%) 297 (30%)
Control Group
# (%) 20 (6%) 52 (16%) 152 (46%) 105 (32%)
Identity Prime
# (%) 25 (8%) 62 (19%) 148 (45%) 96 (29%)
Violence Prime
# (%) 19 (6%) 69 (21%) 149 (45%) 96 (29%)
3.4.7 Treatment Effects Across Moderating Variables
This section presents the results from analyses that examine the treatments effects across
various moderating variables. The treatment effects for each of Bosnia’s major ethnic groups
are shown in Figures 3.6 through 3.8. For these analyses, I subset the data by respondent
ethnicity and replicate the analysis from the main text for each ethnic group.
For all other figures, I begin by subsetting the data in order to conduct pairwise compar-
isons of experimental conditions: control/Violence Prime, control/Identity Prime, Identity
Prime/Violence Prime. I then estimate models where I interact a binary treatment indicator
with a moderating variable. Across all figures, the top panel compares control (0) to the
Violence Prime (1), the middle panel control (0) to the Identity Prime (1), and the bottom
panel the Identity Prime (0) to the Violence Prime (1). More details about the figures are
provided below:
• Figures 3.6 through 3.8: Ethnic Groups
– Figures 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 show the results for Bosniak, Croat, and Serb respon-
dents, respectively.
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• Figures 3.9 through 3.11: Local Violence Severity
– The moderating variable is the wartime casualty rate of the respondent’s mu-
nicipality of residence. Figures 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11 correspond to the Co-Ethnic
Neighbor, Co-Ethnic Friend, and Co-Ethnic Values outcomes, respectively.
• Figures 3.12 through 3.14: Age
– The moderating variable is the respondent’s age (in years) at the time of the
survey. Figures 3.12, 3.13, and 3.14 correspond to the Co-Ethnic Neighbor, Co-
Ethnic Friend, and Co-Ethnic Values outcomes, respectively.
• Figures 3.15 through 3.17: Age Status
– The moderating variable is a binary indicator of whether the respondent reached
adult age (18) by the first year of the war (1992). If the respondent reached adult
age by then, the variable assumes a value of 1, 0 otherwise. This variable captures
whether the respondent experienced the entire or almost entire war as an adult.
Figures 3.15, 3.16, and 3.17 correspond to the Co-Ethnic Neighbor, Co-Ethnic
Friend, and Co-Ethnic Values outcomes, respectively.
• Figures 3.18 through 3.20: Ethnic Fractionalization Index
– The moderating variable is the standard ethnic fractionalization index (applied
at the municipal level). The index captures the probability that two randomly
selected individuals in the respondent’s municipality of residence are of different
ethnicities. Figures 3.18, 3.19, and 3.20 correspond to the Co-Ethnic Neighbor,
Co-Ethnic Friend, and Co-Ethnic Values outcomes, respectively.
• Figures 3.21 through 3.23: Modified Ethnic Fractionalization Index (Vignette Groups)
– The moderating variable is a modified ethnic fractionalization index (applied at
the municipal level). The index captures the probability that two randomly se-
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lected individuals in the respondent’s municipality of residence match the respon-
dent’s ethnicity and the ethnicity of the perpetrating group in the Violence Prime.
For Bosniak respondents, the index indicates that the probability that the two
randomly selected individuals are a Bosniak and a Serb. For Croat respondents,
it indicates the probability that the two individuals are a Croat and a Bosniak.
Finally, for Serb respondents, it indicates the probability that the two individuals
are a Serb and a Croat. Figures 3.21, 3.22, and 3.23 correspond to the Co-Ethnic
Neighbor, Co-Ethnic Friend, and Co-Ethnic Values outcomes, respectively.
• Figures 3.24 through 3.26: Modified Ethnic Fractionalization Index (Respondent and
all Out-Group Members)
– The moderating variable is a modified ethnic fractionalization index (applied at
the municipal level). The index captures the probability that two randomly se-
lected individuals in the respondent’s municipality of residence match the respon-
dent’s ethnicity and that of an out-group member. For Bosniak respondents, the
index indicates the probability that the two individuals are a Bosniak and a Croat
or Serb. For Croat respondents, it indicates the probability that the two individ-
uals are a Croat and a Bosniak or Serb. For Serb respondents, it indicates the
probability that the two individuals are a Serb and a Bosniak or Croat. Figures
3.24, 3.25, and 3.26 correspond to the Co-Ethnic Neighbor, Co-Ethnic Friend, and
Co-Ethnic Values outcomes, respectively.
Two main patterns emerge in these additional analyses. First, for every moderating
variable, the treatment effect for the Violence Prime is insignificant at effectively every
level of that variable when some version of Co-Ethnic Neighbor or Co-Ethnic Values is the
dependent variable. This is the case regardless of model type. Second, while the Violence
Prime is occasionally significant at certain levels of the relevant moderating variable when
Co-Ethnic Friend is the dependent variable and the control condition is the comparison
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condition, it never is when the Identity Prime is the comparison condition. Overall, the
results from these additional analyses do not change any of the substantive conclusions
reached in the main text.
Figure 3.6: Violence and Identity Salience Effects for Bosniak Respondents
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Figure 3.7: Violence and Identity Salience Effects for Croat Respondents
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Figure 3.8: Violence and Identity Salience Effects for Serb Respondents
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Figure 3.9: Violence and Identity Salience Effects across Varying Levels of
Local Violence Severity, Co-Ethnic Neighbor
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Figure 3.10: Violence and Identity Salience Effects across Varying Levels of
Local Violence Severity, Co-Ethnic Friend
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Figure 3.11: Violence and Identity Salience Effects across Varying Levels of
Local Violence Severity, Co-Ethnic Values
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Figure 3.12: Violence and Identity Salience Effects across Age, Co-Ethnic
Neighbor
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Figure 3.13: Violence and Identity Salience Effects across Age, Co-Ethnic
Friend
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Figure 3.14: Violence and Identity Salience Effects across Age, Co-Ethnic
Values
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Figure 3.15: Violence and Identity Salience Effects across Age Status,
Co-Ethnic Neighbor
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Figure 3.16: Violence and Identity Salience Effects across Age Status,
Co-Ethnic Friend
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Figure 3.17: Violence and Identity Salience Effects across Age Status,
Co-Ethnic Values
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Figure 3.18: Violence and Identity Salience Effects across Ethnic
Fractionalization Index, Co-Ethnic Neighbor
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Figure 3.19: Violence and Identity Salience Effects across Ethnic
Fractionalization Index, Co-Ethnic Friend








Baseline = Control, Treatment = Violence Prime
Baseline = Control, Treatment = Identity Prime

























































Baseline = Control, Treatment = Violence Prime
Baseline = Control, Treatment = Identity Prime

























































Baseline = Control, Treatment = Violence Prime
Baseline = Control, Treatment = Identity Prime


















































Figure 3.20: Violence and Identity Salience Effects across Ethnic
Fractionalization Index, Co-Ethnic Values
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Figure 3.21: Violence and Identity Salience Effects across Modified Ethnic
Fractionalization Index (Vignette Groups), Co-Ethnic Neighbor
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Figure 3.22: Violence and Identity Salience Effects across Modified Ethnic
Fractionalization Index (Vignette Groups), Co-Ethnic Friend
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Figure 3.23: Violence and Identity Salience Effects across Modified Ethnic
Fractionalization Index (Vignette Groups), Co-Ethnic Values
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Figure 3.24: Violence and Identity Salience Effects across Modified Ethnic
Fractionalization Index (Respondent and all Out-Group Members), Co-Ethnic
Neighbor
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Figure 3.25: Violence and Identity Salience Effects across Modified Ethnic
Fractionalization Index (Respondent and all Out-Group Members), Co-Ethnic
Friend








Baseline = Control, Treatment = Violence Prime
Baseline = Control, Treatment = Identity Prime






0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5














0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5














0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5

















Baseline = Control, Treatment = Violence Prime
Baseline = Control, Treatment = Identity Prime






0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5














0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5














0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5

















Baseline = Control, Treatment = Violence Prime
Baseline = Control, Treatment = Identity Prime






0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5














0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5














0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5










Figure 3.26: Violence and Identity Salience Effects across Modified Ethnic
Fractionalization Index (Respondent and all Out-Group Members), Co-Ethnic
Values
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3.4.8 Full Regression Output for Model Results
This section presents the full regression output for various models discussed throughout the
main text. Across all models, the main independent variables are dummies for the Violence
Prime and the Identity Prime, making the control condition the comparison condition. Re-
gardless of the model, the dependent variable is always scaled in such a way that negative
estimates indicate that the relevant independent variable induces respondents to adopt neg-
ative views of co-ethnics who are socially engaged with out-groups. These tables present the
following results:
• Tables 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11 present the full regression output for Figure 3.3 of the
main text. The dependent variable is a version of Co-Ethnic Neighbor for the models
presented in Table 3.9, Co-Ethnic Friend for Table 3.10, and Co-Ethnic Values for
Table 3.11. Across all three tables, Models 1, 2, and 3 correspond to the OLS, ordered
probit, and probit regressions, respectively.
• Tables 3.12, 3.13, and 3.14 present the full regression output for Figure 3.3 of the main
text while controlling for respondent characteristics. The dependent variable is a ver-
sion of Co-Ethnic Neighbor for the models presented in Table 3.12, Co-Ethnic Friend
for Table 3.13, and Co-Ethnic Values for Table 3.14. Across all three tables, Models
1/2, 3/4, and 5/6 correspond to the OLS, ordered probit, and probit regressions, re-
spectively. Models 1, 3, and 5 always include controls for only pre-treatment covariates
(ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models 2, 4, and 6 always include controls
for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status).
Several patterns emerge across the models presented in Tables 3.12 through 3.14. First,
the inclusion/exclusion of covariate controls does not affect any of the substantive conclu-
sions. Second, independent of condition assignment, Bosniaks are generally more accepting
of co-ethnics who are socially engaged with out-groups than are Croats or Serbs. The dif-
ference between Croats and Serbs is inconsistent in direction across models and usually
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insignificant. Finally, education is positively and significantly associated with acceptance of
co-ethnics engaged in inter-ethnic relationships.
Table 3.9: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of
Co-Ethnics Engaged with Out-Groups, Co-Ethnic Neighbor
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(OLS) (Ordered (Probit)
Probit)
Violence Prime −0.028 −0.049 −0.165
(0.051) (0.094) (0.148)




Comparison Control Control Control
Condition
N 1107 1107 1107
AIC 2345 1802 537
Note: Models 1, 2, and 3 present the results from OLS, ordered probit, and probit regressions, respectively.
For Models 1 and 2, the dependent variable is Co-Ethnic Neighbor, which uses a 4-point scale (from “strongly
disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (4)) and indicates how much the respondent agrees with the statement that
they would like to have the fictional co-ethnic as a neighbor. The dependent variable for Model 3 is a
binary indicator that collapses the scale for Co-Ethnic Neighbor into two values (0 = “strongly disagree” or
“disagree”, 1 = “strongly agree” or “agree”). Threshold coefficients for Model 2 are not presented. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 3.10: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of
Co-Ethnics Engaged with Out-Groups, Co-Ethnic Friend
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(OLS) (Ordered (Probit)
Probit)
Violence Prime −0.093 −0.129 −0.303∗
(0.059) (0.088) (0.128)




Comparison Control Control Control
Condition
N 1084 1084 1084
AIC 2558 2178 754
Note: Models 1, 2, and 3 present the results from OLS, ordered probit, and probit regressions, respectively.
For Models 1 and 2, the dependent variable is Co-Ethnic Friend, which uses a 4-point scale (from “strongly
disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (4)) and indicates how much the respondent agrees with the statement that
they would like to have the fictional co-ethnic as a friend. The dependent variable for Model 3 is a binary
indicator that collapses the scale for Co-Ethnic Friend into two values (0 = “strongly disagree” or “disagree”,
1 = “strongly agree” or “agree”). Threshold coefficients for Model 2 are not presented. Standard errors are
in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 3.11: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of
Co-Ethnics Engaged with Out-Groups, Co-Ethnic Values
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(OLS) (Ordered (Probit)
Probit)
Violence Prime −0.073 −0.093 −0.146
(0.067) (0.084) (0.107)




Comparison Control Control Control
Condition
N 993 993 993
AIC 2526 2408 1118
Note: Models 1, 2, and 3 present the results from OLS, ordered probit, and probit regressions, respectively.
For Models 1 and 2, the dependent variable is Co-Ethnic Values, which uses a 4-point scale (from “strongly
disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (4)) and indicates how much the respondent agrees with the statement that
the fictional co-ethnic likely shares their values. The dependent variable for Model 3 is a binary indicator
that collapses the scale for Co-Ethnic Values into two values (0 = “strongly disagree” or “disagree”, 1 =
“strongly agree” or “agree”). Threshold coefficients for Model 2 are not presented. Standard errors are in
parentheses. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 3.12: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of
Co-Ethnics Engaged with Out-Groups, Co-Ethnic Neighbor, Controlling for
Respondent Characteristics
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
(OLS) (OLS) (Ordered (Ordered (Probit) (Probit)
Probit) Probit)
Violence Prime −0.027 −0.009 −0.044 −0.011 −0.180 −0.151
(0.051) (0.051) (0.095) (0.096) (0.152) (0.153)
Identity Prime −0.073 −0.058 −0.134 −0.108 −0.206 −0.177
(0.051) (0.051) (0.095) (0.095) (0.152) (0.153)
Croat −0.203∗ −0.191∗ −0.369∗ −0.361∗ −0.503∗ −0.496∗
(0.068) (0.069) (0.125) (0.127) (0.173) (0.178)
Serb −0.219∗ −0.226∗ −0.470∗ −0.482∗ −0.141 −0.157
(0.045) (0.045) (0.082) (0.083) (0.132) (0.133)
Male 0.080 0.080 0.163∗ 0.167∗ 0.144 0.157
(0.042) (0.043) (0.079) (0.082) (0.125) (0.130)
Age 0.001 −0.000 0.001 −0.000 0.003 −0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Education 0.059∗ 0.053∗ 0.101∗ 0.092∗ 0.164∗ 0.153∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.037) (0.039) (0.058) (0.061)
Married 0.038 0.041 0.181
(0.045) (0.084) (0.130)
Employed 0.001 −0.007 −0.052
(0.059) (0.110) (0.178)
Unemployed −0.034 −0.067 −0.183
(0.057) (0.106) (0.165)
Constant 3.400∗ 3.452∗ 0.862∗ 1.041∗
(0.130) (0.136) (0.378) (0.399)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Control Control
Condition
N 1107 1090 1107 1090 1107 1090
AIC 2313 2266 1764 1741 529 520
Note: Models 1/2, 3/4, and 5/6 present the results from OLS, ordered probit, and probit regressions,
respectively. For Models 1 through 4, the dependent variable is Co-Ethnic Neighbor, which uses a 4-point
scale (from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (4)) and indicates how much the respondent agrees
with the statement that they would like to have the fictional co-ethnic as a neighbor. The dependent variable
for Models 5 and 6 is a binary indicator that collapses the scale for Co-Ethnic Neighbor into two values (0
= “strongly disagree” or “disagree”, 1 = “strongly agree” or “agree”). Models 1, 3, and 5 include controls for
only pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models 2, 4, and 6 include controls
for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). The reference level for
respondent ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. Threshold
coefficients for Models 3 and 4 are not presented. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 3.13: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of
Co-Ethnics Engaged with Out-Groups, Co-Ethnic Friend, Controlling for
Respondent Characteristics
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
(OLS) (OLS) (Ordered (Ordered (Probit) (Probit)
Probit) Probit)
Violence Prime −0.089 −0.076 −0.121 −0.104 −0.309∗ −0.283∗
(0.057) (0.057) (0.089) (0.090) (0.131) (0.132)
Identity Prime −0.157∗ −0.146∗ −0.244∗ −0.228∗ −0.241 −0.213
(0.057) (0.058) (0.089) (0.090) (0.133) (0.134)
Croat −0.255∗ −0.248∗ −0.403∗ −0.398∗ −0.379∗ −0.364∗
(0.077) (0.078) (0.118) (0.120) (0.162) (0.166)
Serb −0.385∗ −0.389∗ −0.640∗ −0.644∗ −0.328∗ −0.343∗
(0.050) (0.051) (0.077) (0.078) (0.111) (0.112)
Male 0.067 0.065 0.114 0.114 0.096 0.090
(0.047) (0.049) (0.073) (0.076) (0.106) (0.111)
Age 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.008∗ 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Education 0.068∗ 0.064∗ 0.088∗ 0.084∗ 0.166∗ 0.153∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.035) (0.037) (0.051) (0.054)
Married 0.012 −0.001 0.172
(0.051) (0.079) (0.113)
Employed 0.009 0.011 0.008
(0.066) (0.103) (0.151)
Unemployed −0.022 −0.023 −0.090
(0.064) (0.100) (0.141)
Constant 3.224∗ 3.254∗ 0.481 0.580
(0.147) (0.154) (0.329) (0.343)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Control Control
Condition
N 1084 1067 1084 1067 1084 1067
AIC 2496 2454 2108 2081 740 732
Note: Models 1/2, 3/4, and 5/6 present the results from OLS, ordered probit, and probit regressions,
respectively. For Models 1 through 4, the dependent variable is Co-Ethnic Friend, which uses a 4-point
scale (from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (4)) and indicates how much the respondent agrees
with the statement that they would like to have the fictional co-ethnic as a friend. The dependent variable
for Models 5 and 6 is a binary indicator that collapses the scale for Co-Ethnic Friend into two values (0 =
“strongly disagree” or “disagree”, 1 = “strongly agree” or “agree”). Models 1, 3, and 5 include controls for
only pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models 2, 4, and 6 include controls
for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). The reference level for
respondent ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. Threshold
coefficients for Models 3 and 4 are not presented. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 3.14: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Views of
Co-Ethnics Engaged with Out-Groups, Co-Ethnic Values, Controlling for
Respondent Characteristics
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
(OLS) (OLS) (Ordered (Ordered (Probit) (Probit)
Probit) Probit)
Violence Prime −0.074 −0.054 −0.095 −0.070 −0.158 −0.134
(0.066) (0.066) (0.085) (0.086) (0.109) (0.110)
Identity Prime −0.095 −0.077 −0.118 −0.097 −0.172 −0.149
(0.066) (0.066) (0.085) (0.086) (0.109) (0.110)
Croat −0.344∗ −0.331∗ −0.441∗ −0.429∗ −0.603∗ −0.579∗
(0.088) (0.089) (0.113) (0.115) (0.136) (0.139)
Serb −0.288∗ −0.291∗ −0.403∗ −0.409∗ −0.247∗ −0.252∗
(0.059) (0.059) (0.076) (0.077) (0.096) (0.097)
Male 0.137∗ 0.124∗ 0.187∗ 0.171∗ 0.167 0.147
(0.054) (0.056) (0.071) (0.074) (0.090) (0.094)
Age −0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.001 −0.000 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Education 0.079∗ 0.073∗ 0.099∗ 0.091∗ 0.135∗ 0.141∗
(0.026) (0.028) (0.034) (0.036) (0.043) (0.045)
Married 0.054 0.067 0.064
(0.059) (0.077) (0.097)
Employed 0.028 0.037 −0.027
(0.076) (0.100) (0.127)
Unemployed −0.056 −0.077 −0.052
(0.075) (0.097) (0.123)
Constant 2.766∗ 2.816∗ 0.286 0.297
(0.168) (0.177) (0.276) (0.291)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Control Control
Condition
N 993 976 993 976 993 976
AIC 2487 2442 2365 2325 1091 1077
Note: Models 1/2, 3/4, and 5/6 present the results from OLS, ordered probit, and probit regressions,
respectively. For Models 1 through 4, the dependent variable is Co-Ethnic Values, which uses a 4-point scale
(from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (4)) and indicates how much the respondent agrees with the
statement that the fictional co-ethnic likely shares their values. The dependent variable for Models 5 and 6
is a binary indicator that collapses the scale for Co-Ethnic Values into two values (0 = “strongly disagree”
or “disagree”, 1 = “strongly agree” or “agree”). Models 1, 3, and 5 include controls for only pre-treatment
covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models 2, 4, and 6 include controls for both pre- and
post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). The reference level for respondent ethnicity
is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. Threshold coefficients for Models
3 and 4 are not presented. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05
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Chapter 4: Public Views of Political Parties in Post-Conflict
Societies
How does a history of violent conflict shape citizens’ views of political elites? We know
from prior studies that in societies that have experienced violent conflict, elites often employ
rhetoric that references that violence in an attempt to achieve certain political goals. For
instance, former Serbian president Slobodan Milošević often referenced nationalist conflicts
that occurred centuries ago in order to defend his consolidation of power (Anzulovic 1999;
Bieber 2002). Russian president Vladimir Putin has often invoked World War II while trying
to mobilize the public behind his regime and against his adversaries (Edele 2017; Wood
2011). The Chinese Communist Party has similarly referenced World War II-era Japanese
atrocities in order to defend one-party rule (Coble 2007, 2011; Gries 2005). However, is
rhetoric about past violence actually effective at achieving these goals? Does exposure to
this rhetoric increase citizens’ affinity for elites? Alternatively, could it actually decrease
affinity by reminding individuals of how elites failed at originally preventing the violence?
In this study, I explore how rhetoric that references past violence affects citizens’ attitudes
toward political elites. More specifically, I focus my attention on the elites through which
political life in modern societies is organized: political parties.
In order to examine how rhetoric about past violence affects views of political parties, I
conducted an original survey experiment in the post-conflict country of Bosnia. Because I
conducted the experiment in a post-conflict setting where the violence was overwhelmingly
inter-ethnic in nature, the study addressed affinity for both (1) ethnic and (2) multi-ethnic
parties.20 I argue that the effect of recalling past violence on attitudes toward parties varies
as a function of how clearly culpability for the original collapse in peace can be attributed to
these parties. Specifically, some parties and elites are more clearly and obviously responsible
for the breakdown in peace than are others. In the context of a society that experienced
20Following Chandra (2004), I define an ethnic party as one that claims to represent a specific ethnic
group or explicitly demonstrates favoritism toward that group relative to others. Multi-/non-ethnic parties
are ones that do not engage in this kind of rhetoric and behavior.
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inter-ethnic violence, it is ethnic parties that citizens can easily find responsible for failing
to prevent the original violence. Therefore, I expect that when individuals are reminded of
past inter-group violence, their affinity for ethnic parties will decline. In contrast, the role
multi-ethnic parties played in the end of peace is not at all clear. Given this lack of clarity,
my expectation is that rhetoric about past violence should neither increase nor decrease
affinity for multi-ethnic parties.
The results from the survey experiment confirm these expectations. Reminding individu-
als of past inter-group violence (1) reduces affinity for and confidence in ethnic parties while
(2) leaving it unchanged for multi-ethnic ones. This indicates that the continued salience of
past violence decreases support for the political actors who typically dominate post-conflict
electoral and political life (ethnic parties) (Hadzic et al. 2017; Lupu and Peisakhin 2017).
However, we should not conclude from these findings that multi-ethnic parties are necessarily
more popular than ethnic ones in post-conflict settings. A further review of the data reveals
that while rhetoric about past violence does not appear to affect affinity for multi-ethnic
parties, these parties still enjoy tremendously low support among citizens. In total, the over-
riding conclusion the results produce is that ordinary citizens are especially likely to shun
formal politics and political parties in post-conflict societies.
The findings I present have important implications for the literature on violent conflict
and political participation. A growing number of micro-level studies have shown how violent
conflict is often associated with increased prosocial behavior, community engagement, and
political participation (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009; De Luca and Verpoorten
2015a, 2015b; Gilligan et al. 2014; Voors et al. 2012). However, most of these studies have
focused on participatory activities where parties play little to no role in organizing them,
such as attending community meetings or joining civic organizations and social clubs. Far
less attention has been paid to activities where parties are essential and provide a crucial link,
including voting in elections, contributing to campaigns, or becoming members of the parties
themselves. I show that (1) rhetoric about past violence reduces affinity for the kinds of
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parties that dominate post-conflict political life (ethnic parties) and also that (2) confidence
in the alternative (multi-ethnic parties) is remarkably low. This indicates that we may
expect violent conflict to increase participation in activities where parties are absent while
decreasing it in ones where they play an essential role. Ultimately, this opens potentially
fruitful avenues for future research and suggests that scholars studying post-conflict political
participation should consider both the overall level of participation and also what kinds of
activities define that participation.
More broadly, this study also speaks to the well established literature on party-citizen
linkages and democratic performance. Modern democracies rely on active parties with firm
links to the broader society to perform countless functions that are essential, including or-
ganizing citizen participation, managing social conflict, and translating citizens’ preferences
into public policies (Dalton and Weldon 2005; Dalton et al. 2011). This is especially impor-
tant in new or transitioning democracies (McAllister and White 2007; Tavits 2005), where
few things are as vital to the consolidation, stability, and quality of democracy as a strong
party system (Innes 2002; Kitschelt 1992; Mainwaring 1998; Pridham 1999; Toka 1995).
Moreover, strong parties are crucial to the adoption of needed political and economic re-
forms (Haggard and Kaufman 1995), which is especially pressing in post-conflict societies
that require reform in order to avoid repeated conflict (Hartzell and Hoodie 2003; Hartzell et
al. 2001; Hoodie and Hartzell 2005; Hutchison and Johnson 2011). In light of this literature,
this study provides key insights into why post-conflict societies are particularly vulnerable
to further instability, a lack of elite responsiveness, and poor governance.
4.1 Violence, Rhetoric, and Affinity for Political Elites
Whether and how rhetoric about past violence should affect attitudes toward political elites is
not obvious. On the one hand, numerous studies show how the threat of politically motivated
violence can affect citizens’ policy preferences. When confronted with threats to their safety
and security, citizens typically modify their preferences and endorse measures intended to
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reduce the threat (Davis and Silver 2004; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009). In turn, political
elites can strategically exploit the public’s concerns over safety and security in order to
shape citizens’ evaluations of candidates and office holders (Gadarian 2014; Gershkoff and
Kushner 2005). They do so by promising to provide protection and security against the
threat, and this can ultimately benefit the most hawkish and uncompromising of political
actors (Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014; Oates et al. 2009). These studies imply that if rhetoric
that references past violence successfully raises threat perceptions, then we should expect
it to increase affinity for the political elites who employ it. Indeed, given these findings,
it seems reasonable for elites to conclude that they can increase their levels of support by
having citizens recall past violence.
However, the main issue with this literature is that it almost exclusively focuses on current
and ongoing violence. In other words, these studies do not address how rhetoric about
violence and conflict that occurred in the distant past shapes preferences. This is important
because our expectations might differ depending on whether the threat is active or not. For
example, Hadzic (2018) does not find that rhetoric of this kind affects policy preferences in
the long-term, years after the violence has ended. This suggests that the relationship between
rhetoric referencing violence and threat perceptions is severed if the violence is not ongoing.
Instead, rather than increasing threat perceptions, rhetoric that is about temporally distant
violence may simply remind citizens of how elites failed at preventing the original violence.
Literature that examines the relationship between violent conflict and confidence in elite
actors and institutions suggests that this could be the case. Studies in this literature show
that in the aftermath of intense violence, citizens often exhibit little confidence in and affinity
for the formal institutions and actors who failed at originally preventing the violence (De
Juan and Pierskalla 2016; Gates and Justesen 2016; Grosjean 2014). These studies typically
argue that citizens hold elites responsible for the collapse of peace and they can do so for
years or even decades after the violence has ended (Barceló 2017).
This has important implications for my study. I argue that when individuals are exposed
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to rhetoric that is about past violence, they are also asked to recall how elites failed at
preventing the violence and preserving the peace. However, I further argue that this dynamic
should not uniformly apply to all kinds of elites. Instead, how reminding individuals of past
violence affects their attitudes toward elites should be a function of how clearly responsibility
for the collapse in peace can be attributed to these elites. Some elites are obviously more
clearly and obviously culpable for the end of peace than are others.
In this study, I examine an instance of severe inter-ethnic violence. In such a setting, it is
precisely ethnic parties that citizens can easily attribute culpability to for the breakdown in
peace. After all, it is ethnic parties and elites that typically dominate politics and government
in the lead-up to an ethnic conflict (Horowitz 1985; Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Rabushka
and Shepsel 1972). Moreover, the combatant groups that emerge during the conflict are often
extensions of the very ethnic parties who contested elections before the war (Cederman et
al. 2013; Matanock 2017; Mueller 2000). Because the link between ethnic parties and the
collapse of peace is so clear, my expectation is that reminding individuals of past inter-group
violence will reduce their affinity for these types of parties. This discussion generates the
first hypothesis I test in this study:
Ethnic Party Hypothesis: references to past inter-group violence decrease affinity for
ethnic parties.
In contrast to ethnic parties, the role multi-ethnic parties played in the descent into
violence is not at all clear. Even if they held power at some point before the conflict, they
rarely do in its immediate lead-up. Additionally, unlike with ethnic parties, multi-ethnic ones
are practically irrelevant during the actual conflict and do not have ties to the combatant
groups that are active during that time. Given the lack of association between multi-ethnic
parties and inter-group violence, I expect that recalling that violence will neither increase
nor decrease affinity for these kinds of parties. This generates the second hypothesis:
Multi-Ethnic Party Hypothesis: references to past inter-group violence neither increase
nor decrease affinity for multi-ethic parties.
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4.2 The Case of Bosnia
In order to examine how rhetoric about past violence affects affinity for political parties, I
conducted an original survey experiment in the post-conflict country of Bosnia. The site of a
major ethnic civil war in 1992-1995, Bosnia’s descent into violence is best understood in the
context of Yugoslavia’s disintegration in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Following years of
economic and political stagnation, Yugoslavia’s constituent republics held their first demo-
cratic, multi-party elections at various points throughout 1990. Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Yugoslavia’s most ethnically diverse republic, held its elections in November and December
of that year. Parties that were explicitly and exclusively committed to the interests of a
particular ethnic group dominated the elections. In the months after, the Bosniak (Bosnian
Muslim) and Croat members of the government became increasingly alarmed by the cen-
tralization of power pursued by Serbia’s Slobodan Milošević. Eventually, Bosniak and Croat
leaders decided to stage an independence referendum in February of 1992. Independence
was overwhelmingly approved by the electorate but declared illegitimate by Serb leaders and
boycotted by Serb voters. Shortly thereafter, the war broke out in April of 1992.
At the onset of the war, the country’s Bosniak and Croat leaderships were allied against
Serb forces. However, this alliance eventually collapsed and was followed by the Croat-
Bosniak War (October 1992 – February 1994) fought primarily in central and southern
Bosnia. After 16 months of heavy combat between Bosniaks and Croats, the United States
brokered a ceasefire and the original alliance against Serb forces was reformed. The war con-
tinued along these lines until an international intervention brought an end to open hostilities
by the end of 1995.
Bosnia is an appropriate test case for a number of reasons. Fist, the violence was over-
whelmingly inter-group in nature, where ethnicity was the cleavage along which almost all
the violence was committed. All three of the country’s major ethnic groups were involved,
and while the alliance structure changed several times over the course of the war, at various
points significant violence occurred across all three ethnic dyads. The inter-ethnic nature of
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the violence is something that the Bosnian War shares with most modern civil wars. For
instance, from 1960 to 1999, around 70% of civil wars have been fought along ethnic lines
(Sambanis 2001). In this respect, the Bosnian War is an archetypical case of a modern civil
war. Also, in the years after the Cold War, the share of all civil conflicts that are ethnic
ones has increased (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). This means that the war in Bosnia not only
represents a common conflict type, but also one that has become more prevalent in recent
years. This should enhance the generalizability of any potential findings. If rhetoric about
past violence does shape attitudes toward parties in Bosnia, then we can be more confident
that the study’s conclusions apply to other post-conflict societies given the nature of the
violence during the Bosnian War.
Additionally, Bosnia provides a realistic context in which to explore how rhetoric that ref-
erences past violence shapes attitudes toward parties. In the post-conflict period, there have
been numerous competitive, multi-party elections held at the local, regional, and national
levels. Across these elections, the war and competing interpretations of the past continue to
retain a significant amount of political relevance (Hadzic et al. 2017; Kartsonaki 2016; Kerr
2005; Perry 2015). Specifically, leading up to elections, most of Bosnia’s competitive parties
routinely reference the war in their campaign literature and party leaders often discuss past
violence in their speeches.21 This continues to be the case to the present day, almost 25 years
after the war ended, as has been repeatedly noted by international election observers (OSCE
ODIHR 2019). Also, recent survey work indicates that concerns about future violence in the
country and broader region are common among Bosnian citizens (Office of the UN Resident
Coordinator 2013, 2015). This all indicates that Bosnia is an appropriate setting for a study
of this kind. Exposing respondents to rhetoric referencing past violence is not an abstract
exercise that has no bearing on contemporary attitudes. Instead, Bosnian citizens are ex-
posed to real-world rhetoric about the war on a regular basis, a phenomenon I attempt to
mimic in an experimental setting. This is important to the external validity of the study.




The survey experiment was conducted in November and December of 2016. The fieldwork
was carried out by the Bosnian survey firm Prism Research, whose enumerators conducted
tablet-assisted, in-person interviews with 1,125 adult Bosnian citizens. The entire survey
was roughly 15-minutes long and covered a number of topics relevant to a post-conflict soci-
ety. In this section, I describe the design and report results from the part of the survey that
examined how references to past violence and conflict affect affinity for political parties. In-
formation concerning recruitment procedures and sampling locations is presented in Section
4.6.2. Summary statistics for the sample are reported in Section 4.6.3.22
4.3.1 Assignment to Experimental Condition
Respondents started the survey by answering a basic set of demographic questions. They
were then randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions. The first condition is
a pure control and those assigned to it immediately proceeded with the rest of the survey.
Respondents assigned to the second condition received an additional question that asked
them to reflect on the events of the Bosnian War. Specifically, they were asked to describe
their thoughts and feelings about the violence that was committed against their ethnic in-
group by an ethnic out-group. Because significant violence occurred across all three ethnic
dyads, asking respondents about either of the two major out-groups sufficed for this study. I
decided to ask Bosniak respondents about the violence that was committed against them by
Serbs, Croats were asked about Bosniak violence, and Serbs were asked about Croat violence.
I refer to this condition as the Violence Prime. This treatment is based on prior studies in
psychology and economics that employ the controlled recollection of trauma (Lerner and
Keltner 2001) and has in more recent years been extended to the study of war and terrorism
22Before the final survey went out into the field, I also conducted a small pilot study with roughly 100
respondents. The purpose of the pilot was to pre-test various aspects of the questionnaire and software,
including proper randomization of condition assignment, skip patters, branching, etc. Additionally, during
the pilot, Prism collected feedback on question wording from respondents and enumerators, who all indicated
the questions were easy to follow and understand.
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effects in experimental settings (Callen et al. 2014; Lerner et al. 2003).23
Because past violence can be framed in a number of different ways, a discussion of what
motivated the design of the Violence Prime is warranted. My primary objective when
designing the Violence Prime was to make its wording reflect as closely as possible how
political elites actually reference past violence in societies that have experienced inter-group
conflict. Therefore, because political violence is inherently relational (there is always a
perpetrator and a victim) and occurred across clearly delineated ethnic lines in Bosnia, I
decided to ask respondents about the violence that was committed against their ethnic in-
group by a specific ethnic out-group. By referencing an out-group in the prime, I make it more
realistic and reflective of how past violence is often invoked in Bosnia and elsewhere, where
elites rhetorically target certain groups when discussing their in-group’s experiences (Coble
2007, 2011; Gries 2005).24 Additionally, the prime emphasizes the themes of victimhood and
suffering, which are themes that are frequently present in elite rhetoric about past violence
and conflict (Bieber 2002; Coble 2007, 2011; Gries 2005; Maksić 2017). These design choices
should increase the external validity of the study. The more closely the Violence Prime
23While based on prior work, it is also worth noting how the Violence Prime is different from other
treatments employed in previous studies. First, while studies that have adopted a similar approach are
primarily interested in how inducing certain kinds of emotions (e.g., fear, anger, anxiety, sadness) shapes
attitudes and preferences, I remain agnostic about the potential emotions the Violence Prime may generate.
Indeed, a review of the respondents’ answers to the Violence Prime question reveals that a number of
different emotions were induced. Whether references to past violence have heterogenous effects on attitudes
toward political parties depending on what emotions they generate remains a task for future research. Also,
another difference between this study and prior ones is that the Violence Prime is worded more generally
than are treatments used in prior work. For instance, Lerner et al. (2003) ask respondents to reflect on a
specific violent event – the September 11th terrorist attacks – whereas I inquire about the violence committed
against the respondents’ in-group (by a particular out-group) more broadly. I do this because in the Bosnian
context it is debatable whether any single event is sufficiently prominent for every respondent to be aware
of it. The Srebrenica genocide likely meets this standard for Bosniaks, but there is no comparably salient
wartime event I could use for Croat and Serb respondents.
24Due to concerns about imbalance, I did not alternate which out-group respondents were asked about
in the Violence Prime (e.g., asking some Croats about Bosniak violence and others about Serb violence).
For instance, the sample is representative of Bosnia’s ethnic composition, and therefore, only includes 125
Croat respondents. Even with proper randomization, there would be a non-trivial chance that significantly
more Croats are asked about the violence that was committed against them by one out-group than are asked
about the other out-group. I instead opted to ask Bosniak respondents about the form of violence that is
most salient to members of their ethnic group (i.e., Serb violence). I believe I did the same for Croats, for
whom the most salient period of the broader conflict is arguably the Croat-Bosniak War. Finally, I asked
Serbs about Croat violence in order to cover every form of violence (Bosniak, Croat, and Serb) and avoid
primarily focusing on the violence that was committed by a single ethnic group.
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resembles the rhetoric elites employ in real-world post-conflict societies, the more confident
we can be that the findings apply to non-experimental settings.25
Finally, respondents assigned to the third condition received a question that invoked
group identity without referencing past violence. I refer to this condition as the Identity
Prime. I included this condition because I recognize that the Violence Prime invokes both
past violence and group identities. Therefore, the prime is likely to increase the salience
of group identity among respondents, and it would do so in a setting where political life is
heavily “ethnicized” (Hadzic et al. 2017; Swee 2015). By including an additional condition
that cues respondents on identity but not violence, I am better able to determine whether
any potential effects for the Violence Prime are just proxies for the effects of identity salience
on attitudes toward parties. If I detect a significant treatment effect for the Violence Prime
but not the Identity Prime, then we can be more confident that the former is not simply a
proxy for the latter.
In that vein, respondents assigned to the Identity Prime received an extra question that
asked them to describe how they celebrated a recent ethno-religious holiday. In Bosnia,
ethnicity and religion are overlapping cleavages, where Bosniaks identify with Islam, Croats
with Roman Catholicism, and Serbs with Eastern Orthodoxy. Therefore, I decided to ask
Bosniaks about how they celebrated Bajram, Croats were asked about the Catholic Christ-
mas, and Serbs about the Orthodox Christmas. Each of these holidays is widely observed by
individuals of greatly varying levels of religiosity and ethnic nationalism. The question word-
ing cues respondents on collective experiences with in-group members (thereby increasing
the salience of identity) while also avoiding explicit or implicit invocations of past violence.
The wording for the primes is presented in Figure 4.1.
25At the same time, I also recognize that this study is limited in what it can say about how rhetoric that
references past violence more generally (independent of a perpetrating out-group) affects attitudes. Also,
when elites discuss past violence, the tone of the messaging, the personal qualities of the messengers, and
the themes that are emphasized in the rhetoric are likely important factors to consider. Therefore, while
important to the external validity of the experiment, the design choices I describe above also create certain
limitations to what we can conclude from the study. Future work may want to delve into these additional
factors and caveats.
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Figure 4.1: Violence and Identity Primes
Violence Prime
How do you feel when you think about the violence that was committed against
[co-ethnics] by members of the [out-group] people and their leaders during the last
war? Please describe your thoughts.
Bosniak respondents: Bosniaks, Serb
Croat respondents: Croats, Bosniak
Serb respondents: Serbs, Croat
Identity Prime
Please describe how you celebrated the last [ethno-religious holiday].
Bosniak respondents: Bajram
Croat respondents: Catholic Christmas
Serb respondents: Orthodox Christmas
4.3.2 Measuring Party Affinity
After respondents were assigned to an experimental condition, they completed an exercise
designed to measure affinity for political parties. Once again, because my test case corre-
sponds to an instance of ethnic civil war and my argument generates different predictions
for ethnic and multi-ethnic parties, the exercise covers both party types.26
Respondents were first read the introductory prompt presented in Figure 4.2. The prompt
notes that two of Bosnia’s active political parties are an ethnic party associated with the
respondent’s ethnic group and the multi-ethnic Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herze-
govina (SDP BiH). The only feature of this exercise that varied was the ethnic party that
appeared in the prompt and subsequent questions. Respondent ethnicity determined which
ethnic party was used. The Party of Democratic Action (SDA) appeared in the prompt
for Bosniak respondents, the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ
26Bosnia is just one case among many where the distinction between ethnic and multi-ethnic parties is
an important one (Strijbis and Kotnarowski 2015; Szöcsik and Zuber 2015).
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BiH) for Croats, and the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) for Serbs. I
selected these parties because they are currently the most competitive parties of their par-
ticular orientation (Bosniak, Croat, Serb, or multi-ethnic) and have been so for most of the
post-conflict period.27
Figure 4.2: Introductory Prompt about Ethnic and Multi-Ethnic Parties
The [co-ethnic party] and the Social Democratic Party (SDP BiH) are two active
political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I will now read a few statements to you
about each party. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each statement.
Bosniak respondents: SDA
Croat respondents: HDZ BiH
Serb respondents: SNSD
The introductory prompt was followed by a series of questions (consisting of three pairs)
designed to capture respondents’ affinity for the ethnic and multi-ethnic party. For each
pair of questions, respondents were first asked about the ethnic party and then the multi-
ethnic one. Also, every question employed the same 4-point scale ranging from “strongly
disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (4). The first pair asked respondents to indicate how much
they agree or disagree with the statement that the relevant party shares their views and
values. I refer to the question that asked about the ethnic party (SDA, HDZ BiH, or SNSD)
as Ethnic Party Views and the one that asked about the multi-ethnic party (SDP BiH)
as Multi-Ethnic Party Views. The second pair asked respondents how much they agree or
disagree with the statement that the relevant party cares about people like them. I call
these questions Ethnic Party Cares and Multi-Ethnic Party Cares. Finally, the last pair of
questions asked respondents how much they agree or disagree with the statement that they
are likely to vote for the relevant party in future elections. I refer to these questions as
Ethnic Party Vote and Multi-Ethic Party Vote.
27I do not examine how rhetoric about past violence affects affinity for ethnic parties affiliated with groups
other than the respondent’s (e.g., asking Bosniaks about a Serb party). I make the reasonable assumption
that support for such parties is effectively nonexistent.
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This exercise ultimately produced responses to three questions about the ethnic party
(Ethnic Party Views, Ethnic Party Cares, and Ethnic Party Vote) and the multi-ethnic party
(Multi-Ethnic Party Views, Multi-Ethnic Party Cares, and Multi-Ethnic Party Vote). Since
all three questions that are asked about a particular type of party (ethnic or multi-ethnic) tap
into aspects of party affinity, they are strongly and positively correlated. Table 4.1 shows the
bivariate correlations for the ethnic party questions while Table 4.2 shows the correlations
for the multi-ethnic party questions. As Table 4.1 shows, the correlations across the ethnic
party questions are all positive and very strong, ranging from 0.862 to 0.908 depending on
the question dyad. Table 4.2 demonstrates that the same is true for the multi-ethnic party
questions. While the correlations are not quite as strong, they are still all positive and range
from 0.777 to 0.812.
Table 4.1: Bivariate Correlations for Ethnic Party Questions
Ethnic Party Ethnic Party Ethnic Party
Views Cares Vote
Ethnic Party Views 1.000
Ethnic Party Cares 0.908 1.000
Ethnic Party Vote 0.866 0.862 1.000
Table 4.2: Bivariate Correlations for Multi-Ethnic Party Questions
Multi-Ethnic Multi-Ethnic Multi-Ethnic
Party Views Party Cares Party Vote
Multi-Ethnic Party Views 1.000
Multi-Ethnic Party Cares 0.812 1.000
Multi-Ethnic Party Vote 0.777 0.795 1.000
Given that all questions appear to partly capture a latent concept such as party affinity
or support, I use these questions and factor analyses to create composite scales for each party
type. Higher values on the scale indicate higher levels of affinity for the ethnic or multi-ethnic
party from the exercise. I refer to the scale that corresponds to the ethnic party questions
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as Ethnic Party Scale and the one that refers to the multi-ethnic party questions as Multi-
Ethnic Party Scale. These two scales serve as the dependent variables in the subsequent
analysis. This approach has the important advantage of reducing the measurement error
contained in single, specific questions (Spector 1992).
The results from the factor analyses in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 indicate that the questions
scale exceptionally well. For instance, Table 4.3 corresponds to Ethnic Party Scale and
shows that the factor loadings range from 0.947 to 0.968 and Cronbach’s Alpha equals 0.959.
Table 4.4 presents the results for the factor analysis used to create Multi-Ethnic Party Scale
and shows that the factor loadings range from 0.923 to 0.939 while Cronbach’s Alpha equals
0.920. Overall, the excellent scalability of the questions increases the reliability of the scales
and can make us more confident that each question is capturing the same underlying concept.
Table 4.3: Results from Factor Analysis for Ethnic Party Scale
Survey Questions Factor Loadings
Ethnic Party Views 0.968
Ethnic Party Cares 0.966




Table 4.4: Results from Factor Analysis for Multi-Ethnic Party Scale
Survey Questions Factor Loadings
Multi-Ethnic Party Views 0.932
Multi-Ethnic Party Cares 0.939




Balance tests are reported in Section 4.6.6 and indicate that the experimental conditions
are well-balanced across most respondent covariates, including ethnicity, gender, education,
employment status, and marital status. The only exception is respondent age, which varies
somewhat across conditions. However, in substantive terms, differences in age are fairly
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modest: average age is 43.5, 45.7, and 41.8 years for the control, Violence Prime, and
Identity Prime conditions, respectively. Moreover, none of the substantive conclusions are
affected by the inclusion/exclusion of covariate controls. Nevertheless, in order to correct
for potential imbalances, in the analysis below I report results for both models that include
covariate controls and ones that do not include them.
4.4 Results and Discussion
Table 4.5 presents the treatment effects for the Violence Prime and the Identity Prime
on ethnic party affinity. The dependent variable across all models is Ethnic Party Scale,
with higher (lower) values indicating higher (lower) affinity for the ethnic party from the
exercise. I subsetted the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1
(without covariate controls) and 2 (with covariate controls) cover a sample that only includes
respondents assigned to either the control condition or the Violence Prime. The independent
variable of interest, Violence Prime, indicates whether the respondent was assigned to the
prime or to control (1 = assigned to the Violence Prime, 0 = assigned to control). Models 3
(without covariate controls) and 4 (with covariate controls) cover a sample that only includes
respondents assigned to either control or the Identity Prime, and the independent variable of
interest, Identity Prime, indicates condition assignment (1 = assigned to the Identity Prime,
0 = assigned to control).
As the results from Models 1 and 2 show, the Violence Prime has a negative and sta-
tistically significant effect on ethnic party affinity. This result confirms the Ethnic Party
Hypothesis. Specifically, relative to control, assignment to the Violence Prime induces
respondents to express less affinity for ethnic parties associated with their ethnic group. Be-
cause the dependent variable has a standard deviation of one, the treatment effects can be
interpreted in terms of standard deviation changes. For example, based on Model 1, respon-
dents in control on average score 0.068 on the Ethnic Party Scale, compared to −0.088 for
respondents assigned to the Violence Prime. This indicates that the Violence Prime moves
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respondents 0.156 standard deviations in a negative direction on the scale (p = 0.048). Ad-
ditionally, Models 3 and 4 indicate that the treatment effects for the Violence Prime do not
simply proxy for the effects of group identity on ethnic party affinity. The treatment effects
for the Identity Prime are consistently insignificant (p = 0.593 and 0.455), indicating that
respondents assigned to the Identity Prime do not express significantly different levels of
affinity for ethnic parties than do respondents assigned to control.
Table 4.5: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Ethnic Party
Affinity
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4:
Ethnic Party Ethnic Party Ethnic Party Ethnic Party
Scale Scale Scale Scale
Violence Prime −0.156∗∗ −0.152∗
(0.079) (0.078)
Identity Prime −0.043 −0.058
(0.080) (0.078)
Constant 0.068 0.463∗ 0.068 0.380
(0.057) (0.276) (0.058) (0.279)
Comparison Control Control Control Control
Condition
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 638 626 638 627
R2 0.006 0.081 0.000 0.089
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable
is always Ethnic Party Scale (continuous). I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions.
Models 1 and 2 cover respondents assigned to the control condition or the Violence Prime. Models 3 and
4 cover respondents assigned to the control condition or the Identity Prime. Originally, 360, 378, and 387
respondents were assigned to the control, Violence Prime, and Identity Prime conditions, respectively. After
non-response in the dependent variable, this was reduced to 306, 332, and 332 respondents. Models 1 and 3
do not include covariate controls, while Models 2 and 4 do. Controls include respondent ethnicity, gender,
age, education, marital status, and employment status. Due to mild non-response for marital status and
employment status, the models that include controls correspond to slightly smaller samples than do the
models without controls. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05
In sum, I argued that as individuals are reminded of past inter-group violence, their
affinity for ethnic parties should decline. In the context of an ethnic civil war, ethnic parties
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are the political actors who are the most clearly and obviously responsible for the original
breakdown in peace. Therefore, when individuals are exposed to rhetoric that has them recall
the violence, they are also asked to consider how these parties failed at preserving peace.
The results from the first part of the analysis are consistent with this argument. Compared
to respondents in control, those who receive the Violence Prime express systematically more
negative views of ethnic parties. This is especially interesting given that an ethnic party
is precisely the type of party that is most likely to engage in the kind of rhetoric about
past violence that I describe in this paper. The findings here indicate that this may be a
counter-productive strategy. Additionally, because ethnic parties are often the ones that
dominate the political landscape in post-conflict societies, the results illustrate how rhetoric
about past violence reduces affinity for and confidence in perhaps the most important type
of post-conflict political actor.
Proceeding to the results for multi-ethnic parties, Table 4.6 presents the treatment effects
for the Violence Prime and the Identity Prime on multi-ethnic party affinity. All prior
modeling choices remain the same except the dependent variable is now always Multi-Ethnic
Party Scale. Unlike for ethnic parties, I do not find evidence that reminding respondents of
past inter-group violence reduces affinity for multi-ethnic parties. Models 1 and 2 indicate
that respondents assigned to the Violence Prime do not express significantly less or more
affinity for multi-ethnic parties than do respondents in the control condition. Models 3 and 4
also show that there is no evidence that respondents who receive the Identity Prime express
systematically different views of multi-ethnic parties than do respondents in control. In sum,
this indicates that citizens do not penalize multi-ethnic parties the way they do ethnic parties
when they are reminded of inter-group violence that occurred in the past. Ultimately, these
findings confirm the Multi-Ethnic Party Hypothesis. Because the role these types of
parties played in the original descent into violence is not at all clear, it seems that recalling
that violence neither increases nor decreases affinity for multi-ethnic parties. Instead, when
we consider the results from the analysis in total, exposure to rhetoric that references past
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violence appears to only shape attitudes toward the political actors who clearly failed to
prevent the original violence.
Table 4.6: The Effects of Violence and Identity Salience on Multi-Ethnic Party
Affinity
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4:
Multi-Ethnic Multi-Ethnic Multi-Ethnic Multi-Ethnic
Party Scale Party Scale Party Scale Party Scale
Violence Prime −0.069 −0.068
(0.082) (0.081)
Identity Prime −0.099 −0.070
(0.080) (0.079)
Constant 0.058 −0.131 0.058 0.710∗∗
(0.059) (0.284) (0.058) (0.285)
Comparison Control Control Control Control
Condition
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 624 611 616 604
R2 0.001 0.033 0.003 0.040
Note: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable
is always Multi-Ethnic Party Scale (continuous). I subset the data in order to compare experimental condi-
tions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents assigned to the control condition or the Violence Prime. Models 3
and 4 cover respondents assigned to the control condition or the Identity Prime. Originally, 360, 378, and
387 respondents were assigned to the control, Violence Prime, and Identity Prime conditions, respectively.
After non-response in the dependent variable, this was reduced to 295, 321, and 329 respondents. Models
1 and 3 do not include covariate controls, while Models 2 and 4 do. Controls include respondent ethnicity,
gender, age, education, marital status, and employment status. Due to mild non-response for marital status
and employment status, the models that include controls correspond to slightly smaller samples than do the
models without controls. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05
However, we should not conclude from these results that multi-ethnic parties necessarily
have an electoral advantage over ethnic ones in post-conflict societies. Rather, rhetoric about
past violence reduces affinity for the latter while leaving it unchanged for the former. Like
I noted earlier, ethnic parties are still the ones who often dominate post-conflict electoral
competition. In order to understand where support for ethnic and multi-ethnic parties stands
(independent of condition assignment), I report the distribution of responses for every survey
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question for ethnic and multi-ethnic parties in Tables 4.7 and 4.8, respectively.
Comparing these distributions shows just how low support for multi-ethnic parties is
compared to ethnic ones. For example, for ethnic parties, the percentage of respondents
who replied either “agree” or “strongly agree” to Ethnic Party Views, Ethnic Party Cares,
and Ethnic Party Vote is 45.5%, 41.8%, and 44.0%, respectively. The equivalent quantities
for multi-ethnic parties are only 12.6%, 10.2%, and 10.2%. Additionally, an overwhelm-
ing majority of respondents replied “strongly disagree” (the lowest affinity category) to the
questions that ask about multi-ethnic parties. Specifically, these quantities equaled 78.7%,
81.2%, and 83.9% for Multi-Ethnic Party Views, Multi-Ethnic Party Cares, and Multi-Ethnic
Party Vote, respectively. In other words, these distributions reveal that multi-ethnic parties
are extremely unpopular when compared to ethnic ones.28
Table 4.7: Distribution of Responses for Ethnic Party Questions
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
Ethnic Party Views 47.5% 7.0% 22.0% 23.5%
Ethnic Party Cares 50.5% 7.6% 20.8% 21.0%
Ethnic Party Vote 50.1% 5.9% 17.4% 26.6%
Table 4.8: Distribution of Responses for Multi-Ethnic Party Questions
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
Multi-Ethnic Party Views 78.7% 8.7% 8.8% 3.8%
Multi-Ethnic Party Cares 81.2% 8.6% 7.1% 3.1%
Multi-Ethnic Party Vote 83.9% 5.9% 5.7% 4.5%
28Please see Section 4.6.5 for more detailed distributions that cover how respondents answered the ques-
tions across the entire sample as well as every experimental condition.
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With that in mind, there are a number of things we can conclude from the results.
First, when individuals are reminded of past violence, they also recall how political elites
originally failed at preventing the violence. In turn, this reduces individuals’ affinity for and
confidence in elites. However, this dynamic does not apply to all types of political elites.
Instead, it is the kinds of elites who are clearly and obviously implicated in the collapse of
societal peace that pay a penalty with citizens. In the context of a society that experienced
inter-ethnic violence, this typically includes ethnic parties. In contrast, multi-ethnic parties,
whose role in the descent into violence is not at all clear, experience neither an increase nor
decrease in their levels of public support when individuals are reminded of past inter-group
violence. Nevertheless, affinity for multi-ethnic parties is exceptionally low in post-conflict
societies. In total, this indicates that the continued salience of past inter-group violence
reduces confidence in the political actors who often dominate post-conflict political life (i.e.,
ethnic parties) and the alternative (i.e., multi-ethnic parties) enjoys very little support.
Ultimately, the overriding conclusion of this paper is that in post-conflict settings ordinary
citizens are especially likely to shun formal politics and the political parties it is organized
around.
4.5 Conclusion
I started this paper by asking how a history of violent conflict affects attitudes toward polit-
ical elites. Specifically, by focusing on political parties, this study examines the type of elite
actor around which electoral competition and political life is organized in modern democra-
cies. By conducting an original survey experiment in the post-conflict country of Bosnia, I
was able to explore citizens’ views of both ethnic and multi-ethnic parties. Ultimately, I show
that (1) the kind of rhetoric about past violence that is so common in post-conflict societies
reduces support for ethnic parties and (2) support for multi-ethnic parties is exceptionally
low. In total, the findings indicate that in post-conflict societies citizens are particularly
likely to turn away from political parties. This has important implications for a number
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of prominent literatures, including emergent research on the micro-level effects of violent
conflict on political participation as well as more established work on party-citizen linkages
and democratic performance.
A number of interesting and open questions remain. First, this study focuses on the
Bosnian case, where the violence was inter-ethnic and post-conflict political life is often
dominated by discussions of what occurred in the past. Does a similar dynamic apply to post-
conflict societies where the cleavage structure that defined the violence was different (e.g., left
vs. right, center vs. periphery)? While ethnic conflict represents the modal conflict type in
modern times, future studies should also explore whether a similar relationship between
references to past violence and affinity for political parties and elites exists in societies
emerging from different types of conflicts.
Also, I opted to examine views of parties, which are primarily political actors. However,
there are other types of elites who also enjoy significant influence in post-conflict societies.
For instance, does rhetoric about past violence have a similar effect on perceptions of religious
or economic elites? The null result for multi-ethnic parties indicates that citizens do not hold
all elites responsible for the original breakdown in peace. Therefore, we may similarly find
a null effect if we focus on elites and actors who are not explicitly political. However, if
rhetoric about past violence reduces affinity for and confidence in the dominant type of
political actor in many post-conflict societies (i.e., ethnic parties), might it induce citizens’
to seek leadership elsewhere (i.e., among non-political elites)?
Relatedly, my study addressed affinity for domestic elites and not internatonal ones.
Future work may want to delve into how rhetoric about past violence and conflict shapes
perceptions of international actors and organizations. In recent years, foreign intervention
has become increasingly common (Khanna et al. 1998; Regan 2002), and even after the vio-
lence ends, foreign actors often retain a significant presence in post-conflict societies (Juncos
2005; Kang and Meernik 2004; Kevlihan et al. 2014; Uvin 2001). Given that presence and
influence, a better understanding of how rhetoric about the past affects views of international
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actors is a potentially fruitful avenue for further research. When domestic elites engage in
this kind of rhetoric, do they actually increase affinity for the international actors who ulti-
mately ended the violence? This question and others deserve further study in research that
addresses the relationship between violent conflict and elite-citizen relations.
Additionally, what can be done to increase confidence in political parties operating in
post-conflict societies? As I described earlier, modern democracies rely on parties to perform
functions that are essential to the health of a polity. In settings where affinity for and confi-
dence in parties is low, successfully carrying out these functions will be difficult. Therefore,
what kinds of incentives and policies can be put in place to dissuade parties (ethnic ones
in particular) from engaging in the kind of rhetoric I describe in this paper? Alternatively,
what can domestic and international actors and organizations do to boost support for multi-
ethnic parties, who appear to be tremendously unpopular in post-conflict settings? These
questions remain open and should be addressed in future research.
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4.6 Supplementary Appendix
This supplementary appendix contains the following:
4.6.1: examples of Bosnian elites engaging in rhetoric that is about past violence.
4.6.2: information concerning recruitment procedures and sampling locations.
4.6.3: summary statistics for the sample of respondents.
4.6.4: the exact wording of the survey questions that measure affinity for political parties.
4.6.5: detailed distributions for responses across survey questions and experimental condi-
tions.
4.6.6: balance tests.
4.6.1 Elite Rhetoric and Violence in Bosnia
In this section, I briefly review instances of Bosnia’s most competitive political parties ref-
erencing the Bosnian War in their literature. Specifically, this review covers the parties
that appeared in the experiment: the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Croatian
Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ BiH), the Alliance of Independent So-
cial Democrats (SNSD), and the Social Democratic Party of Bosnian and Herzegovina (SDP
BiH). As noted earlier, the SDA, HDZ BiH, SNSD, and SDP BiH are the country’s most pop-
ular Bosniak, Croat, Serb, and multi-ethnic parties, respectively. While not an exhaustive
review, this exercise is intended to demonstrate that the country’s most prominent political
actors do actually engage in rhetoric that has citizens recall past inter-group violence.
Beginning with the SDA, the party’s most recent “program declaration” was released in
2015 and is a statement of the SDA’s fundamental principles and top priorities. Among
these priorities is the rejuvenation of Bosniak culture following the war:
We will strive to renew and develop the Bosniak cultural heritage
after the mass destruction and genocide against Bosniaks that occurred
during the war of aggression (SDA 2015, p. 9).
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Additionally, in its program, the party commits itself to pursuing further legal action
against Serbia for that country’s involvement during the Bosnian War:
The SDA will collect the new facts and evidence needed to renew
the lawsuit against Serbia...for violating the UN Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide during the 1992-
1995 aggression against Bosnian and Herzegovina (SDA 2015, p. 11).
As these two excerpts show, the suffering Bosniaks endured is a prominent theme in
the SDA’s rhetoric about the war. This is illustrated by the party’s repeated references to
genocide and their promises of seeking legal action against perpetrators.
The HDZ BiH also references the war in its literature. In the party’s 2018 election pro-
gram, the HDZ BiH commits itself to opposing any interpretation of the war that endangers
the reputation of Croat service members. The party proclaims that such interpretations
amount to a “distortion of the historical facts and truths” about the war:
We will strongly and resolutely oppose any distortion of the historical
facts and truths about the Homeland War that endangers the reputa-
tion and dignity of Croat defenders (HDZ BiH 2018, p. 12).
The full protection of the reputation and dignity of Croat defenders
and the Homeland War is and will remain a permanent commitment
of ours (HDZ BiH 2018, p. 13).
Similar to the SDA, the SNSD also emphasizes suffering and victimhood in its party
documents. For example, in literature released during the lead-up to the 2018 Bosnian
general elections, the SNSD repeatedly condemns Operation Storm. This was a 1995 joint
military operation between the Croatian Army, the Bosniak dominated Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croat paramilitaries in Bosnia. In doing so, the party stresses
how much suffering Serb civilians endured as a consequence of Operation Storm:
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Ethnic cleansing, supposedly opposed by the entire world, was made
possible with the assistance of Western powers and NATO. They trained
the Croat Army, gave it the green light, and enabled a terrible ethnic
cleansing to occur (SNSD 2018, p. 142).
130,000 Serbs were expelled and ethnically cleansed, many were killed,
and all simply because they were Orthodox (SNSD 2018, p. 142).
Finally, the multi-ethnic SDP BiH also references the Bosnian War in its documentation.
However, they do so less frequently than the SDA, HDZ BiH, and SNSD. Additionally, these
references typically have a very tone from those employed by ethnic parties. The most
prominent difference is that when the SDP BiH discusses the war, they do not explicitly
mention a specific ethnic group. Below are two examples from the party’s 2015 program:
Peace requires an end to condoning the war crimes of the 1990s, orga-
nizing the return of displaced persons and refugees, finding all missing
persons, and continuously working to restore trust among the peoples
of the region (SDP BiH 2015, p. 6).
The SDP BiH will promote and implement anti-fascist policies, pri-
marily aimed at fostering the country’s democratic development and
strengthening our tradition of resistance and opposition to the kind
of fascism that emerged during World War II and the 1992–1995 War
(SDP BiH 2015, p. 10).
In sum, all four of Bosnia’s most prominent political parties continue to engage in rhetoric
that references the Bosnian War. Admittedly, the Violence Prime is designed to resemble
the references employed by ethnic parties more so than multi-ethnic ones. This is in part
because ethnic parties are the ones that dominate electoral competition in Bosnia and many
other post-conflict societies. However, future work may want to consider whether and how
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differences in the framing of past violence shape attitudes. Ultimately, this exercise suggests
that Bosnia provides a realistic context in which to examine how references to past violence
shape affinity for political parties. Rather than being an abstract exercise with no bearing on
actual attitudes, the experiment I conducted for this study attempts to mimic a real-world
phenomenon.
4.6.2 Recruitment Procedures and Sampling Locations
Prism employed a multistage random stratified sampling design for this study. The sample
was first stratified by region. Within each region, the sample was further stratified by
urbanization levels. Due to the cross-classification of regions and urbanization levels, 240
Primary Sampling Units (PSU) were selected across strata. For urban locations, streets
served as PSUs while villages and settlements served as PSUs in rural districts. Regional
supervisors provided enumerators with a starting point for each PSU, and therefore, the
enumerators had no control over the selection of starting points.
From each starting point the enumerator selected the third household from the right
(excluding the starting point). If the enumerator was unable to obtain an interview at the
initial household, they selected the household to the immediate right of the initial one as
the first substitute. If the enumerator was again unable to obtain an interview at the first
substitute household, they selected the household to the immediate left of the initial one
as the second substitute. Finally, if the enumerator could not obtain an interview at the
second substitute household, the enumerator selected a new initial household as the starting
point by continuing with a random route procedure that was designed for them prior to the
fieldwork. This process was then repeated until an interview was obtained.
After the enumerator selected a household, they asked the person present whether there
are any permanent household members living at the residence who are 18 or older. If
there was only one eligible household member, that member was asked to participate in
an interview. If there were multiple eligible household members, the enumerator randomly
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selected a respondent using a Kish grid they received from their regional supervisor.
All enumerators were local to the region they were assigned to and received training prior
to the fieldwork. The training was conducted at Prism’s regional centers and consisted of role-
playing exercises and mock interviews that needed to be completed successfully before the
enumerator was approved for actual fieldwork. Prior to starting the final study, Prism also
conducted a small pilot study with roughly 100 respondents in order to test various aspects
of the questionnaire, including proper randomization, branching, skip patterns, question
wording, etc. Prism also collected feedback from the personnel involved with the pilot study
(8 enumerators and the fieldwork supervisor) concerning the selected names used in the
vignette. All those involved agreed that the ethnicity of the fictional individual described in
the vignette is easily identifiable by virtue of his name. All information was then compiled
into a pilot study report which I closely consulted before finalizing the questionnaire.
Figure 4.3: Distribution of Respondents Across Bosnian Municipalities
The final sample for the survey consisted of 1,125 adult (18 or older) Bosnian citizens.
Figure 4.3 presents a map that displays the number of respondents and share of the sample
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that corresponds to each of Bosnia’s current 143 municipalities. Respondents were sampled
from 49 of these municipalities.
4.6.3 Summary Statistics
Table 4.9: Summary Statistics for the Sample of Respondents
Respondent Sample
# of respondents 1125
# (%) assigned to Control 360 (32%)
# (%) assigned to Violence Prime 387 (34%)
# (%) assigned to Identity Prime 378 (34%)
# (%) Bosniaks 608 (54%)
# (%) Croats 125 (11%)
# (%) Serbs 392 (35%)
# (%) Women 642 (57%)
# (%) Men 483 (43%)
# (%) Married 644 (57%)
# (%) Unmarried 469 (42%)
# (%) NA 12 (1%)
# (%) Employed 367 (33%)
# (%) Unemployed 324 (29%)
# (%) Not in Labor Force 428 (38%)





Summary statistics for the sample are presented in Table 4.9. Respondent age is measured
in years while education is measured on a 7-point scale ranging from “no education” (1) to
“masters / doctorate” (7). Employment status is a three-category variable that includes “em-
ployed”, “unemployed”, and “not in labor force” (homemakers, students, pensioners, disabled
persons, etc.). I collected information on respondent characteristics for ethnicity, gender, age,
and education prior to condition assignment. Therefore, these covariates are pre-treatment.
The survey firm further collected information on employment and marital status at the end
of the survey, thereby making these covariates post-treatment. For descriptive reasons, I pro-
vide information for both pre- and post-treatment covariates. There was no non-response for
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pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, and education) and minimal non-response
for post-treatment covariates (around 1% for both employment and marital status).
4.6.4 Wording of Survey Questions
After condition assignment, respondents were read a prompt (already presented in the main
text) and asked a series of questions designed to measure their views of ethnic and multi-
ethnic parties. The exact wording of the prompt and the survey questions is presented in
Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Prompt and Survey Questions about Ethnic and Multi-Ethnic
Parties
The [co-ethnic party] and the Social Democratic Party (SDP BiH) are two ac-
tive political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I will now read a few statements to
you about each party. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each statement.
1. This party represents my views and values.
Strongly Strongly
disagree Disagree Agree agree
[co-ethnic party] # # # #
SDP BiH # # # #
2. This party is concerned with the welfare of people like me.
Strongly Strongly
disagree Disagree Agree agree
[co-ethnic party] # # # #
SDP BiH # # # #
3. I am likely to vote for this party in future elections.
Strongly Strongly
disagree Disagree Agree agree
[co-ethnic party] # # # #
SDP BiH # # # #
Bosniak respondents: SDA
Croat respondents: HDZ BiH
Serb respondents: SNSD
157
4.6.5 Detailed Distribution of Responses
Table 4.10 shows a detailed distribution of responses across the full sample and each ex-
perimental condition for Ethnic Party Views. Tables 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15 do the
same for Ethnic Party Cares, Ethnic Party Vote, Multi-Ethnic Party Views, Multi-Ethnic
Party Cares, and Multi-Ethnic Party Vote, respectively. Across all tables, I provide both the
number and percentage of respondents who correspond to each response category.
Table 4.10: Detailed Distribution of Responses Across 4-Point Scale, Ethnic
Party Views
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
All Respondents
# (%) 505 (47%) 75 (7%) 234 (22%) 250 (23%)
Control Condition
# (%) 146 (43%) 29 (9%) 78 (23%) 86 (25%)
Violence Prime
# (%) 191 (52%) 20 (5%) 75 (20%) 84 (23%)
Identity Prime
# (%) 168 (47%) 26 (7%) 81 (23%) 80 (23%)
Table 4.11: Detailed Distribution of Responses Across 4-Point Scale, Ethnic
Party Cares
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
All Respondents
# (%) 536 (51%) 81 (8%) 221 (21%) 223 (21%)
Control Condition
# (%) 159 (47%) 31 (9%) 67 (20%) 81 (24%)
Violence Prime
# (%) 200 (54%) 22 (6%) 81 (22%) 65 (18%)
Identity Prime
# (%) 177 (50%) 28 (8%) 73 (21%) 77 (22%)
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Table 4.12: Detailed Distribution of Responses Across 4-Point Scale, Ethnic
Party Vote
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
All Respondents
# (%) 491 (50%) 58 (6%) 171 (17%) 261 (27%)
Control Condition
# (%) 152 (49%) 21 (7%) 46 (15%) 92 (30%)
Violence Prime
# (%) 176 (53%) 21 (6%) 61 (18%) 77 (23%)
Identity Prime
# (%) 163 (49%) 16 (5%) 64 (19%) 92 (27%)
Table 4.13: Detailed Distribution of Responses Across 4-Point Scale,
Multi-Ethnic Party Views
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
All Respondents
# (%) 799 (79%) 88 (9%) 89 (9%) 39 (4%)
Control Condition
# (%) 241 (75%) 34 (11%) 33 (10%) 14 (4%)
Violence Prime
# (%) 282 (80%) 29 (8%) 26 (7%) 16 (5%)
Identity Prime
# (%) 276 (81%) 25 (7%) 30 (9%) 9 (3%)
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Table 4.14: Detailed Distribution of Responses Across 4-Point Scale,
Multi-Ethnic Party Cares
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
All Respondents
# (%) 820 (81%) 87 (9%) 72 (7%) 31 (3%)
Control Condition
# (%) 247 (77%) 35 (11%) 32 (10%) 8 (2%)
Violence Prime
# (%) 292 (83%) 28 (8%) 17 (5%) 13 (4%)
Identity Prime
# (%) 281 (83%) 24 (7%) 23 (7%) 10 (3%)
Table 4.15: Detailed Distribution of Responses Across 4-Point Scale,
Multi-Ethnic Party Vote
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
All Respondents
# (%) 822 (84%) 58 (6%) 56 (6%) 44 (4%)
Control Condition
# (%) 252 (81%) 23 (7%) 22 (7%) 13 (4%)
Violence Prime
# (%) 286 (84%) 20 (6%) 17 (5%) 17 (5%)
Identity Prime
# (%) 284 (86%) 15 (5%) 17 (5%) 14 (4%)
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4.6.6 Balance Tests
Tables 4.16, 4.17, and 4.18 present the results from balance tests. Table 4.16 shows the
results before dropping cases due to non-response in Ethnic Party Scale or Multi-Ethnic
Party Scale. Tables 4.17 and 4.18 show the results after dropping cases due to non-response
in Ethnic Party Scale and Multi-Ethnic Party Scale, respectively.The response rate was 86.2%
for Ethnic Party Scale and 84.0% for Multi-Ethnic Party Scale.
The models are probit regressions that correspond to pairwise comparisons between ex-
perimental conditions. For each model, the dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator
of condition assignment. Across all tables, Models 1 and 2 compare the control condition
and the Violence Prime (1 = Violence Prime, 0 = control). Models 3 and 4 compare the
control condition and the Identity Prime (1 = Identity Prime, 0 = control). Models 5 and
6 compare the Identity Prime and the Violence Prime (1 = Violence Prime, 0 = Identity
Prime). Models 1, 3, and 5 examine whether the experimental conditions are well-balanced
across only pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models 2, 4,
and 6 examine whether the experimental conditions are well-balanced across both pre- and
post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status).
As the results show, the experimental conditions are well-balanced across most covari-
ates, including ethnicity, gender, education, marital status, and employment status. Only
respondent age is correlated with treatment assignment. However, in substantive terms,
differences in respondent age are modest: average age is 43.5, 45.7, and 41.8 years for the
control, Violence Prime, and Identity Prime conditions, respectively. Additionally, none of
the substantive conclusions depend on the inclusion / exclusion of covariate controls.
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Table 4.16: Balance Test on Respondent Characteristics, Before Non-Response
Variables DV: DV: DV: DV: DV: DV:
Violence Violence Identity Identity Violence Violence
Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime
Croat −0.140 −0.146 −0.204 −0.186 0.060 0.026
(0.149) (0.152) (0.151) (0.153) (0.156) (0.159)
Serb 0.072 0.074 0.008 0.017 0.070 0.069
(0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.098) (0.099)
Male 0.019 0.030 −0.053 −0.030 0.064 0.048
(0.094) (0.097) (0.094) (0.098) (0.093) (0.096)
Age 0.006∗ 0.006∗ −0.003 −0.004 0.009∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Education 0.031 0.039 0.032 0.028 −0.002 0.009
(0.045) (0.048) (0.045) (0.048) (0.043) (0.045)
Married −0.062 0.029 −0.111
(0.101) (0.103) (0.101)
Employed −0.025 0.013 −0.021
(0.134) (0.133) (0.130)
Unemployed −0.054 −0.063 0.007
(0.129) (0.129) (0.127)
Constant −0.372 −0.370 0.067 0.095 −0.437 −0.461
(0.290) (0.305) (0.288) (0.303) (0.277) (0.294)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Identity Identity
Condition Prime Prime
N 747 734 738 725 765 757
AIC 1041 1027 1030 1018 1060 1054
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents
assigned to control or the Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Identity Prime. Models 5 and 6 cover respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime.
Models 1, 3, and 5 only include pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models 2,
4, and 6 include both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). The reference
level for ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05
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Table 4.17: Balance Test on Respondent Characteristics, After Non-Response
in Ethnic Party Scale
Variables DV: DV: DV: DV: DV: DV:
Violence Violence Identity Identity Violence Violence
Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime
Croat −0.124 −0.123 −0.167 −0.131 0.037 −0.006
(0.162) (0.166) (0.164) (0.168) (0.168) (0.171)
Serb 0.013 0.017 0.053 0.069 −0.029 −0.033
(0.109) (0.111) (0.109) (0.110) (0.106) (0.107)
Male 0.082 0.076 −0.027 −0.002 0.097 0.065
(0.102) (0.106) (0.102) (0.106) (0.100) (0.103)
Age 0.005 0.006 −0.004 −0.004 0.009∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Education 0.024 0.023 0.029 0.032 −0.005 −0.009
(0.050) (0.053) (0.049) (0.052) (0.047) (0.049)
Married 0.004 0.108 −0.127
(0.110) (0.112) (0.110)
Employed 0.061 −0.002 0.084
(0.145) (0.142) (0.139)
Unemployed −0.012 −0.047 0.035
(0.141) (0.137) (0.137)
Constant −0.308 −0.341 0.098 0.054 −0.407 −0.417
(0.315) (0.332) (0.311) (0.327) (0.302) (0.318)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Identity Identity
Condition Prime Prime
N 638 626 638 627 664 659
AIC 891 879 891 881 922 920
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents
assigned to control or the Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Identity Prime. Models 5 and 6 cover respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime.
Models 1, 3, and 5 only include pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models 2,
4, and 6 include both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). The reference
level for ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05
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Table 4.18: Balance Test on Respondent Characteristics, After Non-Response
in Multi-Ethnic Party Scale
Variables DV: DV: DV: DV: DV: DV:
Violence Violence Identity Identity Violence Violence
Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime
Croat −0.086 −0.075 −0.103 −0.075 0.005 −0.022
(0.165) (0.169) (0.165) (0.169) (0.168) (0.172)
Serb 0.100 0.106 0.053 0.071 0.055 0.045
(0.110) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.110) (0.108)
Male 0.054 0.056 −0.090 −0.058 0.136 0.101
(0.102) (0.107) (0.103) (0.108) (0.101) (0.104)
Age 0.006∗ 0.007∗ −0.003 −0.004 0.010∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Education 0.018 0.020 0.034 0.037 −0.015 −0.018
(0.051) (0.054) (0.050) (0.054) (0.048) (0.050)
Married −0.013 0.050 −0.089
(0.113) (0.114) (0.112)
Employed 0.031 −0.029 0.086
(0.147) (0.145) (0.142)
Unemployed 0.033 −0.064 0.095
(0.142) (0.140) (0.138)
Constant −0.326 −0.384 0.078 0.066 −0.408 −0.459
(0.317) (0.332) (0.318) (0.334) (0.304) (0.319)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Identity Identity
Condition Prime Prime
N 624 611 616 604 650 643
AIC 870 856 861 850 900 896
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents
assigned to control or the Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Identity Prime. Models 5 and 6 cover respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime.
Models 1, 3, and 5 only include pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models 2,
4, and 6 include both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). The reference
level for ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05
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Chapter 5: Policy Preferences in a Post-War Environ-
ment29
Various studies have found that the threat of politically motivated violence can directly
affect citizens’ policy preferences. When confronted with such threats, individuals attach
greater importance to safety and adopt policy views aimed at reducing the threat (Davis
and Silver 2004; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009). Other work similarly shows that the threat
of violence can produce or activate authoritarian attitudes (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Het-
herington and Suhay 2011), induce hawkishness on foreign policy (Gadarian 2010; Gershkoff
and Kushner 2005), and increase ethnocentrism (Kam and Kinder 2007), contributing to the
vote shares of hawkish, uncompromising parties and candidates (Getmansky and Zeitzoff
2014; Oates et al. 2009). In turn, politicians can strategically employ the public’s con-
cerns over perceived safety threats in order to shape citizens’ policy preferences or candidate
evaluations (Gadarian 2014; Gershkoff and Kushner 2005), and their ability to do so can
undermine political rights and civil liberties (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009).
Prior research has focused on ongoing or recent threats. Does this dynamic also apply to
violence that occurred in the past? While we may naturally expect memories of temporally
distant violence to fade, recent studies show that violence committed in the often distant past
can cast a long shadow on citizens’ social attitudes and voting behavior (Lupu and Peisakhin
2017; Rozenas et al. 2017; Zhukov and Talibova 2018). Politicians, too, have exploited past
conflicts for strategic purposes. Serbia’s former president Slobodan Milošević often diverted
attention from his inability to improve citizens’ living conditions by referencing nationalist
conflicts that occurred centuries earlier (Bieber 2002). Russian president Vladimir Putin
has often invoked World War II in order to mobilize the public against domestic and foreign
adversaries (Edele 2017). The Chinese Communist Party has similarly used memories of
29This chapter was previously published on 06/13/2018 as a research article in Research and Politics
(https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168018779932) under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND) 4.0 License. The original publisher is SAGE. The chapter has been adapted
(with permission from SAGE) from how it appeared in published form. The full attribution is as follows:
Hadzic, Dino. 2018. “Policy Preferences in a Post-War Environment.” Research and Politics 5(2): 1–6.
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World War II-era Japanese atrocities in order to foster nationalism and sustain one-party
rule (Coble 2011).
However, are invocations of violence that was committed long ago actually effective at
shaping what citizens care about? Can reminders of past violence keep the safety threat alive
and thereby affect policy preferences decades later? In order to address these questions, I
conducted an exploratory study of the relationship between temporally distant violence and
current policy preferences. This study involved an experiment on a large (N=1,125) and
nationally representative sample of respondents in the post-war country of Bosnia. I find
that respondents who are primed on past violence do not consider safety-related policy issues
any more important than do respondents in the control condition or those who are primed
on their ethnic identity. Moreover, this finding applies across (a) all of Bosnia’s major
ethnic groups and (b) a host of moderating variables. This study represents a first cut at a
neglected question in the literature on the long-term consequences of war. The findings serve
to motivate future research on the relationship between violent conflict and preferences. I
elaborate on the implications of these findings and potential avenues for future research in
the conclusion.
5.1 Case Selection and Research Design
I picked Bosnia as the test case for several reasons. First, the Bosnian War (1992-1995)
ended more than 20 years ago, allowing me to study how reminders of past violence affect
current preferences. Second, the violence was severe, widespread, and involved all three of the
country’s major ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs), making the war easy to recall
years later. Finally, recent survey work indicates that concerns about future violence still
permeate Bosnian society (Office of the UN Resident Coordinator 2013, 2015). Therefore,
given how the war continues to be socially relevant, if past violence can be invoked, engender
a sense of safety threat in the present, and ultimately influence what kinds of issues citizens
prioritize (safety vs. non-safety issues), this should be especially detectable in a setting like
Bosnia. I further discuss the case in Section 5.4.1 of the Supplementary Appendix (SA).
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The survey experiment was conducted in November and December of 2016 on a nationally
representative sample of respondents. The fieldwork was administered by the survey firm
Prism Research, whose enumerators conducted tablet-assisted, in-person interviews with
1,125 adult Bosnian citizens. The full survey covered a number of topics. For this study,
I focus on the part that examines policy preferences. Information concerning recruitment
procedures and sampling locations is found in Section 5.4.2. Summary statistics for the
sample are presented in Section 5.4.3.
5.1.1 Assignment to Experimental Condition
The survey started with a basic set of demographic questions. After answering these, respon-
dents were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions. The first condition
is a control and respondents assigned to it immediately proceeded to the rest of the survey.
Treatment 1 (which I label the Violence Prime) is designed to invoke a sense of threat
that is grounded in the events of the Bosnian War. Respondents in this condition were asked
to reflect on the violence that was committed against their ethnic group by an ethnic out-
group. While the alliance structure shifted several times during the war, significant violence
occurred across all three ethnic dyads. Therefore, asking respondents about either of the
two major out-groups sufficed for this study. I opted to ask Bosniaks about the violence
committed against them by Serbs, Croats were asked about Bosniak violence, and Serbs
were asked about Croat violence.
The design of this prime is loosely based on prior studies on the controlled recollection
of past violence in experimental settings (Callen et al. 2014; Lerner et al. 2003). Note
that while these studies have primarily focused on how inducing certain emotions (e.g.,
anger, fear, sadness) shapes preferences, I am instead interested in the simpler question
of whether recalling past violence committed in the context of a civil conflict affects the
importance individuals attach to safety-related policy issues in the present. Therefore, I
remain agnostic about the potential emotions that reminders of past violence may induce
and the precise psychological mechanisms that explain how much importance respondents
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attach to certain policy areas. Indeed, a review of respondents’ answers to the Violence Prime
question suggests that a number of different emotions were generated, including anger, fear,
and sadness. Whether the effect on policy preferences is heterogeneous depending on what
emotions are induced remains a task for future work.30
Finally, Treatment 2 (which I label the Identity Prime) asked respondents how they
celebrated a recent ethno-religious holiday associated with their ethnic group. Because eth-
nicity and religion are overlapping cleavages in Bosnia, Bosniaks were asked about Bajram,
Croats about the Catholic Christmas, and Serbs about the Orthodox Christmas. I include
the Identity Prime because the Violence Prime may increase the salience of identity among
the respondents. It would do so in a setting where some public policy issues are highly “eth-
nicized.” Therefore, should I find that the Violence Prime has a significant effect on policy
preferences, it might be due to a heightened sense of threat (which is what I am interested
in) or the increased salience of identity. By including a condition that (a) invokes identity
but (b) does not mention past violence, I am better able to determine whether any treat-
ment effects are due to threat perceptions or identity salience. After receiving either prime,
respondents in both treatment conditions continued with the rest of the survey.31 The exact
wording of the primes is presented in Section 5.4.4 of the SA.32
5.1.2 Measuring Policy Preferences
Post-treatment, respondents received a list of four public policy issues (child care, education,
infrastructure, and policing) and were asked to rank them in order of importance.33 I picked
a diverse set of issues that citizens are likely to care about given their impact on people’s
30Additionally, the Violence Prime is worded more generally than treatments employed in other work.
For instance, Lerner et al. (2003) inquire about a specific event – the September 11th terrorist attacks. In
the Bosnian context, no single wartime event is sufficiently prominent/salient for all respondents to be aware
of it. The Srebrenica massacre would likely meet this standard for Bosniak respondents, but it is debatable
whether any event is comparably prominent for Croats and Serbs.
31This study was approved by the institutional review board at Washington University in St. Louis (IRB
no. 201607026). All respondents provided informed consent prior to starting the survey.
32Balance tests reported in Section 5.4.5 indicate that the experimental conditions are generally well-
balanced across respondent characteristics.
33The exact wording for the question is presented in Section 5.4.6.
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everyday lives. This makes it more likely that they carefully consider the tradeoffs involved
in focusing on one issue over another.
Note that one issue relates to safety (policing) while the others do not. Admittedly,
the role of the police is broad and when asked about policing some respondents may think
about activities that are not clearly connected to personal safety (i.e., non-violent crime).
However, compared to the other policy areas included in this exercise, a prioritization of
policing is the most obvious way of addressing threats to safety, including the threat posed
by inter-group violence. In fact, I use policing as the safety-related issue due to the nature
of the violence that occurred during the Bosnian War. Because it was primarily a civil war,
examining views about foreign and military policy (the issues that are often examined in
other studies) would not be appropriate for this setting. Instead, policing is a policy area
clearly linked to personal safety that might be threatened by fellow citizens, and is therefore
more directly connected to the nature of the conflict in Bosnia. Indeed, several case studies
on Bosnia have described how in the post-war period both policymakers and citizens have
regarded policing as an important factor in reducing concerns about renewed inter-group
violence (Celador 2005; Stefanovic and Loizides 2017).
One potential issue when examining policy preferences in a post-war setting is that in-
stitutions often lack the citizens’ confidence (Grosjean 2014). In the case of policing, this
is important because even if recalling past violence generates a sense of safety threat, this
may not translate into prioritization of policing due to a widely held view that the police
is an ineffective institution. However, recent survey data from Bosnia indicates that this is
unlikely to be the case. In a 2015 survey commissioned by the Office of the UN Resident
Coordinator, Bosnian citizens expressed more confidence in the police than in any other
domestic or international institution.34 This provides an additional reason why asking about
34In the aforementioned survey, respondents stated their level of confidence in the following institutions:
the police, religious leaders, political parties they voted for, political parties in general, the courts, the army,
their municipal authorities, their cantonal government, their entity government, the Council of Ministers,
the presidency, the Office of the High Representative, the European Union, the European Union Force, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and the United Nations. 60.8% of respondents
stated they have “complete” or “some” confidence in the police, a higher share than for any other institution.
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policing is preferable to potential alternatives. If recalling past violence does not induce
respondents to prioritize policing over other policy issues, then we can be more confident
that this is not due to a lack of public confidence in the police’s ability to provide security.35
5.2 Results
The results are presented in Figure 5.1. Each panel corresponds to a different pairwise com-
parison of experimental conditions: (a) control/Violence Prime, (b) control/Identity Prime,
and (c) Identity Prime/Violence Prime. The independent variable is always binary and
identifies the conditions that are being compared (Baseline = 0, Treatment = 1). I plotted
the coefficient estimates for a number of model types, including OLS, ordered probit, and
probit regression, and the dependent variable always measures how important respondents
think policing is as a policy issue. For the OLS and ordered probit models, I employed a
4-point scale, from “least important” (1) to “most important” (4), indicating how important
respondents believe policing to be. For the probit models, the dependent variable is binary
and assumes a value of 1 if the respondent ranked policing as the most important policy
issue (0 otherwise). Because of how the dependent variables are scaled, positive (negative)
estimates indicate higher (lower) issue importance for policing. I include 95% confidence
intervals for all estimates.36
As the results show, the treatment effect for the Violence Prime is always insignificant.
This is the case regardless of model type (OLS, ordered probit, or probit) or comparison
condition (control or Identity Prime). In sum, I do not find evidence that recalling past
violence induces citizens to attach greater importance to safety-related policy issues.
35Because this study is exploratory and the survey covered a number of topics, overtaxing respondents
through an excessively long questionnaire was a concern. For that reason, I included only one question
that measures policy preferences. Future work that delves deeper into the relationship between violence and
preferences should employ multiple measures so as to reduce potential noise.
36The distribution of responses across experimental conditions is presented in Section 5.4.7 of the SA.
The full regression output for Figure 5.1 is shown in Tables 5.7 through 5.9. Results presented in Tables
5.10 through 5.12 show that none of the conclusions change after controlling for respondent characteristics.
Additionally, I replicated the analyses while using survey weights in order to improve the representativeness
of the sample, and present the results in Tables 5.13 through 5.18. These results again show that none of
the conclusions change.
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Figure 5.1: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences






−0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
Baseline: Control
Treatment: Identity Prime
−0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
Baseline: Identity Prime
Treatment: Violence Prime
Note: Each panel corresponds to a pairwise comparison of experimental conditions. The independent
variable is always binary and identifies the conditions being compared (Baseline = 0, Treatment = 1).
The dependent variable always measures how important respondents think policing is as a policy issue,
with higher values indicating greater importance. The figure displays coefficient estimates with 95%
confidence intervals.
However, does this pattern hold across ethnic groups? After all, because the wording
for both primes needed to correspond to respondent ethnicity, there are within-condition
differences in what holiday or ethnic dyad the primes invoke. Additionally, the survey was
designed to be nationally representative, and therefore, significant variation exists in the
number of respondents associated with each ethnic group (54% Bosniak, 11% Croat, 35%
Serb). Given this variation, is this finding driven by a particular ethnic group?
In order to explore whether differences across ethnicity exist, I subsetted the data by
respondent ethnicity and replicated the main analysis for each ethnic group. The results
are presented in Figure 5.5 and indicate that little changes from the main analysis. Across
every model for each ethnic group, the differences between experimental conditions in how
important policing is as a policy issue are insignificant.
I further explored whether this relationship is moderated by proximity to actual violence
by examining whether the treatment effects vary across (a) levels of local violence severity or
(b) respondent age. To do so, I present results in Figure 5.6 from models where I interact a
binary treatment indicator with the wartime casualty rate of the respondent’s municipality
of residence. I also do the same with respondent age in Figures 5.7 and 5.8. The results show
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that the treatment effect for the Violence Prime does not vary significantly across levels of
violence severity or respondent age.
Finally, in Bosnia, notable changes have occurred to the composition of local police forces
over the years. While still ongoing work, making the ethnic makeup of local forces reflect the
ethnic composition of localities has been an important policy priority (Coliver 1999; Doyle
2007). Therefore, individuals living in highly homogeneous areas (where effectively the entire
police force is composed of co-ethnics) may be more trusting of the police than those living
in ethnically diverse areas (where some of the police is composed of out-group members).
For that reason, I examine whether the treatment effects vary across various measures of
local ethnic diversity and present the results in Figures 5.9 through 5.14. The results once
again show that the Violence Prime does not have a significant treatment effect on policy
preferences, regardless of the level of ethnic diversity.
Important to note is that the null effects I present in Figure 5.1 are not an artifact of
insufficient sample size. With 1,125 respondents, the sample is adequately large to unearth
meaningful treatment effects if they in fact exist. A different concern may be that the Bosnian
War is so salient among citizens that every respondent is already aware of the violence that
occurred, and the null findings are therefore due to ceiling effects. Another potential issue
could be that the Violence Prime does not reflect how past violence is actually invoked by
elites and is therefore too weak or unrealistic to shift preferences. However, other parts of the
survey suggest that ceiling effects and/or a weak treatment are unlikely to be responsible for
the null findings. As noted earlier, the full survey covered several topics, including attitudes
toward out-groups, political engagement, and party (ethnic and multi-ethnic) affinity. For
these other outcomes, I do observe statistically significant and substantively meaningful
treatment effects for the Violence Prime. Therefore, while I cannot definitely rule out these
alternative explanations, the fact that I detect significant treatment effects for a number
of outcomes that are examined on the same survey provides some reassurance that ceiling
effects or a weak treatment do not explain the null findings in this study.
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To summarize, I do not find evidence that potential safety threats grounded in past
violence induce citizens to prioritize safety-related issues to ones not directly associated with
safety. This is in contrast to other studies that find heightened safety concerns do lead
individuals to attach more importance to some issues than to others. However, these studies
have been conducted in settings where the violence is either ongoing or recent. This study
is instead set in a different context (i.e., years after the violence has ended), and presents
suggestive evidence that the link between safety concerns and policy preferences may not
hold in the long-term.
5.3 Conclusion
This study represents a first cut at examining the relationship between temporally distant
violence and current policy preferences. It presents preliminary evidence that the ability of
elites to manipulate the salience of past violence to shape public attitudes may be limited.
However, we should not conclude from this study that elites cannot under any set of circum-
stances invoke past violence to alter preferences. Rather, the findings I present suggest that
recalling past violence in and of itself is insufficient to shape public policy preferences. There-
fore, future work should delve deeper into this question and examine when the invocation of
past violence is effective at shaping preferences and when it is not.
For instance, what role do emotions play? The wording of the treatment I employ in this
study is admittedly emotionless and does not attempt to induce a specific kind of emotional
response from the respondents. Indeed, a review of the respondents’ answers to the Violence
Prime question indicates that it stirred up a number of emotions. However, it might be the
case that invocations of violence that induce one kind of emotion are effective at shaping
preferences while invocations that induce a different emotion are not.
Additionally, future studies should also consider the messenger rather than simply the
message contained in these invocations. Political elites are a heterogeneous collection of indi-
viduals, and rhetorical ability, charisma, and status may all be important to understanding
when references to the past are effective (or ineffective) at shaping public attitudes. Ulti-
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mately, the purpose of this study was to discern whether memories of past violence have the
ability to shape current public policy preferences, but open questions remain about what
conditions facilitate or hinder their ability to do so. This remains a task for future research.
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5.4 Supplementary Appendix
This supplementary appendix contains the following:
5.4.1: additional details on the Bosnian case.
5.4.2: description of recruitment procedures and information concerning sampling locations.
5.4.3: summary statistics for the sample.
5.4.4: the exact wording for both primes and a discussion of their effectiveness.
5.4.5: balance tests.
5.4.6: the exact wording for the survey question that measures policy preferences.
5.4.7: descriptive statistics for the distribution of responses across experimental conditions.
5.4.8: results by ethnic group and from interaction models where I show the treatment effects
across various moderating variables.
5.4.9: full regression output for models discussed throughout the main text.
5.4.1 The Case of Bosnia
The Bosnian War is best understood in the context of Yugoslavia’s rapid disintegration in
the late 1980s and early 1990s. After a decade of economic stagnation, Yugoslavia’s most
diverse republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, held its first competitive, multi-party elections in
November and December of 1990. Alarmed by the continued centralization of power under-
taken by Serbia’s Slobodan Milošević, the Bosniak and Croat members of the subsequent
government staged an independence referendum in February of 1992. While overwhelmingly
approved by voters, the referendum was also boycotted by the country’s Serb population.
Shortly thereafter, the Bosnian War broke out in April of 1992.
While the alliance structure between the country’s three major ethnic groups changed
several times throughout the course of the war, at various points, significant violence was
committed across all three ethnic dyads. At first, the country’s Bosniak and Croat leaderships
were allied against Serb forces. However, this alliance eventually collapsed and was followed
by the 16-month Croat-Bosniak War fought primarily in central and southern Bosnia. In
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March of 1994, the Washington Agreement led to a ceasefire between Bosniaks and Croats
and the original alliance against Serb forces was reformed. The war continued along these
lines and finally concluded in late-1995 following an international intervention.
Recent survey work conducted in the country indicates that concerns about future vi-
olence continue to be prevalent throughout Bosnian society. For instance, almost a third
of Bosnian citizens believe that renewed conflict in the Balkan region is likely to occur in
the near future (Office of the UN Resident Coordinator 2013), while almost half express
concerns about renewed violence in the country if the political and social situation does not
improve (Office of the UN Resident Coordinator 2013). Additionally, in a country where
some prominent politicians continue to threaten secession (Kovačević 2017), two-thirds of
Bosnians believe that if the country does break up, it will not do so peacefully (Office of the
UN Resident Coordinator 2015). The continued salience of the war is one reason why Bosnia
is an appropriate test case for this study. If past violence can be invoked, engender a sense
of threat, and ultimately shape current policy preferences, this effect should be especially
likely to emerge in a setting like Bosnia.
5.4.2 Recruitment Procedures and Sampling Locations
Prism Research employed a multistage random stratified sampling design for this study. The
sample was first stratified by region. Within each region, the sample was further stratified
by urbanization levels. Following stratification, 240 Primary Sampling Units (PSU) were
selected by regional supervisors, and therefore, enumerators exercised no influence over the
selection of starting points.
For each starting point, the enumerator was instructed to select the third household from
the right. If the enumerator failed to obtain an interview at that household, they selected the
household to the immediate right of the initial one as the first substitute. If the enumerator
failed to obtain an interview at the first substitute, the household to the immediate left of
the initial one was selected as the second substitute. If the enumerator again failed to obtain
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an interview at the second substitute, they followed a random route procedure to select a
new initial household. These procedures were followed until an interview was obtained.
Following the selection of a household, the enumerator asked the person present whether
any of the household’s members are 18 or older. If multiple household members were aged
18 or over, the enumerator randomly selected a respondent using a Kish grid they received
from their regional supervisor. If the household contained only one member aged 18 or over,
that member was selected for the interview.
Figure 5.2 presents a map that displays the number of respondents and the share of the
sample that correspond to each of Bosnia’s current municipalities. Of the country’s 143
municipalities, respondents were sampled from 49.
Figure 5.2: Distribution of Respondents Across Bosnian Municipalities
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5.4.3 Summary Statistics
Table 5.1 presents summary statistics for the sample of respondents. Respondent age is
measured in years while respondent education is measured on a 7-point scale ranging from
“no education” (1) to “masters/doctorate” (7). Employment status is a three-category nom-
inal variable that includes “employed”, “unemployed”, and “not in labor force” (homemakers,
students, pensioners, disabled persons, etc.). I collected information on respondent charac-
teristics prior to treatment assignment for ethnicity, gender, age, and education, and these
covariates are therefore pre-treatment. The survey firm further collected information on em-
ployment and marital status at the end of the survey, and these two variables are therefore
post-treatment. Nevertheless, for descriptive purposes, I provide information for employment
and marital status in Table 5.1. There was no non-response for pre-treatment covariates (eth-
nicity, gender, age, education) and very low non-response for the post-treatment covariates
(roughly 1% for both employment and marital status).
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics for the Sample of Respondents
Respondent Sample
# of respondents 1125
# (%) assigned to Control 360 (32%)
# (%) assigned to Violence Prime 387 (34%)
# (%) assigned to Identity Prime 378 (34%)
# (%) Bosniaks 608 (54%)
# (%) Croats 125 (11%)
# (%) Serbs 392 (35%)
# (%) Women 642 (57%)
# (%) Men 483 (43%)
# (%) Married 644 (57%)
# (%) Unmarried 469 (42%)
# (%) NA 12 (1%)
# (%) Employed 367 (33%)
# (%) Unemployed 324 (29%)
# (%) Not in Labor Force 428 (38%)






5.4.4 Wording of Violence and Identity Primes
Figure 5.3 presents the exact wording for the Violence Prime and the Identity Prime.
Figure 5.3: Violence and Identity Primes
Violence Prime
How do you feel when you think about the violence that was committed against
[co-ethnics] by members of the [out-group] people and their leaders during the last
war? Please describe your thoughts.
Bosniak respondents: Bosniaks, Serb
Croat respondents: Croats, Bosniak
Serb respondents: Serbs, Croat
Identity Prime
Please describe how you celebrated the last [ethno-religious holiday].
Bosniak respondents: Bajram
Croat respondents: Catholic Christmas
Serb respondents: Orthodox Christmas
A review of the respondents’ answers to these priming questions indicates that both
the Violence Prime and the Identity Prime appear to induce the intended thoughts from
respondents. The former prompts respondents to reflect on the violence that was committed
during the Bosnian War, and practically all respondents had something to say about the
war. Therefore, as expected, the responses indicate that recollection of the war was not
difficult. In fact, a common theme that emerged concerned remembrance of what happened.
Respondents often remarked that they will never forget what happened during the war and
that it was incumbent upon others to remember as well. Even among younger respondents
who have no personal recollection of the war, some commented on how they are aware of
what occurred through the personal stories and narratives of others. Therefore, the Violence
Prime appears to achieve its purpose: it prompts respondents to recall and then carefully
reflect on the violence that was committed during the Bosnian War.
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The Identity Prime was similarly effective at accomplishing what it was designed to do,
i.e., increase the salience of identity among respondents. The most common theme to emerge
concerned celebration, with family, friends, neighbors, and other in-group members. Refer-
ences to traditions and customs that are followed by Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs during the
appropriate ethno-religious holiday were common. Finally, by selecting a widely celebrated
holiday for each ethnic group, I avoided priming respondents on practices or customs that
a sizable share of them do not observe. Instead, practically all respondents who received
the Identity Prime provided an answer that indicates some level of observance. In sum,
both primes appear to be well-designed and generate the intended focus on past violence or
identity.
5.4.5 Balance Tests
Table 5.2 presents the results from balance tests. The models are probit regressions that
correspond to pairwise comparisons between experimental conditions. For each model, the
dependent variable is a binary indicator of condition assignment. Models 1 and 2 compare the
control condition and the Violence Prime (1 = Violence Prime, 0 = control). Models 3 and
4 compare the control condition and the Identity Prime (1 = Identity Prime, 0 = control).
Models 5 and 6 compare the Identity Prime and the Violence Prime (1 = Violence Prime,
0 = Identity Prime). Models 1, 3, and 5 examine whether the experimental conditions are
well-balanced across only pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while
Models 2, 4, and 6 examine whether they are well-balanced across pre- and post-treatment
covariates (marital status, employment status).
As the results show, the experimental conditions are well-balanced across most covari-
ates, including ethnicity, gender, education, marital status, and employment status. Only
respondent age is correlated with treatment assignment. However, in substantive terms, dif-
ferences in age are modest: average age is 43.5, 45.7, and 41.8 years for the control, Violence
Prime, and Identity Prime conditions, respectively. Additionally, none of the substantive
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conclusions change when controlling for pre- or pre-/post-treatment covariates (see Tables
5.10 through 5.12).
Table 5.2: Balance Tests on Respondent Characteristics
Variables Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6:
Violence Violence Identity Identity Violence Violence
Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime Prime
Croat −0.140 −0.146 −0.204 −0.186 0.060 0.026
(0.149) (0.152) (0.151) (0.153) (0.156) (0.159)
Serb 0.072 0.074 0.008 0.017 0.070 0.069
(0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.098) (0.099)
Male 0.019 0.030 −0.053 −0.030 0.064 0.048
(0.094) (0.097) (0.094) (0.098) (0.093) (0.096)
Age 0.006 0.006 −0.003 −0.004 0.009∗ 0.010∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Education 0.031 0.039 0.032 0.028 −0.002 0.009
(0.045) (0.048) (0.045) (0.048) (0.043) (0.045)
Married −0.062 0.029 −0.111
(0.101) (0.103) (0.101)
Employed −0.025 0.013 −0.021
(0.134) (0.133) (0.130)
Unemployed −0.054 −0.063 0.007
(0.129) (0.129) (0.127)
Constant −0.372 −0.370 0.067 0.095 −0.437 −0.461
(0.290) (0.305) (0.288) (0.303) (0.277) (0.294)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Identity Identity
Condition Prime Prime
N 747 734 738 725 765 757
AIC 1041 1027 1030 1018 1060 1054
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents
assigned to control (0) or the Violence Prime (1). Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control (0) or
the Identity Prime (1). Models 5 and 6 cover respondents assigned to the Identity Prime (0) or the Violence
Prime (1). Models 1, 3, and 5 only include pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while
Models 2, 4, and 6 include both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status).
Due to some non-response for employment and marital status, models that include post-treatment covariates
have a slightly lower sample size than models that include pre-treatment covariates only. Pre-non-response
(Models 1, 3, and 5), the sample size across all three experimental conditions is 1,125. Post-non-response
(Models 2, 4, and 6), the sample size across all three experimental conditions is 1,108. The reference level
for ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. Standard errors are
in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05
5.4.6 Wording of Survey Questions
After condition assignment, respondents proceeded to a survey question designed to measure
their policy preferences. They were provided with a list of four public policy issues (child
care, education, infrastructure, and policing) and asked to rank them in order of importance.
The exact question wording is presented in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.4: Survey Question Measuring Policy Preferences
Here is a list of some issues that local governments deal with. Please rank these issues






For purposes of interpretation, in the main text and appendix I rescale the ranking so
that “4” corresponds to the most important and “1” the least important issue. By doing so,
positive (negative) treatment effect estimates indicate higher (lower) issue importance for
policing. All respondents agreed to answer this question. Therefore, there is no non-response
across the dependent variable(s).
5.4.7 Distribution of Responses
Table 5.3 shows the distribution of responses across the full sample. Tables 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6
show the distribution of responses across the control condition, the Violence Prime, and the
Identity Prime, respectively. I provide both the number and percentage of respondents that
correspond to each issue–ranking dyad.
Table 5.3: Distribution of Responses across Full Sample
Least Second Least Second Most Most
Important Important Important Important
Child Care 53 (5%) 164 (15%) 357 (32%) 551 (49%)
Education 129 (11%) 413 (37%) 398 (35%) 185 (16%)
Infrastructure 739 (66%) 241 (21%) 88 (8%) 57 (5%)
Policing 204 (18%) 307 (27%) 282 (25%) 332 (30%)
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Table 5.4: Distribution of Responses across Control Condition
Least Second Least Second Most Most
Important Important Important Important
Child Care 17 (5%) 55 (15%) 111 (31%) 177 (49%)
Education 39 (11%) 126 (35%) 136 (38%) 59 (16%)
Infrastructure 234 (65%) 87 (24%) 27 (8%) 12 (3%)
Policing 70 (19%) 92 (26%) 86 (24%) 112 (31%)
Table 5.5: Distribution of Responses across Violence Prime Condition
Least Second Least Second Most Most
Important Important Important Important
Child Care 16 (4%) 59 (15%) 131 (34%) 181 (47%)
Education 48 (12%) 141 (36%) 128 (33%) 70 (18%)
Infrastructure 250 (65%) 74 (19%) 37 (10%) 26 (7%)
Policing 73 (19%) 113 (29%) 91 (24%) 110 (28%)
Table 5.6: Distribution of Responses across Identity Prime Condition
Least Second Least Second Most Most
Important Important Important Important
Child Care 20 (5%) 50 (13%) 115 (30%) 193 (51%)
Education 42 (11%) 146 (39%) 134 (35%) 56 (15%)
Infrastructure 255 (67%) 80 (21%) 24 (6%) 19 (5%)
Policing 61 (16%) 102 (27%) 105 (28%) 110 (29%)
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5.4.8 Treatment Effects Across Moderating Variables
Figure 5.5 presents the results for each of Bosnia’s major ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats,
and Serbs). Figures 5.6 through 5.14 present the results from models where I interact a
binary treatment indicator with a moderating variable. Across all figures, the top panel
compares control (0) to the Violence Prime (1), the middle panel control (0) to the Identity
Prime (1), and the bottom panel the Identity Prime (0) to the Violence Prime (1). Each
figure presents the treatment effect along with the corresponding 95% confidence interval.
The moderating variables are the following:
* Figure 5.6: the wartime casualty rate of the respondent’s municipality of residence.
* Figure 5.7: the respondent’s age.
* Figure 5.8: a binary indicator of whether the respondent reached adult age (18) by the
first year of the war (1992). If the respondent reached adult age by 1992, the moderator
takes a value of 1, 0 otherwise. This moderator distinguishes respondents who experienced
the entire or almost entire war as adults and those who did not.
* Figure 5.9: the standard ethnic fractionalization index (applied at the municipal level).
This index measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in the respon-
dent’s municipality of residence are of different ethnicities.
* Figure 5.10: a modified ethnic fractionalization index (applied at the municipal level).
This index measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in the respon-
dent’s municipality of residence match the respondent’s ethnicity and the ethnicity of the
perpetrating group from the Violence Prime. For Bosniak respondents, this index indicates
the probability that the two randomly selected individuals are composed of a Bosniak and
a Serb. For Croat respondents, this index indicates the probability that the two randomly
selected individuals are composed of a Croat and a Bosniak. For Serb respondents, this
index indicates the probability that the two randomly selected individuals are composed of
a Serb and a Croat.
* Figure 5.11: a modified ethnic fractionalization index (applied at the municipal level).
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This index measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in the respon-
dent’s municipality of residence match the respondent’s ethnicity and that of an out-group
member. For Bosniak respondents, this index indicates the probability that the two ran-
domly selected individuals are composed of a Bosniak and a Croat or Serb. For Croat
respondents, this index indicates the probability that the two randomly selected individuals
are composed of a Croat and a Bosniak or Serb. For Serb respondents, this index indicates
the probability that the two randomly selected individuals are composed of a Serb and a
Bosniak or Croat.
* Figure 5.12: the percentage of the municipal population that is composed of the re-
spondent’s co-ethnics. Following the war, two Bosnian territorial “entities” were created,
Republika Srpska (Serb dominated) and the Federation of BiH (Bosniak and Croat domi-
nated). One Bosnian municipality, Brčko, is not a member of either entity. Policing is more
centralized in Republika Srpska than in the Federation or Brčko, and the entity has also been
slower to integrate local police forces. For these reasons, I also separately present results for
respondents who reside in Republika Srpska (Figure 5.13) and the Federation/Brčko (Figure
5.14).
The results from these additional analyses do not change any of the substantive conclu-
sions reached earlier. Figure 5.5 shows that the treatment effect for the Violence Prime never
reaches statistical significance at the 95% level, regardless of ethnic group, model type, or
comparison condition. Additionally, across all models presented in Figures 5.6 through 5.14,
the interaction between the treatment indicator and the moderating variable does not reach
significance at the 95% level. In sum, I do not find evidence that the treatment effect for
the Violence Prime varies significantly across ethnic groups or any of the other moderating
variables examined in this section.
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Figure 5.5: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences across Ethnic Groups
Bosniaks
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Figure 5.6: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences across Local Violence Severity




















































































































































Figure 5.7: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences across Age











































































































































Figure 5.8: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences across Age Status











































































































































Figure 5.9: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences across Standard Ethnic Fractionalization
Index











































































































































Figure 5.10: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences across Modified Ethnic Fractionalization
Index (Vignette Groups)
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Figure 5.11: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences across Modified Ethnic Fractionalization
Index (Respondent and all Out-Group Members)
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Figure 5.12: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences across Co-Ethnics as Percentage of
Municipal Population











































































































































Figure 5.13: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences across Co-Ethnics as Percentage of
Municipal Population, Respondents from Republika Srpska

























































































































Figure 5.14: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences across Co-Ethnics as Percentage of
Municipal Population, Respondents from FBiH/Brčko

























































































































5.4.9 Full Regression Output for Model Results
This section presents the full regression output for the various models discussed throughout
the main text. For the OLS and ordered probit regressions, the dependent variable is a
4-point scale measuring how important the respondent says policing is as a policy issue,
ranging from “least important” (1) to “most important” (4). For the probit regressions, the
dependent variable is binary and assumes a value of 1 if the respondent ranked policing as
the most important policy issue, 0 otherwise. The main independent variable for each model
is binary and corresponds to the relevant pairwise comparison of experimental conditions.
These tables present the following results:
* Tables 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9 show the full regression output for Figure 5.1. Table 5.7
corresponds to the OLS models, 5.8 the ordered probit models, and 5.9 the probit models.
Model 1 always compares the control condition and the Violence Prime (1 = Violence Prime,
0 = control). Model 2 always compares the control condition and the Identity Prime (1 =
Identity Prime, 0 = control). Finally, Model 3 always compares the Identity Prime and the
Violence Prime (1 = Violence Prime, 0 = Identity Prime).
* Tables 5.10, 5.11, and 5.12 show the full regression output for the models from Figure
5.1 while controlling for respondent characteristics. Table 5.10 corresponds to the OLS
models, 5.11 the ordered probit models, and 5.12 the probit models. Models 1 and 2 always
compare the control condition and the Violence Prime (1 = Violence Prime, 0 = control).
Models 3 and 4 always compare the control condition and the Identity Prime (1 = Identity
Prime, 0 = control). Models 5 and 6 always compare the Identity Prime and the Violence
Prime (1 = Violence Prime, 0 = Identity Prime). Across all tables, Models 1, 3, and 5 only
control for pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models 2, 4,
and 6 control for pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status).
* Tables 5.13, 5.14, and 5.15 replicate the main models from Figure 5.1 while using
survey weights in order to improve the representativeness of the sample. The 2013 Bosnian
census was employed to compute the survey weights. In the computation of the weights, all
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respondent characteristics were included (ethnicity, gender, age, education, marital status,
and employment status). Respondent age was collapsed into a 4-point scale in order to
permit for proper weighing (1 = 18 to 29 years old, 2 = 30 to 49, 3 = 50 to 64, 4 = 65
and older). Additionally, educational attainment was collapsed into 5 categories (from the
original 7) in order to make the categories comparable to the ones that appear on the census.
The tables and models present the results in the same manner as Tables 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9.
* Tables 5.16, 5.17, and 5.18 replicate the main models from Figure 5.1 while (a) using
survey weights and (b) controlling for respondent characteristics. The survey weights were
computed in the same way as described for Tables 5.13 through 5.15. Also, the controls for
respondent age and education reflect the adjusted response categories described above. The
tables and models present the results in the same manner as Tables 5.10, 5.11, and 5.12.
Table 5.7: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences, OLS Models
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3




Constant 2.667∗ 2.667∗ 2.698∗
(0.058) (0.057) (0.055)
Comparison Condition Control Control Identity Prime
N 747 738 765
AIC 2266 2218 2283
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Model 1 covers respondents assigned
to control (N = 360) or the Violence Prime (N = 387), and therefore includes 747 respondents total.
Model 2 covers respondents assigned to control or the Identity Prime (N = 378), and therefore includes 738
respondents total. Model 3 covers respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime, and
therefore includes 765 respondents total. The sample size across all three experimental conditions is 1,125.
The dependent variable captures how important respondents say policing is as a policy issue, measured on a
4-point scale ranging from “least important” (1) to “most important” (4). Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05
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Table 5.8: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences, Ordered Probit Models
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3




Comparison Condition Control Control Identity Prime
N 747 738 765
AIC 2059 2029 2102
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Model 1 covers respondents assigned
to control (N = 360) or the Violence Prime (N = 387), and therefore includes 747 respondents total.
Model 2 covers respondents assigned to control or the Identity Prime (N = 378), and therefore includes 738
respondents total. Model 3 covers respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime, and
therefore includes 765 respondents total. The sample size across all three experimental conditions is 1,125.
The dependent variable captures how important respondents say policing is as a policy issue, measured on a
4-point scale ranging from “least important” (1) to “most important” (4). Standard errors are in parentheses.
Threshold coefficients are not presented. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 5.9: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences, Probit Models
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3




Constant −0.493∗ −0.493∗ −0.550∗
(0.069) (0.069) (0.068)
Comparison Condition Control Control Identity Prime
N 747 738 765
AIC 912 906 922
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Model 1 covers respondents assigned
to control (N = 360) or the Violence Prime (N = 387), and therefore includes 747 respondents total.
Model 2 covers respondents assigned to control or the Identity Prime (N = 378), and therefore includes 738
respondents total. Model 3 covers respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime, and
therefore includes 765 respondents total. The sample size across all three experimental conditions is 1,125.
The dependent variable assumes a value of 1 if the respondent ranked policing as the most important policy
issue, 0 otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 5.10: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences, OLS Models, Controlling for Respondent
Characteristics
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Violence Prime −0.072 −0.067 −0.115 −0.126
(0.080) (0.080) (0.077) (0.077)
Identity Prime 0.038 0.056
(0.079) (0.080)
Croat −0.404∗ −0.434∗ −0.305∗ −0.351∗ −0.398∗ −0.384∗
(0.128) (0.130) (0.128) (0.130) (0.131) (0.133)
Serb −0.262∗ −0.265∗ −0.231∗ −0.256∗ −0.235∗ −0.230∗
(0.086) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.082) (0.083)
Male 0.186∗ 0.177∗ 0.115 0.099 0.148 0.115
(0.081) (0.083) (0.081) (0.084) (0.078) (0.081)
Age 0.007∗ 0.010∗ 0.008∗ 0.009∗ 0.008∗ 0.010∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Education −0.012 −0.016 0.018 0.005 −0.018 −0.012
(0.039) (0.041) (0.039) (0.041) (0.036) (0.038)
Married −0.140 −0.065 −0.047
(0.086) (0.088) (0.085)
Employed 0.100 0.128 0.067
(0.115) (0.114) (0.109)
Unemployed 0.090 0.118 0.149
(0.110) (0.110) (0.106)
Constant 2.460∗ 2.389∗ 2.319∗ 2.279∗ 2.490∗ 2.355∗
(0.251) (0.263) (0.250) (0.262) (0.233) (0.247)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Identity Identity
Condition Prime Prime
N 747 734 738 725 765 757
AIC 2246 2203 2208 2168 2261 2241
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents
assigned to control or the Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Identity Prime. Models 5 and 6 cover respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime.
Models 1, 3, and 5 only control for pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models
2, 4, and 6 control for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). Due
to some non-response for employment and marital status, models that control for post-treatment covariates
have a slightly lower sample size than models that control for pre-treatment covariates only. Pre-non-response
(Models 1, 3, and 5), the sample size across all three experimental conditions is 1,125. Post-non-response
(Models 2, 4, and 6), the sample size across all three experimental conditions is 1,108. The reference level
for ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. The dependent
variable captures how important respondents say policing is as a policy issue, measured on a 4-point scale
ranging from “least important” (1) to “most important” (4). Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 5.11: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences, Ordered Probit Models, Controlling for
Respondent Characteristics
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Violence Prime −0.066 −0.062 −0.111 −0.123
(0.080) (0.080) (0.079) (0.079)
Identity Prime 0.036 0.054
(0.080) (0.081)
Croat −0.416∗ −0.453∗ −0.323∗ −0.374∗ −0.416∗ −0.404∗
(0.129) (0.132) (0.131) (0.133) (0.135) (0.137)
Serb −0.259∗ −0.262∗ −0.232∗ −0.257∗ −0.232∗ −0.227∗
(0.086) (0.087) (0.087) (0.088) (0.084) (0.085)
Male 0.178∗ 0.170∗ 0.110 0.096 0.145 0.112
(0.081) (0.084) (0.081) (0.085) (0.080) (0.083)
Age 0.007∗ 0.010∗ 0.008∗ 0.009∗ 0.008∗ 0.010∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Education −0.008 −0.011 0.022 0.008 −0.016 −0.010
(0.039) (0.041) (0.039) (0.041) (0.037) (0.038)
Married −0.131 −0.061 −0.046
(0.087) (0.088) (0.087)
Employed 0.097 0.126 0.064
(0.115) (0.115) (0.111)
Unemployed 0.090 0.109 0.146
(0.111) (0.110) (0.109)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Identity Identity
Condition Prime Prime
N 747 734 738 725 765 757
AIC 2039 2006 2019 1985 2081 2064
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents
assigned to control or the Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Identity Prime. Models 5 and 6 cover respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime.
Models 1, 3, and 5 only control for pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models
2, 4, and 6 control for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). Due
to some non-response for employment and marital status, models that control for post-treatment covariates
have a slightly lower sample size than models that control for pre-treatment covariates only. Pre-non-response
(Models 1, 3, and 5), the sample size across all three experimental conditions is 1,125. Post-non-response
(Models 2, 4, and 6), the sample size across all three experimental conditions is 1,108. The reference level
for ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. The dependent
variable captures how important respondents say policing is as a policy issue, measured on a 4-point scale
ranging from “least important” (1) to “most important” (4). Standard errors are in parentheses. Threshold
coefficients are not presented. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 5.12: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences, Probit Models, Controlling for
Respondent Characteristics
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Violence Prime −0.107 −0.098 −0.075 −0.094
(0.098) (0.100) (0.098) (0.099)
Identity Prime −0.045 −0.019
(0.098) (0.099)
Croat −0.235 −0.266 −0.081 −0.138 −0.291 −0.269
(0.160) (0.166) (0.157) (0.161) (0.172) (0.175)
Serb −0.275∗ −0.290∗ −0.302∗ −0.339∗ −0.233∗ −0.219∗
(0.108) (0.109) (0.109) (0.111) (0.106) (0.107)
Male 0.256∗ 0.245∗ 0.154 0.129 0.258∗ 0.231∗
(0.100) (0.103) (0.099) (0.104) (0.099) (0.102)
Age 0.009∗ 0.013∗ 0.009∗ 0.011∗ 0.012∗ 0.014∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Education −0.005 −0.0165 0.045 0.025 −0.018 −0.002
(0.048) (0.051) (0.048) (0.051) (0.045) (0.047)
Married −0.111 −0.072 −0.067
(0.107) (0.109) (0.108)
Employed 0.168 0.199 0.014
(0.145) (0.142) (0.141)
Unemployed 0.225 0.173 0.161
(0.139) (0.139) (0.137)
Constant −0.873∗ −1.030∗ −1.053∗ −1.129∗ −0.965∗ −1.132∗
(0.310) (0.330) (0.309) (0.328) (0.297) (0.317)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Identity Identity
Condition Prime Prime
N 747 734 738 725 765 757
AIC 899 880 899 884 903 899
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents
assigned to control or the Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Identity Prime. Models 5 and 6 cover respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime.
Models 1, 3, and 5 only control for pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models
2, 4, and 6 control for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). Due
to some non-response for employment and marital status, models that control for post-treatment covariates
have a slightly lower sample size than models that control for pre-treatment covariates only. Pre-non-response
(Models 1, 3, and 5), the sample size across all three experimental conditions is 1,125. Post-non-response
(Models 2, 4, and 6), the sample size across all three experimental conditions is 1,108. The reference level for
ethnicity is Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. The dependent variable
assumes a value of 1 if the respondent ranked policing as the most important policy issue, 0 otherwise.
Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 5.13: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences, OLS Models, Using Survey
Weights
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3




Constant 2.676∗ 2.699∗ 2.700∗
(0.067) (0.066) (0.065)
Comparison Condition Control Control Identity Prime
N 734 725 757
AIC 2357 2304 2416
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Model 1 covers respondents assigned to
control or the Violence Prime. Model 2 covers respondents assigned to control or the Identity Prime. Model
3 covers respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime. All respondent characteristics
(ethnicity, gender, age, education, marital status, employment status) were used in the computation of
survey weights. Therefore, due to mild non-response for marital and employment status, 17 observations are
dropped across the entire sample (resulting in a sample size of 1,108 across all three experimental conditions).
The dependent variable captures how important respondents say policing is as a policy issue, measured on a
4-point scale ranging from “least important” (1) to “most important” (4). Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05
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Table 5.14: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences, Ordered Probit Models,
Using Survey Weights
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3




Comparison Condition Control Control Identity Prime
N 734 725 757
AIC 2022 1982 2081
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Model 1 covers respondents assigned to
control or the Violence Prime. Model 2 covers respondents assigned to control or the Identity Prime. Model
3 covers respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime. All respondent characteristics
(ethnicity, gender, age, education, marital status, employment status) were used in the computation of
survey weights. Therefore, due to mild non-response for marital and employment status, 17 observations are
dropped across the entire sample (resulting in a sample size of 1,108 across all three experimental conditions).
The dependent variable captures how important respondents say policing is as a policy issue, measured on a
4-point scale ranging from “least important” (1) to “most important” (4). Standard errors are in parentheses.
Threshold coefficients are not presented. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 5.15: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences, Probit Models, Using Survey
Weights
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3




Constant −0.513∗ −0.501∗ −0.536∗
(0.082) (0.083) (0.081)
Comparison Condition Control Control Identity Prime
N 734 725 757
AIC 886 893 913
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Model 1 covers respondents assigned to
control or the Violence Prime. Model 2 covers respondents assigned to control or the Identity Prime. Model
3 covers respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime. All respondent characteristics
(ethnicity, gender, age, education, marital status, employment status) were used in the computation of
survey weights. Therefore, due to mild non-response for marital and employment status, 17 observations are
dropped across the entire sample (resulting in a sample size of 1,108 across all three experimental conditions).
The dependent variable assumes a value of 1 if the respondent ranked policing as the most important policy
issue, 0 otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 5.16: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences, OLS Models, Controlling for Respondent
Characteristics, Using Survey Weights
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Violence Prime −0.110 −0.114 −0.126 −0.128
(0.091) (0.091) (0.092) (0.092)
Identity Prime 0.019 0.016
(0.090) (0.091)
Croat −0.286 −0.289 −0.284 −0.283 −0.362∗ −0.365∗
(0.148) (0.149) (0.160) (0.161) (0.154) (0.153)
Serb −0.256∗ −0.265∗ −0.233∗ −0.245∗ −0.241∗ −0.246∗
(0.103) (0.104) (0.096) (0.100) (0.101) (0.101)
Male 0.195∗ 0.185 0.120 0.093 0.103 0.068
(0.092) (0.095) (0.094) (0.097) (0.097) (0.101)
Age 0.172∗ 0.195∗ 0.145∗ 0.162∗ 0.150∗ 0.187∗
(0.049) (0.055) (0.050) (0.055) (0.048) (0.056)
Education −0.002 −0.007 −0.004 −0.026 −0.017 −0.037
(0.065) (0.070) (0.058) (0.062) (0.063) (0.065)
Married −0.104 −0.034 −0.086
(0.100) (0.099) (0.101)
Employed 0.068 0.138 0.171
(0.128) (0.126) (0.122)
Unemployed 0.062 0.075 0.190
(0.124) (0.126) (0.122)
Constant 2.316∗ 2.317∗ 2.422∗ 2.445∗ 2.496∗ 2.466∗
(0.303) (0.305) (0.282) (0.287) (0.294) (0.299)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Identity Identity
Condition Prime Prime
N 734 734 725 725 757 757
AIC 2334 2338 2290 2295 2396 2398
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents
assigned to control or the Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Identity Prime. Models 5 and 6 cover respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime.
Models 1, 3, and 5 only control for pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models
2, 4, and 6 control for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). All
respondent characteristics were used in the computation of survey weights. Therefore, due to mild non-
response for marital and employment status, 17 observations are dropped across the entire sample (resulting
in a sample size of 1,108 across all three experimental conditions). The reference level for ethnicity is
Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. The dependent variable captures
how important respondents say policing is as a policy issue, measured on a 4-point scale ranging from “least
important” (1) to “most important” (4). Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 5.17: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences, Ordered Probit Models, Controlling for
Respondent Characteristics, Using Survey Weights
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Violence Prime −0.110 −0.114 −0.125 −0.127
(0.092) (0.092) (0.094) (0.094)
Identity Prime 0.018 0.015
(0.093) (0.093)
Croat −0.294 −0.298 −0.309 −0.308 −0.376∗ −0.379∗
(0.154) (0.155) (0.168) (0.170) (0.158) (0.158)
Serb −0.253∗ −0.262∗ −0.237∗ −0.250∗ −0.241∗ −0.245∗
(0.103) (0.104) (0.097) (0.098) (0.102) (0.102)
Male 0.183 0.171 0.119 0.091 0.097 0.063
(0.094) (0.097) (0.097) (0.099) (0.100) (0.103)
Age 0.175∗ 0.197∗ 0.146∗ 0.162∗ 0.150∗ 0.185∗
(0.050) (0.056) (0.053) (0.058) (0.049) (0.057)
Education 0.011 0.004 0.004 −0.021 −0.008 −0.028
(0.065) (0.070) (0.058) (0.063) (0.063) (0.067)
Married −0.091 −0.029 −0.079
(0.101) (0.101) (0.103)
Employed 0.073 0.144 0.166
(0.129) (0.131) (0.126)
Unemployed 0.068 0.069 0.186
(0.126) (0.128) (0.126)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Identity Identity
Condition Prime Prime
N 734 734 725 725 757 757
AIC 1999 2004 1969 1973 2062 2064
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents
assigned to control or the Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Identity Prime. Models 5 and 6 cover respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime.
Models 1, 3, and 5 only control for pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models
2, 4, and 6 control for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). All
respondent characteristics were used in the computation of survey weights. Therefore, due to mild non-
response for marital and employment status, 17 observations are dropped across the entire sample (resulting
in a sample size of 1,108 across all three experimental conditions). The reference level for ethnicity is
Bosniak. The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. The dependent variable captures
how important respondents say policing is as a policy issue, measured on a 4-point scale ranging from “least
important” (1) to “most important” (4). Standard errors are in parentheses. Threshold coefficients are not
presented. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 5.18: Safety Threat and Policy Preferences, Probit Models, Controlling for
Respondent Characteristics, Using Survey Weights
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Violence Prime −0.108 −0.109 −0.080 −0.081
(0.114) (0.115) (0.116) (0.116)
Identity Prime −0.010 −0.015
(0.117) (0.117)
Croat −0.097 −0.091 −0.073 −0.057 −0.277 −0.266
(0.178) (0.180) (0.182) (0.183) (0.196) (0.195)
Serb −0.225 −0.230 −0.306∗ −0.318∗ −0.193 −0.192
(0.125) (0.126) (0.132) (0.131) (0.124) (0.124)
Male 0.259∗ 0.239∗ 0.171 0.129 0.207 0.192
(0.113) (0.117) (0.113) (0.117) (0.115) (0.120)
Age 0.208∗ 0.231∗ 0.160∗ 0.181∗ 0.161∗ 0.177∗
(0.060) (0.068) (0.063) (0.072) (0.060) (0.071)
Education 0.048 0.025 0.081 0.047 −0.011 −0.020
(0.076) (0.081) (0.082) (0.088) (0.076) (0.079)
Married −0.011 0.025 0.002
(0.126) (0.127) (0.126)
Employed 0.126 0.202 0.062
(0.157) (0.160) (0.159)
Unemployed 0.160 0.132 0.170
(0.150) (0.153) (0.152)
Constant −1.231∗ −1.251∗ −1.178∗ −1.181∗ −0.877∗ −0.919∗
(0.375) (0.383) (0.387) (0.399) (0.371) (0.382)
Comparison Control Control Control Control Identity Identity
Condition Prime Prime
N 734 734 725 725 757 757
AIC 872 877 884 888 904 909
Note: I subset the data in order to compare experimental conditions. Models 1 and 2 cover respondents
assigned to control or the Violence Prime. Models 3 and 4 cover respondents assigned to control or the
Identity Prime. Models 5 and 6 cover respondents assigned to the Identity Prime or the Violence Prime.
Models 1, 3, and 5 only control for pre-treatment covariates (ethnicity, gender, age, education), while Models
2, 4, and 6 control for both pre- and post-treatment covariates (marital status, employment status). All
respondent characteristics were used in the computation of survey weights. Therefore, due to mild non-
response for marital and employment status, 17 observations are dropped across the entire sample (resulting
in a sample size of 1,108 across all three experimental conditions). The reference level for ethnicity is Bosniak.
The reference level for employment status is Not in labor force. The dependent variable assumes a value of
1 if the respondent ranked policing as the most important policy issue, 0 otherwise. Standard errors are in
parentheses. ∗p < 0.05
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine how rhetoric that references past inter-
group violence affects a number of important social and political outcomes. The findings I
presented show that reminding individuals of past violence and conflict can shift perceptions
with respect to some outcomes (attitudes toward out-groups, ethnic party affinity) but not
others (attitudes toward co-ethnics who associate with out-groups, multi-ethnic party affinity,
policy preferences). While this dissertation helps us achieve a better understanding of social
and political dynamics in post-conflict societies, it also poses as many questions it answers.
In these concluding remarks, I propose several open questions that require additional work
and that may prove to be fruitful avenues for further research.
First, as noted several times throughout the dissertation, my primary objective when
designing the Violence Prime was to have it reflect certain features that are common in
real-world rhetoric about past violence. First, the prime emphasizes the themes of suffering
and victimhood. Additionally, because ethnic violence is inherently relational (there is a
perpetrator and a victim), the wording also “points the finger” at a specific out-group. While
I believe these design choices made the prime more realistic, the study is still conducted in
an experimental setting, and therefore, questions about external validity naturally arise. An
examination of whether these dynamics apply outside of an experimental context and that
uses real-world observational data would be a worthwhile endeavor.
Researchers may also want to delve into whether the content of the rhetoric matters. For
instance, should we expect the themes that rhetoric stresses (i.e., victimization vs. recon-
ciliation, retribution vs. forgiveness) to produce heterogeneous effects for important social
and political outcomes? Also, while this may seem rare in many post-conflict societies,
what effects should we expect from rhetoric or messaging that acknowledges the misdeeds
of the in-group? If citizens are exposed to messaging that references the violence that was
committed by co-ethnics, could that actually improve perceptions of out-group members?
Answering these questions remains a task for future work.
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Another topic that deserves further attention is whether the effects I detect in this dis-
sertation recede over time. More specifically, will the ability for references to past violence to
affect attitudes toward out-group members or ethnic parties diminish as war memories fade?
The null findings I present for policy preferences suggest that this could be the case for some
outcomes at least. However, there are other studies that indicate violence committed even
in the distant past can have strikingly durable effects on attitudes and behavior. Further
examining the temporal dimension can help add additional nuance to what I present here.
Also, are the effects moderated by public attempts to mend the wounds of war? Some
post-conflict societies and governments have more aggressively tried to foster inter-ethnic
reconciliation than have others. With respect to how recalling past violence shapes views of
out-groups, should we expect the the results to vary depending on whether the governments
of post-conflict countries have made reconciliation an important priority? For instance, the
second substantive chapter suggests that reintegration may be an effective way of achieving
reconciliation. Future work should take up this implication more directly.
Finally, researchers should also examine how much of what I present in this dissertation
can be extended to post-conflict societies where the cleavage structure was not ethnic (e.g.,
left vs. right, center vs. periphery). What if political or ideological allegiance (rather than
ethnicity) determined who committed the violence and against whom? In that type of
setting, where citizens lack a convenient heuristic like ethnicity, how does recalling past
violence shape trust in other citizens? It could be the case that in this context, rhetoric about
past violence does not affect social relations because citizens cannot attribute culpability or
allegiance to somebody as easily as in ethnically diverse societies that experienced ethnic civil
war. Alternatively, reminding individuals of past violence may engender negative attitudes
across the board and toward everyone who is not already close to you given the uncertainty
over which “side” somebody identified with during the conflict. I see this as potentially the
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